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	 This dissertation is the achievement of a decade-long exploration and thinking. 
When I was a two-year master student in the Institute of Sociology, National Tsing Hua 
University (NTHU) in 2009, I found that my term paper discussing how Taiwan Railways 
Administration’s Tamsui Branch Line became the Red Line of Taipei Metro might have 
potential to be extended as a master’s thesis. My advisor at that time, Professor Wu 
Chyuan-Yuan, agreed with my idea and encouraged me to write the thesis about the 
Taipei Metro so that I started my research on the history of the Taipei Metro. However, 
after I began to write the thesis, I found that I am swamped with the historical and 
theoretical complexity of this topic. Firstly, there was no comprehensive history writing 
about the metro system in Taiwan’s capital, although the Taipei Metro already became a 
vital part of Taipei. Moreover, the metro system involved so many political and 
technological controversies that many historical materials became too sensitive to 
access. Notably, many of the controversies included not only local politics but also an 
international one. Finally, writing a historical and sociological thesis about a technological 
system in a catching-up country like Taiwan forced me to touch the intellectual issues 
which cost many scholars’ talent and efforts for even more arguments. As a master 
student in the age of early twenties, I cannot handle this complicated topic with 
satisfaction. One of the committee members of my master’s thesis told me, “I really 
admire your courage to choose this difficult topic as your thesis!” Then, he turned to 
Professor Wu, “I also admire the advisor who is willing to let his student do so!”

	 After I graduated from NTHU, many questions about the Taipei Metro’s history 
occupied my mind. How has Taiwan’s international status influenced Taiwan’s metro 
systems? Where are the evidence which can prove the U.S. government did intervene in 
the project of Taipei Metro? Why are the cases of the Taipei Metro or other technological 
systems in Taiwan special? What is the uniqueness of the technology in Taiwan? Although 
I had worked for one year in Taichung City Government as a serviceman and for a 
technology corporation, these questions had accompanied me in these years. When I 
discussed my doctoral studies plan with Professor Wu, these questions were critical 
issues in our conversation. As a sociologist concentrating on the history of technology in 
Taiwan, Professor Wu also focused on similar issues. For me, to find answers to the 
questions and to write a better history for the Taipei Metro was the most crucial goal to 
study in the U.S., and the Georgia Tech became the best place for me to reach the goal. 
Five years passed, and I hand this dissertation as the answers to the questions 
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accompanying with me for over ten years. However, without many people’s help, I cannot 
complete this job.

	 First, I need to thank my advisor, John Krige, sincerely for his assistance, 
profession, and endless passion for advising his graduate students. His works inspired 
me to combine diplomatic history and the history of technology for writing the history of 
Taiwan’s rail mass transportation systems. He was one of the key reasons why I chose 
Georgia Tech. His teaching and advising have shown how a scholar and a teacher should 
be, and, during the process of working with him, I received solid training to be a scholar in 
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toward his research and teaching while providing helpful care to his student. I am proud 
of being his first Taiwanese doctoral student and the last one before his retirement. 

	 Second, I want to thank the committee members of my dissertation for their 
contribution to this research. Professor Hanchao Lu did not only help me as the 
committee member but also gave me continuous advice and care for these years. His 
view of social history inspires me to write chapter 7 of this dissertation, making this 
research include users into it. Besides my doctoral study, he also broadened my 
knowledge and vision about China no matter for historical works or for the country itself. 
Profess Eric Schatzberg provided many useful opinions for my dissertation, especially his 
opinion about the idea of technological systems when the committee was reviewing my 
proposal. Professor Daniel Amsterdam brought his view of urban history, providing a 
helpful direction to me to refine this dissertation. I am delighted to receive the 
encouragement from these two scholars making me more confident with this dissertation. 
Dr. Michelle Fei-Yu Hsieh helped me to clarify my direction of organizing my materials with 
her sociologist perspective. Her comparative works also provided me a larger scale to 
locate my study of metro systems. Furthermore, I have to thank her for being a member 
of the committee as Professor Wu left us in sudden.

	 Many metro engineers and retired technical officials contributed very much to this 
dissertation, especially the ten interviewees. Their whole career life and profession built 
fantastic metro and railway systems for Taiwanese, and their passion and experience 
helped me to write the history of the Taipei Metro. I want to send my great thank to Dr. 
Hwang Ti-Chang. Dr. Hwang enabled me to reach many metro engineers and technical 
officials, making the interviews possible. Moreover, he also provided me plentiful materials 
and helpful suggestions for my study. I learned a lot about the technical knowledge of 
metro systems from him, so he was like another advisor in my field. The following 
institutes and their staffs also contributed to the materials collection of this dissertation. 
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was another outstanding teacher of sociology, whom I learned much. In these five years, 
Bill had helped me to live my studying aboard life smoothly. Thank Xinchen, Elise, 
Alejandra, Jonah, Alice, Mario, Chris, and Renee for their friendship and supports. I will 
really miss my time of being in the office with them. As a Taiwanese student in a city 
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historical works built a role model of being a sociologist and historian of technology. Even 
VI
in the last weeks of his life, he still dedicated his profession and efforts to making this 
dissertation better as a member of the committee reviewing my proposal. I am lucky 
enough to have him as my teacher, but not fortunate enough to have him longer. Without 
him, I cannot complete this dissertation.   
VII
List of Figures 
Figure 2.1: Taiwan’s Railways in the 1920s (left)	 36

Figure 2.2: Taiwan’s Railways in 1955 (right)	 36

Figure 2.3: The Xiluo Bridge	 44

Figure 2.4: The MacArthur Thruway	 45

Figure 2.5: The type CT 270 locomotive purchased with the U.S. Aid	46

Figure 4.1: The Railways in Taipei before 1988	 81

Figure 4.2: A level crossing damaged by a bus in Taipei City in 1971	 84

Figure 4.3: The Route of the Tamsui Line Railway	 94

Figure 4.4: The Research Report for the Tamsui Line Issue	 95

Figure 4.5: The Tamsui Line Railway in the 1980s	 97

Figure 4.6: The Range of the Mass Transportation Planning for Taipei 
Metropolitan	 102

Figure 4.7: The metro network recommended by the DEC	 106

Figure 4.8: The DEC’s conceptual design of the Taipei Main Station.	114

Figure 4.9: The lobby of the Taipei Main Station	 116

Figure 4.10: The appearance of the Taipei Main Station	 117

Figure 5.1: Taipei Metropolitan	 126

Figure 5.2: Traffic Congestion in Taipei in 1983.	 127

Figure 5.3: The network of Taipei Metro	 131

Figure 5.4: The metro networks recommended by the BMTC (left)	 132

Figure 5.5: The metro networks recommended by the DEC (right)	 132

Figure 5.6: The first phase network of the Taipei Metro recommended by the 
TTC	 139

Figure 5.7: The Planning Manuals of the DORTS	 148

Figure 5.8: The Planning Manuals of the DORTS	 148

Figure 6.1: The Recommended Extensive Network by the TTC.	 158

Figure 6.2: The Map of the Taipei Metro and its Future Vision	 165

Figure 6.3: The Xinbeitou Station	 167

Figure 6.4: The Jiantan Station	 168

Figure 6.5: The Pandrol Fastener	 169

Figure 6.6: The Vossloh Fastener	 169

VIII
Figure 6.7: The Track Arrangement without Cross-platform Interchange	173

Figure 6.8: The Track Arrangement with Cross-platform Interchange	174

Figure 6.9: The Picture in the Bombardier’s Technical Proposal	 178

Figure 6.10: The Exterior View Plan in the URC’s Technical Proposal	178

Figure 6.11: and 6.12: The Name Plates on the Trains Type C301	 178

Figure 6.13: The American Style Underground Mall on the Red Line	182

Figure 6.14: The Japanese Style Underground Mall next to the Taipei Main 
Station	 182

Figure 7.1: Sumitomo’s technical proposal of the NTS.	 194

Figure 7.2: Mitsui’s booklet in Chinese within its technical proposal of the 
Monorail	 195

Figure 7.3: The UTDC’s technical proposal of the Skytrain.	 195

Figure 7.4: The GEC’s technical proposal	 196

Figure 7.5:  Westinghouse’ technical proposal	 196

Figure 7.6: Matra’s technical proposal. Note how the program controls a 
train.	 197

Figure 7.7: The communication design of two married-pairs in the VAL256	
200

Figure 7.8: the Matra’s train (right) and Bombardier’s train (left)	 212

Figure 8.1: the Taiwanese opera star, Sun Tsui-feng (right), demonstrated 
how to take escalators.	 223

Figure 8.2: the screenshot of the video for the Metro Culture Festival in 2013.	
225

Figure 8.3: the rebuilt elevated TRA Taichung Station	 230

Figure 8.4: THSR’s propaganda of etiquettes on the train.”	 231

Figure 8.5: the president of the TRSC. The calligraphy says “National trains 
made by nationals.”	 233

Figure 8.6: the Formosa Boulevard Station	 238
IX
List of Tables 
Table 3.1: the members of the UN Advisor Group	 58

Table 4.1: The Growth of Population of Taipei City	 82

Table 5.1: The members of the USTTG	 137
X
Acronyms and Names 
	 This dissertation mentions many names and acronyms of institutes, technology, 
companies, and technical terms, and many of them are Chinese or Japanese. Hence, this 
appendix provides explanations and references for the names and acronyms in this 
dissertation. For readers’ convenience, the references are in the form of charts listing the 
acronyms, full names, and their Chinese or Japanese. I also classify the charts into 
institutes, companies, and technology. The companies, institutes, and technology from 
America and Europe had their Chinese names in Taiwan’s archives and my interviews, so I 
also list their Chinese names in the charts.
Governments and Institutes:
Acronym Full Name Chiese
R.O.C. Republic of China 中華⺠國
PRC People Republic of China 中華⼈⺠共和國
AIT American Institute in Taiwan 美國在台協會
FATPA France Aisa Trade Promotion Association 法亞貿易促進會
KMT Kuomintang/Chinese Nationalist Party 中國國⺠黨
CCP Chiese Communist Party 中國共產黨
PLA People’s Liberation Army 中國⼈⺠解放軍
DPP Democratic Progressive Party ⺠主進步黨
Executive Yuan Executive Yuan 中華⺠國⾏政院
CUSA Council for United States Aid ⾏政院美援運⽤委員會
CIECD Council for International Economic Cooperation 
and Development
⾏政院國際經濟合作發展委員會
EPC Economic Planning Council ⾏政院經濟設計委員會
CEPD Council for Economic Planning and Development ⾏政院經濟建設委員會
NDC National Development Council ⾏政院國家發展委員會
SAFED Sino-American Fund for Economic and Social 
Development
⾏政院中美經濟社會發展基⾦
JCRR Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction
中國農村復興聯合委員會
MND Ministry of National Defense 中華⺠國國防部
MOTC Ministry of Transportation and Communications 中華⺠國交通部
TRA Taiwan Railways Administration 交通部台灣鐵路管理局
XI
UHDC Urban and Housing Development Committee 都市建設與住宅計畫⼩組
TPB Transportation Planning Board 交通部運輸計畫委員會
IOT Institute of Transportation 交通部運輸研究所
NTCU National Chiao Tung University 國立交通⼤學
NCKU National Cheng Kung University 國立成功⼤學
TMRT Taipei Mass Rapid Transit Group, TPB 運輸計畫委員會捷運⼩組
TMCTS Taipei Medium Capacity Transit System Group 臺北市政府中運量⼩組
TRUPO Office of Taipei Railway Underground Project 交通部台北市區地下鐵路⼯程處
RRB Railway Reconstruction Bureau 交通部鐵路改建⼯程局
DORTS Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City 
Government
臺北市政府捷運⼯程局
TRTC Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation 臺北⼤眾捷運股份有限公司
USTTG United States-Taiwan Transit Group 美台捷運⼩組





Acronym Full Name Chiese or Japanese
DEC Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting 德國鐵路顧問司
PCI Pacific Consultants International パシフィックコンサルタンツ株式
会社
SOFRETU Société française d'études et de réalisations de 
transports urbains
法國SOFRETU集團
RATP Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens 法國RATP集團
P&B Parsons & Brinckerhoff 派森斯公司
DMJM Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall 鼎捷⼯程顧問公司
BMTC British Mass Transit Consultants 英國⼤眾捷運顧問司
TTC Taipei Transit Consultants 台北捷運顧問司
ATC American Transit Consultants 美國捷運顧問司





CTCI CTCI Group 中鼎⼯程股份有限公司
BES BES Group 中華⼯程股份有限公司
MAA MAA Group 亞新⼯程顧問股份有限公司
KHI Kawasaki Heavy Industries 川崎重⼯業株式会社
URC Union Rail Car Partnership 美國聯合鐵路機⾞集團
GEC General Electric Company 英國通⽤電器公司
XIII
GRS General Railway Signal Company 美國GRS公司
UTDC Urban Transportation Development Corporation 加拿⼤UTDC公司
KMG Kaku Morin Group 郭茂林グループ
TRSC Taiwan Rolling Stocks Corporation 台灣⾞輛股份有限公司
Companies
Full Name Chiese or JapaneseAcronym
XIV
Metro and Technology
Acronym Full Name Chiese or Japanese
MRT Mass Rapid Transit ⼤眾捷運系統
AGT Automated Guideway Transit ⾃動導軌捷運系統
RRT Railway Rapid Transit 鐵路捷運系統
MCTS Medium Capacity Transit System 中運量捷運系統
LRT Light Rail Transit 輕軌捷運系統
BRT Bus Rapid Transit 公⾞捷運系統
CBTC Communication-Based Train Control 通訊式列⾞控制
ATO Automatic Train Operation ⾃動列⾞作業系統
ATC Automatic Train Control ⾃動列⾞控制系統
UPS Uninterruptible Power System 不斷電系統
TLA Transmission Line Assembly 傳輸線路組
VAL Véhicule Automatique Léger Null
APM Automated People Mover Null
NTS Newtran System/New Transport System 新交通システム
KRTS Kaohsiung Rapid Transit System ⾼雄捷運系統
BART Bay Area Rapid Transit 舊⾦⼭灣區捷運系統
WMATA Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 華盛頓捷運系統
MARTA Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority 亞特蘭⼤捷運系統
RIT Rede Integrada de Transporte Null
JTA Jacksonville Transportation Authority Null
XV
Summary 
	  This dissertation discusses how a complex rail mass transportation emerged in 
postwar Taiwan, with particular emphasis on the role of  U.S.-Taiwan relations in shaping 
Taiwan's profession of transportation studies and planning, and the subterranean railway 
project in Taipei, as well as the Taipei Metro. Two main interrelated theoretical innovations 
characterize this project. Firstly, I situate the evolution of the system in a global context. 
This is dominated in the 1950s and 1960s by American hegemony that "imposes" an 
'American model" on Taiwan in the transportation study and planning phase in a Cold War 
context beginning with the Korean War. US President Nixon's tilt to mainland China in the 
1970s opened a space for Taiwanese stakeholders to shop around for consultants and 
technology in different countries and led to the acquisition of very different types of 
hardware, to the consideration of different ways of laying out the tracks to facilitate 
passenger comfort, and even to different concepts for the huge central station to respect 
local customs. Facing a huge trade deficit with the U.S. in the 1980s, Washington then 
tried to impose a ‘Buy America’ policy on Taiwan, only to find that the local officials were 
now confident enough to push back against proposals made by U.S. consultants. 

	 Secondly, I introduce and analyze the concept of technological hybridity to capture 
the rich complexity of this "large technological system.” Thinking about the Taipei Metro 
as a multi-dimensional hybrid system that is also engaged in the project of nation-building 
obliges me to ask: in what sense can it be regarded as a national project? I suggest that 
the national achievement lies in the capacity to integrate these multiple hybridities into a 
smoothly functioning technical system that is the pride of local authorities, the 
government, and the people of Taiwan.

	 Technological hybridity means the coexistence of knowledge, artifacts, and 
ideology coming from different nation-states in a technological system. However, we need 
to limit the use of the idea to particular conditions to give it any analytical weight. First, 
when hybridity redefines or changes the functions and meanings of the technology. 
Second, when hybridity mixes different political and technological ideologies even if they 
differ sharply from each other. Third, when hybridity reverses or at least changes the 
power relations between the stronger and the weaker partners. This dissertation aims to 
explain why and how hybridity occurred by analyzing the temporal-spatial environment, 




	 Finally, this dissertation also discusses how people maintain and manage the 
systems and how users have used them. Taiwanese technical officials and Taiwanese 
people have built a "Formosa technological sublime," a concept derived from David Nye's 
American technological sublime, to exhibit Taiwan's collective morality and nationality by 
building and displaying a spectacular technological system. The Taiwanese do not have a 
techno-nationalist attitude towards the rail mass transportation system, which 
emphasizes the nation's originality in technological innovation. Rather, they treat the 
metro and even the high speed rail system as emblems of a modern nation, as materials 
from which to construct a newly emerging Taiwanese national identity. 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Chapter 1: Introduction 
American Hegemony, Technological Hybridity, 
National Pride, and the History of Taiwan’s Rail 
Transportation Systems after WWII

“Metro system is the crystal of modern technology, and even those advanced countries continue to 
develop and study it. However, this construction is still pioneering although we already reach top 
level worldwide in many engineering fields and technologies; but, on metro system’s planning, 
designing, construction, operation, and management, especially on electromechanical engineering, 
we rely on the latest knowledge and experience of advanced countries. Hence, introducing the best 




國際上興建捷運統的最佳技術，變列為本局的首要工作。)”  Chi Pao-Cheng (齊寶錚), 1987. 1
“Knowledge that is so closely tied up with national economic and military competitiveness can only 
flow across borders if the states concerned see good reasons for it to do so. International 
collaboration transcends national boundaries, but it doesn’t dissolve national interests. On the 
contrary, it is one strategy among others for pursuing national interests, at least in domains, such as 
space and the nuclear, that constituted the core state power after World War II. ” John Krige, 2014. 2
 Chi, Pao-cheng 齊寶錚, The Plan and Construction of the Taipei Metro《台北都會區捷運系統的1
籌劃與建設》, (Taipei: KMT, 1987), Pp. 7.
 Krige, John, “Embedding the National in the Global: US-French Relationships in Space Science 2
and Rocketry in the 1960s” in Science and Technology in the Global Cold War edited by Naomi 
Oreskes and John Krige (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), Pp. 229.
1
A National Metro 
	 Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan, is today a bustling city of 2.6 million inhabitants 
spread over 272 square kilometers.  If we include the population living in New Taipei City  3
(新北市) we have Taiwan’s largest metropolitan area with over 6 million people. They are 
served by a number of subterranean railways and a metro system that carries 789 million 
passengers per year . This system comprises a complex network of six lines that criss-4
cross the city from north to south and east to west, many of which intersect in the huge 
Taipei Main Station. Since Taipei is the capital city and the largest metropolitan area of 
Taiwan, the metro system has becomes a symbol of this new emerging nation-state so 
that the system is not only a system for the city but also for the whole country. It has been 
gradually put together over three decades after a long phase of planning that began in the 
late 1960s early 1970s. Hence the fundamental question of this dissertation: how have 
the rail mass transportation systems in Taipei become what they are today? This thesis 
analyzes that historical development with particular attention to the political and 
bureaucratic processes that shaped the technological choices that produced the system 
that we have. While inspired by Thomas Hughes’s analysis of large technical systems, it 
differs importantly by historicizing the evolution of the ‘hardware’ that is constitutive of its 
core, and that only acquires its ‘momentum’ in the 1990s.

	 Two main interrelated theoretical innovations characterize this project. Firstly,  I 
situate the evolution of the system in a global context. This is dominated in the 1950s and 
1960s by American hegemony that “imposes” an ‘American model” agenda on Taiwan in 
the transportation study and planning phase based on the Cold War configuration set by 
the Korean War. US President Nixon’s tilt to mainland China in the 1970s opened a space 
for Taiwanese stakeholders to shop around for consultants and technology in different 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK) and led to the acquisition of very 
different types of hardware, to the consideration of different ways of laying out the tracks 
to facilitate passenger comfort, and even to different concepts for the huge central station 
to respect local customs.  

 New Taipei City is the largest city in Taiwan with about 4 million people surrounding Taipei City. It 3
was reformed as New Taipei City from Taipei County in 2010 due to the administration reformation 
of local governments. 
 In 2019.4
2
	 Secondly, I introduce and analyze the concept of technological hybridity to capture 
the rich complexity  (at many different levels ) of this “large technological system.”  These 
types of hybridity are the hybridity of knowledge, the hybridity of functions and styles, and 
the hybridity of systems. Thinking about the Taipei Metro as a hybrid system that is also 
engaged in the project of nation building obliges me to ask: in what sense can it be 
regarded as a national project? I suggest that the national achievement lies in the 
capacity to integrate these multiple hybridities into a smoothly functioning technical 
system that is the pride of local authorities, the government, and the people of Taiwan. 

	 In the remainder of this introduction, I fill out this theoretical framework in more 
detail, describe my methodology, and then summarize the content of each chapter.  A 
brief epilog suggests further questions for research. 

Metro, a Global System 
	 Metro, or urban rail transportation system, is undoubtedly that kind of 
technological system described by historian of technology Thomas Hughes. Hughes  
states: “Technological systems contain messy, complex, problem-solving components.” 
In addition, “they are both socially constructed and society shaping. “ Metro, as a kind of 5
technological system, has physical components, such as rails, concrete structures, trains, 
stations, central train control centers, and power supply systems. It also includes 
organizations, such as manufacturing firms, utility companies, sometimes investment 
banks, and governments, and they incorporate components usually labeled scientific, 
such as books, articles, and university teaching and research programs. Legislative 
artifacts, such as regulatory laws, can also be part of technological systems like metro . A 6
metro system integrates these different technical, institutional, and ideological contents 
into a complex social transport facility pursuing particular goals and functions. For 
example, moving passengers inside or outside of a city, developing a new urban plan, 
incubating related industries, and forming a political, cultural, or social order—that is to 
say, building a new form of life.

	 In this sense, a history of building a metro system is like Hughes’ “system building” 
studies. In Hughes’ studies of power systems in American and European cities, he uses 
the metaphor of “reverse salient” to describe how system builders solved the problem of 
 Hughes, P. Thomas, “The Evolution of Large Technological Systems” in The Social Construction 5
of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology edited by 
Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, Anniversary Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2012), Pp.45. 
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making systems work. The metaphor is appropriate because an advancing military 
exhibits many of the irregularities and unpredictable qualities of an evolving technological 
system. In the case of a technological system, inventors, engineers, and other 
professionals dedicate their creative and constructive powers to correcting reverse 
salients so that the system can function optimally and fulfill system goals . Building a 7
metro system involves unpredictability and its development is evolutionary so that 
Hughes’ concept can also apply to the actual process  of building a metro system. 
Taiwanese scholar, Chang Kuo-Hui (張國暉), takes Hughes’ approach to analyze how 
Taiwanese introduced the VAL (Véhicule Automatique Léger) system from France to 
Taiwan. Chang finds that VAL’s technological momentum triggered a series of deeper 
problems that were embedded within the context of Taiwan’s developmental and 
authoritative state. He goes on to argue that Taiwanese engineers played a critical role in 
the mutual reshaping of the imported large technology system and local infrastructural 
construction network. The building or transplanting of a metro system involves solving 
reverse salients . Just as Chang emphasizes the importance of local context for shaping 8
or reshaping a technological system, Hughes’ works also focusses on how local contexts 
of politics, economy, society, and cultures made a difference between power systems in 
different cities, regions, and countries.

	 However, Hughes does treat technological systems as global and involving 
transnational actors and transnational circulation of technology. His case studies of power 
networks are comparative, and restricted within the national frame. As a result Hughes 
overlooks three factors that are important for us here. First, he focuses on how the local 
political context shaped and reshaped technological systems, but relations between 
nation-states are mostly out of his scope or at least merely in the background. In the case 
of power networks in western countries or of the central artery project in Boston , his 9
view may not be problematic because these cases in western countries did not involve 
the interrelations among different states, especially among western and non-western 
 Hughes, P. Thomas, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 7
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countries. In the case of the metro system in a country like Taiwan, we cannot 
underestimate the importance of nation-states and the relations among states. Especially, 
as I pointed out at the very beginning, the Taipei Metro and the subterranean railways in 
Taipei are national technological systems developed in a global context marked by major 
asymmetries of power between states. Hughes does not consider the impact of power 
relations between technologically advanced countries and catching-up countries, like 
Taiwan. The solving of a reverse salient does not only mean the perfection of a system but 
also the formation of power relations.	 

	 Further, conflicts and cooperation can also be the sources of innovation 
implemented by hybrid strategies. Although technological momentum could more or less 
explain why technological systems from western countries tend to shape non-western 
countries’ society rather than being shaped by it, it cannot thoroughly explain the power 
relations among different actors in the process of building a technological system. 
Moreover, power relations impact the evolution of a technological system before it gains 
momentum or even earlier. 

	 Second, for Hughes, as for Latour in his “model of translation, ” the formation of 10
technological systems in different countries seems to involve independent processes that 
are only weakly connected with each other. Hughes and Latour’s concepts can indeed 
help us not to be trapped into the western-centric viewpoint or a diffusion model that 
overlooks the roles played by local context and actors. The formation of a metro system 
involves many years of knowledge acquisition, the circulation of transnational human 
‘manpower’, and the coproduction and competition of global actors and local contexts. 
All metro systems are born to be both global and local. However, overlooking the linkages 
between them is to miss the transnational circulation of knowledge and technology in the 
process of building technological systems in different places while it dissolves the 
boundary between “local” and “global.” If we don’t look for interconnections, every 
system seems purely locally built and the importance of transnational actors, knowledge, 
and artifacts is not visible, even though they enrich our understanding of the history of 
technological systems. Chang’s study of the Brown Line fixes this problem by taking the 
VAL’s  French context into consideration, showing that the making of the Brown Line was 
the coproduction of transplanting a large system . Nonetheless, Chang’s study only 11
focuses on the case of the VAL system on the Brown Line, so it cannot provide a total 
 Latour, Bruno, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press1987), Pp. 132-144.10
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picture of the transnational history of the Taipei Metro and the development of rail mass 
transportation technology in Taiwan.

	 Third, Hughes’ case studies only concentrate on the construction of technological 
systems without going into the long preparatory period of design and planning that 
precedes building a system. Beginning in the 20th century, we can find that transportation 
studies and planning have played a critical role in building a rail mass transportation 
system since building and running a rail mass transportation system became more and 
more technically complex and expensive. Thus, two essential facts need to be noted. 
Firstly, before building a metro system, people need to acquire knowledge about the city. 
Without the knowledge of the city, system builders would not know where, how, and what 
to build for the city. Furthermore, to use Latour’s words, they cannot translate the 
interests of building a metro system to persuade political leaders and citizens to support 
their plan. Secondly, in a catching-up country like Taiwan, people had to build institutions 
and transnational professional relationships to acquire knowledge and knowhow, so that 
they could later generate knowledge about their own cities. In the case of metro systems, 
people needed to build their profession of transportation studies and planning. Of course 
some countries simply hired international companies to do the knowledge-making job or 
even to build the whole system. But, even so, hiring international engineers and scientists 
to generate local knowledge about a city is a meaningful subject for historians of 
technology, notably in a country like Taiwan, whose social and political history is marked 
by a determination to affirm its autonomy and build its own identity faced by a powerful, 
hostile neighbor in mainland China.

	 Thus this dissertation treats metro systems as global systems that are the products 
of interaction, cooperation, negotiation, and struggles with transnational technology and 
actors. Describing a metro system as global does not mean that we are talking about a 
history of the diffusion of metro systems; instead, we need to emphasize not only local 
context but also transnational flows of technology. Building a metro system involves local 
and international scholars, political leaders of different nation-states, technical officials, 
international system providers, technical officials, and passengers riding on the system. 
These actors shared a decades-long procedure of knowledge-making and system 
building engaging people, knowledge, and artifacts across borders of nation-states. 
Taiwan’s metro system is transnationally constructed, and this dissertation describes just 




Questions in Making of the Metro 
	 Once we define building the Taipei Metro as the transnational production of a 
technological system, the questions that this dissertation tries to answer emerge. First, as 
the first section reveals, we may observe that Taiwan’s rail mass transportation systems 
have many features derived from different types of technological or ideological thinking, 
and some of them even contradict each other. For example, two kinds of systems, RRT 
(Rail Rapid Transit) and AGT (Automated Guided Transit), were built into one metro system 
at the same time. Besides, the vast Taipei Main Station aims to be the grand central 
station serving passengers all around the metropolitan while the Taipei Metro has a 
network that distributes passengers to different interchange stations. Furthermore, the 
Brown Line, which is the outcome of the integration of the French system, the VAL256, 
and the Canadian system, CITYFLO650, is also a puzzle needing historians to solve. With 
the view of the transnational history of technology, we can figure out that the features 
might come from different countries rather than merely root in the local context. These 
phenomena show, I argue, the technological hybridity of a technological system, and one 
of the missions of the dissertation is to trace the sources of this hybridity.

	 Second, I would like to answer how technology transfer happened in Taiwan, 
especially the systematic technology of rail mass transportation systems. In the case of 
rail mass transportation technology in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government did not merely 
want to build a transportation system in Taiwan. It was also eager to build the profession 
of transportation studies and planning, the industries of rail transportation, and the 
abilities to design and build a metro system for Taiwan or even for other countries. Hence, 
we can regard the history of Taiwan rail mass transportation technology as the history of 
technology transfer. We can further find that a transnational view would be suitable for 
writing the history of technology transfer because, on the national level, technology 
transfer naturally involves transnational flows of technology. Technology transfer involves 
a complicated process, multiple actors, and chronological development. My dissertation 
shows how it has happened over decades providing a comprehensive picture of the 
technology transfer of rail mass transportation systems, and revealing the institution of 
technology transfer for rail mass transportation technology in Taiwan.	 

	 Third, this dissertation shows how a catching-up country like Taiwan dealt with the 
technologically advanced countries like the U.S. for its technological development. This 
question is the extension of the previous one, but I focus more on what limitations and 
opportunities Taiwanese had, what strategies they took, and how the power relations 
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worked when they dealt with the technologically advanced countries. Moreover, when a 
country tries to build a global technological system, it has to face the critical relations with 
the international consultants and system providers, especially as regards technology 
transfer. In this kind of relation, technologically advanced countries can use knowledge 
and technology to leverage their political and economic power; on the other hand, 
technologically advanced countries may lose superiority to the countries that receive 
knowledge and technology in the process of technology transfer. Therefore, the relations 
between technologically advanced countries and catching-up countries is problematic. In 
this dissertation, we will discuss the roots of these problematic relations, and the 
strategies of the actors, such as engineers, technical officials, political leaders, and 
international consultants.

	 By asking the questions above, we find that building the metro system in Taiwan 
has involved mobilizing transnational knowledge and technology. The process involves 
building the profession of transportation studies and planning so that Taiwanese technical 
officials could generate knowledge about their capital city, Taipei, to plan and design its 
mass transportation systems. It also involves the transnational flows of knowledge, 
technology, and people for transferring technology into the rising nation-state under 
decades-long military threats. Finally, the process has been achieved with tricks, 
strategies, policies, and institutions taken by different actors aiming at keeping or 
changing power relations between Taiwan and the technologically advanced countries led 
by the U.S. Therefore, I further discuss what factors shaped the decades-long process of 
the making of the system, what actions Taiwanese took in the process, and what the 
outcomes were of the process of transnational making of metro systems in Taiwan.

American Technological Hegemony in Taiwan 
	 The first argument that this dissertation makes is that foreign policies have been 
one of the factors shaping the process of building the metro system, and it is the one 
which historians of technology focusing on the postwar period should not overlook. Since 
the Chinese Civil War from 1945 and 1949 and the following Korean War, the U.S. has 
been the hegemonic power over the postwar Taiwan with its military protection and 
international political impacts while the KMT  government in Taiwan and Taiwan itself has 12
been faced by communist China’s military threats for decades. Nonetheless, the KMT 
government has continued to develop Taiwan’s economic and technological power to 
confront China’s ideological and political competition and to secure the survival of its 
 Kuomintang (中國國民黨) means Chinese Nationalist Party.12
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sovereignty, the U.S. being one of its primary resources. For the U.S., it tried to enforce its 
alliances through its superiority of economic and scientific power confronting the 
communist campaign in the Cold War. Moreover, the U.S. also exploited this 
predomination of resources and knowledge to attract neutral countries like India to join 
the “Free World” or at least not to join the communist bloc. The goal of the use of 
scientific and technological power was to shape a global environment with the political 
order which did not threaten its dominant status. We call this kind of effort and power the 
American hegemony of science and technology as John Krige does , and the U.S. used 13
the hegemonic power globally in the Cold War for decades. By sharing knowledge, 
Americans tried to shape the world . 
14
	 We may find a similar development in Asia at the same time. American experts 
played an essential role in the “Green Revolution” in Asia and Latin America, aiming at 
solving the problems of famine and poverty, especially in South Asia. In doing so they 
were mainly competing with the Soviet Union’s economic and technological assistance in 
the neutral countries . Moreover, we can also find how the Ford Foundation was 15
dedicated to agriculture in India during the 1950s and the 1960s so as not to upset India’s 
non-aligned policy . In the cases in both West Europe and South Asia, we can find that 16
consensus played a vital role in the hegemony. A consensus had to be won, and 
sometimes it was brokered against a backdrop of deep local and national divisions. In 
other words, consensual hegemony implies only that an influential fraction of a local elite, 
supplemented by U.S. overt and covert support, and operating in a particular local 
constellation of the balance of forces, was able to impose its vision of what kind of 
society should be built in these countries .
17
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	  The KMT’s political agenda met the U.S.’ global Cold War strategy forming the 
Taiwanese version of American hegemony of science and technology. The KMT 
government and the U.S. government initiated a series of technological assistance 
projects in the framework of  “U.S. Aid” to help Taiwan to build its infrastructure, incubate 
professional human resources, set up professional institutes, and develop industries. As it 
did in Western Europe, the U.S. government did not only provide economic assistance to 
Taiwan but also sent experts helping Taiwanese to develop their science and technology 
comprehensively. In these projects, knowledge, and technology crossed borders, flowing 
from the U.S. to Taiwan in written documents, human resources, education, training, and 
artifacts. The KMT government and Taiwanese technical officials cooperated with 
American experts and officials to build the institutions of technological assistance, 
causing the coproduction of American hegemony. America was not merely a place where 
knowledge and technology were coming from but also a symbol of progress and 
richness.

	 Although U.S. Aid ended in 1965, American technological assistance projects 
continued with the same institutions and Taiwan’s profession of transportation studies 
and planning was founded during this time. The Taiwanese government hired American 
consultants through the U.S. government and the U.N. to diagnose Taiwan’s 
transportation systems. It then introduced the science of transportation studies and 
planning, which was the rising discipline in the U.S. in the 1960s trying to build the 
profession of transportation studies and planning using the American model. The 
Transportation Planning Board, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (TPB) 
was the institute that developed the profession. With it, the Taiwanese started to learn 
how to make knowledge about their cites for future transportation systems. Therefore, 
this profession was a product of the American hegemony of transportation science and 
technology.

	 However, the coproduction of hegemony does not imply 100% cooperation of 
Taiwanese, and when the U.S.-Taiwanese relations changed, the nature of technological 
hegemony changed too. In 1971, President Nixon announced that he would visit Beijing in 
the next year, and then, in the same year, the UN passed Resolution 2758, leading to the 
KMT government losing its seat in the UN. When Nixon visited China in 1972, the U.S. 
and China signed the first of the Three Joint Communiqués, but this was just the 
beginning of the KMT’s government’s diplomatic downfall in the 1970s. Although 
American companies shared noticeable business in the project of railway electrification in 
10
the early 1970s , Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting (DEC) from West Germany started to 18
provide consulting services for the Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA) and then to 
consult the project of the mass transportation system in Taipei Metropolitan in 1977. 
Furthermore, in 1980 when the U.S. had just terminated its formal diplomatic relationship 
with the KMT government, the TPB hired British Mass Transit Consultants (BMTC), which 
had just finished its job of planning Hong Kong’s metro system, to plan and design the 
Taipei Metro.

	 The decline of the U.S.-Taiwan relations would create space for Taiwanese 
technical officials to introduce alternative resources of knowledge and technology. During 
the 1960s, Taiwan had close relations with the U.S. confronting communist China so that 
the U.S. was the only source of knowledge and technology for Taiwan. Moreover, even in 
the field of transportation studies and planning, the U.S. still had immense superiority 
over Taiwan. Hence, participating in the coproduction of the American hegemony of 
science and technology seemed to be an ideal option. However, in the institution of 
technological hegemony, Taiwan still sought a measure of autonomy, and the limited 
autonomy granted to receivers was also a feature of the American hegemony of science 
and technology. When U.S.-Taiwan relations turned sour, the Taiwanese would seek 
alternative sources for their development. For the U.S., it did not necessarily need Taiwan 
to be wholly Americanized in every technological field because there was no intention of 
competing with communist China to show the superiority of the capitalist model.

	 As a result, the TPB introduced German, British, and Japanese companies and 
experts to co-work with Taiwanese technical officials and engineers hired by state-owned 
consultants joining the planning and designing of Taiwan mass transportation systems. 
First of all, the German consultants, DEC, consulted the Taipei Railway Underground 
Project in 1979 after it helped the TPB design the future mass transportation systems for 
the Taipei metropolitan, determining that the Taiwanese government would build a metro 
system and rebuild the West Coast Line as a subterranean railway. During the DEC’s 
consulting, the transportation planning knowledge, ideas, and experience generated in 
Germany were introduced to Taipei with different forms. Furthermore, German ideas and 
designs about railways were realized in Taipei's subterranean railway. For example, Taipei 
Main Station was the product of the idea of a grand central station for a railway network.

	 On the other hand, the TPB formed the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit Group (TMRT) to 
initiate the project of the Taipei Metro, hiring the BMTC to consult the project. Like the 
 Chang, “Constructing the Taipei Metro Muzha Line,” Pp. 191.18
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DEC, BMTC also introduced British knowledge, experience, and designs of metro 
systems into Taiwan. Last but not least, Taiwanese technical officials also invited 
Japanese companies and experts to review German and British designs and plans. In 
some cases, they even directly hired the Japanese to design the affiliated facilities of the 
systems. Therefore, the TPB, as the technological institute within the Taiwanese 
government, exploited its autonomy to decide which country could import their 
knowledge into Taiwan when the KMT government’s relationship with the U.S. declined in 
the early 1980s. It was the beginning of the end of the American hegemony of mass 
transportation technology.

	 However, a change in U.S.-Taiwan relations again changed the situation in the 
mid-1980s. Firstly, the Regan Administration raised the hope that formal diplomatic 
relations with the KMT government would improve dramatically, though this did not 
actually materialize.  Following on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1980, 
in 1982 the U.S. signed the August 17th  Communiqué to enforce the U.S.-Sino relations 
by promising more ties between the two countries and gradually decreased the sale of  
weapons to Taiwan. At the same time, China presented the idea of “one country, two 
systems” and the “three links” creating political pressure on the KMT government. 
Secondly, Taiwan’s strong economic growth powered by its manufacturing industries 
created a widening trade deficit between the U.S. and Taiwan, to which the U.S. 
government initiated its “buy American” policy seeking compensate for the trade 
imbalance in trade.

 	 In 1984, the U.S. government introduced American metro-related companies to 
intervene in the project of the Taipei Metro. When the TPB and Taipei City Government 
seriously disagreed on whether to build an automated metro system in Taipei, the U.S. 
government “suggested” that the Taiwanese government hire American consultants to 
solve the conflict by integrating two metro systems into one. Then, in 1986, the U.S. 
government pressured the Taiwanese government to reopen the bid for general 
consultants of the project of the Taipei Metro. Although the BMTC could join the bid, the 
American Transit Consultants (ATC), which was formed by three American metro-related 
companies won the bid becoming the general consultants of the metro project. During the 
design and construction period, the ATC also introduce American ideas and experience to 
Taiwanese technical officials and engineers. Many American designs and ideas were also 
realized in the Taipei Metro.

	 That said, the Taiwanese did not completely eliminate other countries' ideas and 
designs,  becoming wholly “Americanized” again. First, when Americans returned and 
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intervened in the project of the Taipei Metro, the Taipei's subterranean railway was under 
construction, and Taiwanese technical officials and British consultants had already made 
significant progress in design and planning. Hence, American consultants and Taiwanese 
technical officials kept many British designs in the Taipei Metro. Second, in the process of 
American interruption in the project of the Taipei Metro, Taiwanese technical officials 
retained their autonomy as the client of the consultants so that the decision-making 
power of the project was still in Taiwanese hands. Furthermore, facing the pressure of 
buying American, the Taiwanese often adopted flexible strategies to purchase the 
artifacts which they believed to be suitable for Taipei. Thus, although America returned as 
the main player in the construction of the Taipei Metro, the Taipei Metro did not become 
totally Americanized.

  	 The ideas and history above show how the U.S.-Taiwan relations have affected the 
development of rail mass transportation technology in Taiwan after WWII and how the 
American hegemony of science and technology has worked as an institution shaping 
Taiwan’s profession of transportation studies and planning. When U.S.-Taiwan relations 
were close, and Taiwan lacked resources and knowledge during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Taiwanese willingly cooperated with the U.S. government and its experts creating the 
American technological hegemony together building an indigenous profession. When the 
relations declined, the Taiwanese exploited their autonomy turning to alternative sources 
of knowledge, seeking more suitable options for mass transportation systems in the 
capital city. Once political-economic interests emerged, the U.S. would again use its 
military and political power to leverage the situation bringing American technology back 
to Taiwan, and Taiwanese would take a series of strategies to fulfill American’s needs on 
the one hand and maintain their autonomy on the other. The aftermath of the decades-
long process, as the history above indicates, was the mixture and coexistence of 
knowledge, ideas, designs, and artifacts from different countries, and I call this kind of 
mixture technological hybridity.

	 The coproduction mechanisms under American hegemony created a suitable 
environment for the birth of hybrid knowledge and technology, and the development of 
the American hegemony of technology drove Taiwanese to adopt hybrid strategies to 
build their transportation system. First, the knowledge sharing and cooperation of local 
elites drove technology across the national border. Then, American experts and local 
elites would cooperatively produce knowledge and technology aiming at solving local 
problems, such as food supply, nuclear power, or urban planning, generating local’s 
feedback to Americans. Thus, the circulation of knowledge and technology between the 
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two partners emerged. Moreover, if local elites introduced alternative knowledge and 
technology from other sources like the Soviet Union, or turned to “go their own way” to 
fulfill their requirements or political economy agendas, we may witness the birth of hybrid 
knowledge and technology. In our cases of the Taipei Metro and the railways in Taipei 
City, we found the artifacts also become hybrid due to the actions and strategies dealing 
with the American factor. So, hybridity is both a strategy and an outcome.

Technological Hybridity 
	 Technological hybridity means the coexistence of knowledge, artifacts, and 
ideology coming from different nation-states in a technological system. This perspective 
can help us to catch the peculiar phenomena and the developmental track of 
technological systems in postcolonial countries like Taiwan, because, as the history of rail 
transportation in postwar Taiwan and many other transnational histories of technology 
indicate, hybrid technology is a common phenomenon, reflecting the political status of 
countries, and their strategies to maintain sovereignty. Moreover, technological hybridity 
reveals the impossibility of totally self-sufficient national technology, and many 
transnational historians of technology already note this fact. However, knowledge, people, 
and artifacts do travel across borders seeking markets, political orders, innovation, and 
development, and components of technology would be constructed to form technological 
networks that combine elements from different sources. In some cases, even the 
technological systems in North America and Europe are hybrid in a transnational way.

	 Krige’s study on the trans-Atlantic coproduction of the gas centrifuge for uranium 
enticement in the 1960s shows how hybrid knowledge of gas centrifuges emerged in the 
cooperation of American and British scientists. He points out that all knowledge is 
admittedly ‘hybrid,' made up of bits and pieces of this and that, insofar as it is the product 
of a social process. But here another dimension is added: the national provenance of 
those discrete elements in the transnationally produced melange. In the coproduction 
field, scientists and engineers on both sides of the Atlantic defined ‘British’ or ‘American’ 
elements in the hotchpotch of knowledge that they produced in the late 1960s. And we 
more readily see that the affirmation of the national technology in the hybrid is also the 
performative expression of power .
19
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	 Therefore, according to this definition and the empirical studies, almost all 
technological systems are hybrid so that the concept of technological hybridity seems to 
be meaningless implying that this dissertation’s case study of Taiwan shows nothing 
special. For example, National Highway No.1 in Taiwan  was built by the Taiwanese 
government under American company’s consulting in the 1970s, and we can find cars 
and trucks from many countries running on this transportation system. So, is this an 
example of technological hybridity? Why do we need to discuss the technological 
hybridity of rail transportation in Taiwan if all technology is hybrid? The concept of 
technological hybridity becomes meaningless if we exploit it in this way.

  	 The mere mixture of technology from different countries cannot is not a meaningful 
idea of technological hybridity, and we need to limit the use of the idea in particular 
conditions to give it any analytical weight. According to my studies of rail transportation 
technology in Taiwan, I discuss the idea of technological hybridity in the three following 
conditions. First, the concept would be used when the hybridity can redefine or change 
the functions and meanings of the technology. Second, the concept would be used when 
the hybridity can mix different political and technological ideologies to work together even 
if they contrast with each other. Third, the concept would be used when the hybridity can 
reverse or at least change the power relations between the stronger and the weaker.

	 These three conditions do not exclude each other; instead, sometimes they can 
reinforce or generate each other. For example, different political or technological 
ideologies may lead to technology with different meanings or functions when the 
technology travels to a different country; or, when technology’s functions or meanings 
change, technology can be a pivot to change the relations leading to technology derived 
from different ideologies being integrated as one system. In this dissertation, a historical 
analysis of transportation technology in Taiwan, my aim is to recognize the moments 
when technological hybridity mattered and to explain why and how the hybridity occurred 
by analyzing the temporal-spatial environment, actors’ interests and strategies, and the 
interactions among different actors and technology. That is to say, how the American 
hegemony of science and technology, the development of the U.S.-Taiwan relations, and 
the actions and strategies taken by the Taiwanese created and shaped technological 
hybridity and how the hybridity shaped the city and the island country.

	 The American hegemony of science and technology created a suitable 
environment for the birth of  technological hybridity of rail transportation technology. With 
this hegemonic power in the Cold War, the circulation of knowledge, people, and artifacts 
emerged in Taiwan, America, and other countries, and the Taiwanese government and 
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engineers took a variety of strategies to fulfill their local requirements, to satisfy their 
political and economic agendas, and to secure their autonomy, even though they did not 
always succeed. The change of the political and economic conditions, especially in U.S.-
Taiwan relations, would provide limits and chances for the Taiwanese to create the 
historical opportunity for the advent of the technological hybridity of rail transportation 
technology.

	 This dissertation shows three types of technological hybridity that emerged in the 
history of the Taipei Metro and other rail mass transportation technology: the 
technological hybridity of knowledge, the technological hybridity of styles and functions, 
and the technological hybridity of systems. I do not argue that the three types of hybridity 
can include all meaningful modes of hybridity in the history of technology; rather, I 
emphasize that the classification of hybridity should be rooted in solid empirical cases 
and practical examples. Hence, the types of technological hybridity can be extended 
based on further research. 

The Technological Hybridity of Knowledge 
	 Krige’s case study of the corporation of the U.S. and the UK in gas centrifuge 
technology reveals that technological hybridity is created by the transnational circulation 
of knowledge, people, and artifacts. The mechanism and actions creating hybridity are 
cooperations at a practical level, training, induction of ways of doing things, import of 
regulation, and co-production of knowledge by scientists or engineers from multiple 
countries. This case also shows that hybrid knowledge is not a mixture of knowledge in 
which we can easily recognize origins and define national boundaries between two or 
more countries; instead, hybrid knowledge emerges in a complex process that often blurs 
these very features.

	 U.S. Aid and the following Americanization of Taiwan’s profession of transportation 
studies and planning were the basis for the future formation of hybrid knowledge. In the 
1960s and the early 1970s, the American hegemony of transportation technology 
provided not only resources and knowledge but also the institution of a profession for the 
island nation to construct its infrastructures. The TPB, the institute, which was founded 
with American resources, became both the receiver and the producer of the knowledge of 
transportation and Taiwan’s cities. Knowledge, as “information,” as “expertise,” as “know-
how,” crosses borders in many ways—in written or printed form (books, including 
textbooks and manuals, letters, newspapers, academic publications, technical reports, 
blueprints, trade journals) or embedded in devices (like an initial guidance system) as well 
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as in living things (like human beings and cloned animals) . American transportation 20
studies and planning was established in Taiwan with a series of practical actions.

	 After the mid-1970s, Taiwan started to introduce knowledge from Germany, Japan, 
and Britain with the institutes established with the help of the U.S. aid so that the 
mechanism of Americanization became the mechanism for producing hybrid knowledge. 
The boundary of knowledge from different countries was vague, but we can still observe 
how German and Japanese knowledge influenced Taiwan. First, Taiwanese began to 
regard the American experience of transportation as negative examples while they once 
followed it closely.  Second, Taiwanese technical officials showed Taiwan’s autonomy and 
mobility by seeking alternative sources of knowledge rather than limiting themselves to  
the U.S. Therefore, the process of making hybrid knowledge of transportation studies and 
planning after the mid-1970s also exhibits Taiwan’s intention to change the relationship 
with the U.S. Third, the process of the making of the knowledge was marked by conflicts 
and negotiations among Taiwanese stake holders, German consultants, Japanese 
consultants, and American consultants. Moreover, the knowledge of transportation 
contained different political and technological ideologies leading to particular designs, so 
the making of hybrid knowledge during this period finally caused the hybridity of the 
designs of Taipei’s mass transportation—the technological hybridity of styles and 
functions. 

	 Last but not least, the history of the Taipei Metro shows that American knowledge 
of transportation studies and planning learnt in American cities like San Francisco and 
Washington D.C. entered Taiwan with the U.S. government’s political momentum and 
determination to be compensated for the trade  imbalance  between the two countries. 
Furthermore, American consultants’ works were based on other consultants’ labors. 
Thus, the history of the technological hybridity of knowledge of transportation studies and 
planning is not merely the history of how Taiwan escaped from American factors 
becoming autonomous; instead, American knowledge could return to the country , 
making the process more complicated. There is no clear-cut way to distinguish which part 
of hybrid knowledge belongs to a particular nation-state, but we can recognize the 
mechanisms that produced it and the process by which different  nations got involved.

The Technological Hybridity of Styles and functions 
	 When we focus on the change of the styles and functions of technology, which 
travels from one place to  another, especially for those which are oriented from West 
 Krige, American Hegemony, Pp. 2.20
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Europe and North America and that travel to Africa and Asia, Frank Dikötter and David 
Edgerton are two scholars worthy of being discussed. In Exotic Commodities: Modern 
Objects and Everyday Life in China, Dikötter shows how Chinese in the early 20th century 
interpreted and redefined technology imported from western countries. Although Dikötter 
opposes the idea of hybridity because it implies that two ontologically distinct 
technologies are mixed, his work discussing the history of how technology was used in 
early 20th century China shows different kinds of mixture and hybridity of technology 
under the context of use . Similarly, Edgerton’s “creole technology” also emphasizes use 21
instead of innovation to describe how catching-up countries modify and redefine 
technology that traveled to their lands to fulfill local demands . Unlike Dikötter, Edgerton 22
uses the word “creole," indicating the existence of technological hybridity. Both of them 
show that technological hybridity can change the functions and meanings of technology 
with its mixture, integration, or redefining of technology’s style. That being said, Dikötter 
and Edgerton tend to limit their studies to single artifacts or small-scale technologies (like 
bicycles) , and, when it comes to a large technological system, their perspective hardly 
challenges the traditional center-periphery view and does not deal with the power 
relationship between stronger countries and the weaker.

	 On the other hand, Eden Medina’s case study of cybernetics in Allende’s Chile 
inspires us to discuss the change of styles and functions in transnational technological 
systems . When cybernetics traveled to Allende’s Chile, the Chileans did not only change 23
its meaning but also its style, functions, and configuration. Her case study of cybernetics 
in Chile exhibits how technological hybridity of styles and functions happen in a 
postcolonial country. Moreover, we also find that the hybridity does not only mean the 
mixture or integration of artifacts but also refers to the assembly or reconstruction of 
ideology. Medina’s study only involves the intersection between British technology and 
the Chilean local context leading to an analytic frame of global and local that overlooks 
the integration of technology from multiple technologically advanced countries as 
Edgerton and Dikötter do. Moreover, although Medina’s story of the Cybersyn reveals the 
contradictions between technology and Chile’s local economy, politics, and technological 
practice, it does not show how Chilean and the British engineers integrated the system 
 Dikötter, Frank, Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China. (New York: 21
Columbia University Press, 2006)
 Edgerton, David, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. (New York: 22
Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), Pp.43-45.
 Medina, Eden, Cybernetic Revolutionsaries (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014).23
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with the nation-state. Instead, limited by its materials, it is just a story of how the 
technological system and the socialism embedded in it failed to be rooted in Chile. 
Integration cannot be the core of this great story.

	  The history of the Taipei Metro and Taipei’s subterranean railways hence can serve 
as an example showing how the hybridity of styles and functions emerges in the 
integration of designs and artifacts with different, or even contradictory technical and 
political ideologies. The cases in Taipei are also evidence of how technology from multiple 
technologically advanced countries was integrated into one technological system thanks 
to the combined efforts  of local technical officials, engineers, and international 
consultants. The Taipei Metro’s network and affiliated designs are the most typical 
example. By following the British consultants’ designs and experience in Britain and Hong 
Kong, the TPB and the Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government 
(DORTS) make the Taipei Metro’s network L-shaped with four interchange stations built 
into the form of the cross-platform interchange. This design aims at distributing 
passengers to different stations avoiding over-concentration in a particular station. 
However, before the construction of the Taipei Metro, the German consultants helped the 
Taipei Railway Underground Project Office (TRUPO) to design and build the Taipei Main 
Station based on the concept of a “grand central station” trying to build the Taipei Main 
Station as the transportation center of the metropolitan. Thus, the designs contradicting 
with each other were integrated into one system serving the city.

	 The technological hybridity of styles and functions reveals the track of 
transnational technology, the autonomy of the technology receiving countries, and the 
conflicts, negotiation, and integration of a technological system involving technology from 
different countries. These series of actions are necessary for the process of technology 
transfer, so the analysis of the hybridity can help us to understand how a technology 
transfer worked. As Hughes argues, technological systems solve problems or fulfill goals 
using whatever means are available and appropriate; the problems have to do mostly with 
reordering the physical world in ways considered useful or desirable, at least by those 
designing or employing a technological system . Hence, the hybridity of styles and 24
functions shows how the problems the metro builders wanted to solve and in what order 
they tackled them.  Moreover, the formation of hybridity also involves the interactions in 
the power relations among multiple countries so that we can observe the development of 
the power relations by exploring the technological hybridity of styles and functions.

 Hughes, “Evolution,” Pp. 47.24
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The Technological Hybridity of Systems 
	 “A technological system can be both a cause and an effect; it can shape or be 
shaped by society.” Hughes states, “as they grow larger and more complex, systems tend 
to be more shaping of society and less shaped by it.” Therefore, “the momentum of 
technological systems is a concept that can be located somewhere between the poles of 
technical determinism and social constructivism. ” In the history of transportation 25
systems, especially metro systems, we can find much evidence echoing what Hughes 
argues. Matra’s VAL(Véhicule Automatique Léger) system was the technological system 
gaining hard momentum in the 1980s and early 1990s for its tacit knowledge, efficiency, 
patent protection, complexity, and technological advancement. Having this momentum, 
as Chang argues, it traveled to Taiwan, generating the coproduction of the Brown Line as 
a technological system with Taiwanese technical officials and engineers .  Analytically, 26
hard technological momentum carries particular meanings, ideology, and functions and a 
set of power relations and political order. Facing this kind of technological system, 
postcolonial countries like Taiwan seem to have no choice but replicate it domestically. So 
how did the Brown Line become a “hybrid metro?”

	 Peter Perdue modifies Hughes’ idea by presenting the idea of the technological 
brake. First, technological brakes are as strong as momentum: large systems stop as well 
as change. Second, Hughes implies that large systems necessarily have greater 
momentum than small ones. The propulsion or braking of a system of elements depends 
on the tightness of the links between the elements, not on their complexity . Thus, 27
Chang’s “coproduction of the technological system” can be seen as the weakening of 
VAL’s technological momentum, meaning the transnational movement of technological 
systems makes them “more shaped than shaping society.”

	 This dissertation shows this is only a part of the whole story. First, the first phase of 
the Brown Line experienced the modifications made by Taiwanese technical officials and 
engineers due to the Matra’s withdrawing from Taiwan. Moreover, the second phase of 
the Brown Line, the Neihu extension line, is the product of the integration of the VAL 256 
 Hughes, Thomas P., “Technological Momentum” in Does Technology Drive History? the 25
Dilemma of Technological Determinism edited by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1994), Pp. 112.
 Chang, “Constructing the Taipei Metro Muzha Line,” Pp. 179-180.26
 Perdue, C. Peter, “Technological Determinism in Agrarian Societies” in Does Technology Drive 27
History: the Dilemma of Technological Determinism edited by Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), Pp.182-183.
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and the Bombardier’s CITYFLO650. The accomplishment of the whole Brown Line 
involves four stages: first, the transnational technology transfer of the VAL system; 
second, the weakening of the momentum of the system and coproduction of the system 
in Taipei; third, the modification of the system by integrating local technology and the 
system; finally, the integration of two systems. Hence, I argue that the concept of the 
technological hybridity of systems can be a useful analytic tool to discuss the Brown Line 
of the Taipei Metro.

	 The hybridity shows the possibility of the transnational building of technological 
systems. The transnational building of the technological system does not mean merely 
adding local components or involving local actors; instead, it could involve the integration 
or combination of two or more technological systems. In this process, the meaning and 
functions of technological systems changed, and there would be new goals and orders 
that the hybrid systems tend to build. Moreover, the hybridity of systems reveals how the 
Taiwanese changed the power relations between the technologically advanced countries. 
The Taiwanese ‘broke into’ the technological system reshaping it as a hybrid one. The 
hybrid metro shapes and reshapes not only Taipei City and passengers' lives with 
particular forms but also the power relations between the catching-up country and the 
technologically advanced countries. In the new relations, the catching-up country, as the 
case of the Brown Line in Taiwan, can gain financial interests, end political storms, and 
realize the autonomy of the country as a nation-state, especially a new rising country like 
Taiwan. 

Metro as a Nationalist Technology 
	 In the case study of the project of Taiwan’s High Speed Rail, Chang found that the 
notion of “hybrid engineering” in this project meant an engineering culture that values 
hybridity. He also discovered that Taiwanese politics and society gradually directed their 
engineers to pursue engineering optimization and non-dependence rather than seeking 
simply survival or perfection. He goes on to argue, “Taiwan’s engineering culture of 
hybridity has not only been developed within its engineer community but has also been 
constructed by its politics and society.” Thus an engineering culture of hybridity became a 
culture that the Taiwanese constructed and shared in their society . My historical count 28
of the Taipei Metro and the subterranean railways in Taipei echo Chang’s argument that 
Taiwan’s engineers and technical officials value hybridity for seeking non-dependence. 
 Chang, Kuo-Hui, “Technological Construction as Identity Formation: the High Speed Rail, 28
Hybrid Culture and Engineering/Political Subjectivity in Taiwan,” (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University, 2010), Pp.10-11.
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This dissertation also reaches a similar conclusion of how technical practice and decision 
making generated the autonomy and subjectivity of Taiwan. However, this dissertation 
further takes the approach of social history to explore how the Taiwanese out of the 
engineering communities interoperate and shape the metro systems, finding a different 
phenomenon. Taiwanese passengers and citizens do not value hybridity as metro 
engineers do, and they shape the systems as users in a different way. 

	 Edgerton points to an understudied aspect in the history of technology: 
maintenance. Maintenance is almost as widely distributed as use. As a consequence, 
maintenance and repair are the most widespread forms of technological expertise. 
Maintenance and repair have been the realm of the small trader and skilled workers. They 
were different from, marginal to and yet interdependent with the great systems of 
technics . Edgerton also emphasizes the importance of the use of technology and 29
argues that the historians of technology need to focus more on the technologies which 
are widely used instead of merely sticking to cutting-edge innovation . Scholars who 30
focus on users also reveal that users embed the new technology into their social or 
cultural context redefining how the technology is to be used, although their context and 
way may not be compatible with those which the designers had in mind .
31
	 Along these lines, this dissertation does not only discuss the design and 
construction of the rail transportation systems in Taiwan but also how people maintain 
and manage the systems and how users have used them, especially how Taiwanese have 
used the metro systems. First of all, the technical officials and engineers took American 
consultants’ suggestions to build a spectacular metro system that would attract people to 
use it since they had a progressive consciousness of changing Taipei and Taiwan by 
building the Taipei Metro. Then, technical officials who were in charge of the operation of 
the metro system took a series of actions to make the system extremely clean and highly 
ordered passing new laws, promoting rider etiquette, and using different kinds of 
propaganda. They set cleanliness as one of the top goals of their operation. Besides the 
management of the metro’s space, the operators of the system keep improving the 
maintenance and management, focusing on becoming the most efficient metro system in 
the world.

 Edgerton, Shock, Pp. 80.29
 Edgerton, David, “From Innovation to Use: Ten Eclectic Theses on the Historiography of 30
Technology,” History and Technology 16:2 (1999): Pp. 111-136.
 Oudshoorn, Nelly, and Pinch, Trevor edit, How Users Matter: the Co-Construction of Users and 31
Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).
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	 Taiwanese people echo the technical officials’ ambition of making Taiwan modern. 
Despite a few cases of disorder in the Taipei Metro, people rapidly adapted themselves to 
satisfy the need to build a neat and ordered environment. Furthermore, they treat the 
etiquette and space in the metro system as constituting  “metro culture” and as a source 
of national pride for Taiwan. Since the mid-1990s, Taiwanese national identity has grown 
so that the Taiwanese need symbols to show the uniqueness of Taiwan as a nation while 
the Taiwanese government has been excluded from mainstream international society. The 
metro culture and the Taipei Metro’s efficiency became the subject for Taiwanese to show 
Taiwan’s progress and kindness when facing the vast, powerful, and emerging China.  
Accordingly Taiwanese people highly value foreigners’ appreciation of Taiwan’s metro 
systems.

	 Taiwanese technical officials  replicated the Taipei Metro’s features, such as 
monumental architecture and a neat environment, when they developed later projects for 
rail mass transportation systems like the Taiwan High Speed Rail (TSHR) and Kaohsiung 
Rapid Transit System(KRTS). The Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA), the state-owned 
intercity railway operator, also tried to modify its railways and stations when it reformed 
some of its lines as commute railways. Taiwanese people and the rail transportation 
system operators also built the metro culture into the systems whether they were 
traditional railways, the high speed train, or metros. The phenomenon, I argue, can be 
called “Metrolization," which is derived from the Mandarin Chinese Jieyunhua (捷運化), 
meaning to make things metro alike.

	 Taiwanese technical officials and Taiwanese people have built a “Formosa 
technological sublime,” a concept derived from David Nye’s American technological 
sublime , to exhibit Taiwan’s collective morality and nationality by building and showing 32
spectacular technological systems. Interestingly, the Taiwanese do not take their railway 
manufacturing industries and the hybrid systems as a source of national pride; instead, 
they care more about how they introduced technology from advanced countries and 
integrated it into a good system. So, the Taiwanese do not have a techno-nationalist 
attitude towards rail mass transportation system, which emphasizes the nation’s 
originality in technological innovation,  instead, they treat the metro and even the high 33
speed rail system as a nationalist technology,  as materials from which to construct a 
newly rising Taiwanese national identity.

 Nye, David E., American Technological Sublime. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).32
 Edgerton, Shock, Pp. 110.33
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Methodology 
	 This dissertation is mainly based on three primary sources. First, the dissertation 
relies on government archives in Taiwan. However, many of the archives were classified 
for decades until I applied for declassification or the right to use them. For example, the 
archives "Subterranean Railway" and "Metro System" were classified ‘confidential’ for 
three decades until 2019.  I applied for access appealing to Taiwan's National Archives' 
new policy that applicants can review the confidential documents about to be declassified 
without making copies. 

The archives in the National Archives Administration, National Development 
Council (National Archives), is one of the primary sources of archival material. These 
archives include the documents of U.S. Aid, the Sino-American Fund for Economic and 
Social Development (SAFED), the TRUPO, and the project of Taipei Metro before 1986 
when the project was transferred from the TPB to Taipei City Government. The archives of 
TRUPO and the Taipei Metro were also classified confidential until I applied to see them 
and asked for declassification. 

The other source of archives is Academia Sinica’s archives of the Institute of 
Modern History. The archives have material on international consultants for transportation 
projects in the 1960s and 1970s, including the project for elevated railways in Taipei City 
and early studies of the subterranean railway project. For the history of the Taipei Metro 
since 1986, the archives and technical documents in the library of the DORTS contributed 
much to my studies. Finally, the library of the Institute of Transportation, Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication (IOT) provides plentiful materials about the history of 
the TPB. Furthermore, with the assistance of the IOT’s officials, I obtained a copy of 
documentation related to an outstanding senior member of the TPB, Dr. Chiang Yu-sheng 
(姜渝生). It contains an interview with him providing abundant details of how technology 
transfer worked in the TPB during its early days. 

	 Second, I held ten interviews with the metro related technical officials and 
engineers including high-ranked supervisors of the related institutes, technical 
consultants within the government, international consultants, equipment suppliers, and 
system operators. These interviews were held during March and July 2019 in Taipei City 
or New Taipei City. The interviews provide many details about decision making, technical 
practice, political background, and the interactions with international consultants. The 
interviewees did not only tell stories about metro systems, transportation planning, and 
railways but also built my understanding of the transportation profession and technical 
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issues in rail transportation. Furthermore, their words can be clues for further searches in 
archives and technical reports and for crosschecking  with  archival materials. The 
interviewees also provided or lent copies of technical documents and written materials to 
me for this study.

	 Third, I also exploited the databases of newspapers and images for analysis or 
rebuilding the history. For the newspapers, I used the United Daily News’ (聯合報) 
database to access the news during the 1960s and 1990s. These materials provide many 
contents for the early development of the projects of railways in Taipei and the 
construction of the social history of the Taipei Metro. For the news after 2000, I directly 
use medias’ online materials since Taiwanese media has generated online news since 
2000. Furthermore, I also used the National Repository of Cultural Heritage held by 
National Taiwan University to search for and acquire image materials.

	 Besides the resources above, publications and websites of the Taipei Metro also 
contributed to this dissertation. Moreover, technical reports about the projects of mass 
transportation systems and the Taipei Metro, which I found in Taipei Public Library and 
National Chiao Tung University Library, were also essential materials for this dissertation.   

Chapter Summaries 
	 The chapters of this dissertation roughly follow the history chronologically except 
for chapter 4 and chapter 5. The periods covered in each chapter overlap a little. In 
chapter 1, The Island, I provide a picture of U.S.-Taiwan relations since 1949 and their 
impact on the development of technology in Taiwan in these decades. After being 
defeated by the Chinese Communist Party in China, the KMT government had nothing 
but an island with 8 million people and the infrastructure left by the Japanese colonial 
government that had been badly damaged by WWII. However, the Korean War brought in 
U.S. Aid to help strengthen Taiwan’s economic and technological power to confront 
communist China’s threats. In the period of U.S. Aid (1950-1965), the KMT government 
and the U.S. coproduced American hegemony of science and technology contributing to 
Taiwan’s construction of its technological capability and the establishment of institution 
needed for the future development of Taiwan transportation technology. 

	 Chapter 2, The TPB, focuses on the history of the TPB (Transportation Planning 
Board). First, we learn how Taiwan’s transportation planning and management science 
was imported in the context of the Cold War and under American hegemony. The 
establishment of the TPB initiated Taiwan’s profession of transportation studies and 
planning, and it also benefited from U.S. Aid’s extension, although the Aid ended in 1965. 
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I argue that the change in U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1970s, when Nixon turned to 
mainland China as an ally to confront the Soviet Union, created a space for the Taiwanese 
government to seek alternative sources of knowledge of transportation planning, leading 
to technological hybridity of knowledge. 

In chapter 3, The Underground,  I go on to discuss technological hybridity in the 
implemented project: the TRUPO. This project “buried” underground the intercity railroad 
through downtown Taipei City as advised by German and Japanese consultants during 
the 1980s, after a decade-long argument of whether to build an elevated railway or a 
subterranean one. Along with the project of the Taipei Metro, we also find that different 
technological ideologies of mass transportation were realized in the same project leading 
to the hybridity of technological style and function. Taipei Main Station is one of the most 
typical examples.

 	 Chapter 4, The Taipei Metro I, chapter 5, The Taipei Metro II, and chapter 6, The 
Hybrid Metro focus on the Taipei Metro. When the Taiwanese government started to build 
the Taipei Metro in the early 1980s, the U.S. government and American companies 
showed their ambition to get the business of Taipei Metro as compensation for the huge 
trade deficit between the U.S. and Taiwan at that time. Under American hegemony’s 
protection, the Taiwanese government seemed to have no choice. However, the Taipei 
Metro was partly planned using British consultants' advice and also part of the mass 
transportation plan devised by Taipei Metropolitan using German consultants. Facing 
American political pressure, Taiwanese engineers and technical officials took hybrid 
approaches integrating knowledge, ideologies, and styles from these different countries 
into one metro system fulfilling their goal to build a modern metro system of which the 
country could be proud while maintaining Taiwan’s autonomy as a nation-state. However, 
the American factors did not only mean political pressure and hegemonic power; in fact, 
American consultants contributed much to incubate Taiwanese engineers’ profession of 
building a metro system. Moreover, the project of the Taipei Metro launched a massive 
mobilization of knowledge and human resources transnationally and within Taiwan. 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the mobilization of knowledge and human resources, while 
chapter 5 focuses more on the tension between the U.S. and Taiwan and Taiwan’s hybrid 
strategies.

	 Chapter 6 primarily discusses the most special metro line in the Taipei Metro, the 
Brown Line. The case of the Brown Line demonstrates how the technological hybridity of 
systems happens and why it matters. The Brown Line has been the only automated 
guideway transit (AGT) line until today, and the decision to build it involved the conflicts 
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between the TPB and the Taipei City Government, and American efforts to integrate the 
TPB and Taipei City’s plan of the Taipei Metro. In the design stage, the French firm Matra 
won the bid of the Brown Line system, transplanting its VAL system in Taipei. However, a 
series of accidents happened to the Brown Line leading to Matra’s withdrawal from 
Taiwan. Taiwanese technical officials and engineers took a series of actions to modify the 
system, and, when they started to build the extension of the Brown Line, Taiwanese 
integrated the Bombardier’s AGT system with the modified VAL as a hybrid technological 
system showing how technological hybridity changed the power relations between a 
catching-up country and a technologically advanced country. 

	 Chapter 7, The People, takes a social history approach of to discuss how the 
Taiwanese people, who are passengers and citizens, interpret rail transportation systems 
in Taiwan and their technological hybridity. I describe their enthusiastic appreciation of 
“modernization” in the Taipei Metro, Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR), or other newer metro 
systems, that they regard as vectors of national pride. The technical officials, engineers, 
system operators, politicians, media, and other Taiwanese people have shaped the metro 
systems and the THSR into a“Formosa technological sublime”.  It symbolizes the 
collective national morality and bestows an identity on the new rising nation-state by 
building efficient operation, breathtaking architecture, a neat and ordered environment, 
and a disciplined but considerate metro culture. 
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Chapter 2: The Island 
U.S. Aid and Taiwan’s Dependence on American 
Hegemony of Science and Technology

	 “Everything in the past is like dying in yesterday; everything in the future is like living in 
tomorrow. From now,  no matter in public service or private life, all actions should be newborn. (從
前種種譬如昨⽇死，此後種種譬如今⽇⽣，今後公私⽣活與⼯作，皆應從新做起，⼀切措施
皆要新⽣。)” Chiang Kai-shek, 1950 
 “The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are 
limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are 
inexhaustible”—Harry Truman, 1949 
	 In October 1944 the Allies were about to launch Operation KINGII to get back the 
Philippines with their dominant fleets and air force. To prevent the Allies’ troops from 
landing there, the Empire of Japan not only gathered almost all of its navy in Southeast 
Asia.  It also launched a massive air strike on the U.S. Navy’s carriers from Taiwan, also 
called Formosa, the island colony next to China. As we know, the empire’s once-proud 
navy was quickly destroyed, as was the air force in Taiwan that only damaged two 
cruisers. Following General MacArthur’s plan, America bypassed Taiwan, engaging the 
Japanese in bloody battles in Okinawa in 1945. Thus, when Japan surrendered, Taiwan 
was free from the occupation of American troops. The U.S. left Taiwan to Chiang Kai-
shek, and his KMT  government. However, the KMT government’s catastrophic failure in 34
the Chinese Civil War and the following Korean War changed the historical trajectory of 
this island, that came under important American influence. Unlike in Okinawa, most of the  
U.S. there between 1950 and 1965 were not soldiers but engineers, managers, experts, 
and technical officials. We will call this period “the U.S. Aid period.” Facing the new 
situation of the decades-long Cold War, Taiwan was not only the final fortress for the 
 Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party 中國國⺠黨 was founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1894 34
and was reformed into the KMT by Chiang Kai-shek in 1919. It had ruled Taiwan for over 50 years 
since 1949, and it is the biggest opposition party in Taiwan now. 
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“Chinese Nationalists” but also the showcase of the “free world” under American 
hegemony not only for the military but also for science and technology. 

	 The initiating point of the development of Taiwan’s metro systems and the 
subterranean railways in Taipei can be traced back to the importation of the 
transportation planning profession. Although U.S. Aid was not directly involved in this 
process, it defined the political and institutional framework for American hegemony over 
the science and technology of transportation studies and planning. To understand how 
U.S. influence was embedded in Taiwan we need to understand the historical 
environment in Taiwan after 1949 and how it impacted the transnational importation of 
knowledge, people, and artifacts. What was Taiwan’s status from 1940 until 1965? What 
were the choices and the actions that Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT government took to 
deal with communist China’s threats, and with changing relations with the U.S., while 
developing the former island colony left by the collapsed Empire of Japan? To answer 
these questions we must describe the existing railway systems in Taiwan at the time to 
understand the local context, especially Taiwan’s Japanese colonial experience, so 
getting an idea of the rail mass transportation technology before the American factor 
began to play an important role in the country.  This will help us analyze the role played by 
the U.S. in developing mass transport in Taiwan, and introduce us to 

CUSA, the ad hoc institute set up to cooperate with the U.S. to manage and to execute 
the technical and economic assistance projects supported by U.S. Aid. 

Formosa, the Counterattack Base 
	 The Chinese faced no peace after the victory won by bitter struggles with imperial 
Japan in 1945.  It was followed by an even more severe civil war between the KMT 
government and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). Chiang Kai-shek and his army 
faced terrible defeats in the series of battles with the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), and 
Chiang and the KMT government moved from the mainland’s capital, Nanjing, to 
Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Chengdu in 1949. On October 1st, 1949, Mao Zedong 
announced the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) proclaiming that 
“the Chinese people have stood up!” at the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) in 
Beijing. Chiang had no choice but to retreat with his government to Taiwan in December 
of the same year . At that time, the Republic of China (R.O.C.), as a member of the Allies, 35
still did not sign any agreement with Japan to legally acquire the island although the KMT 
 In fact, Chiang flew to Taipei several times for preparation of setting Taipei as his temporary 35
capital in an earlier time in 1949.
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government had controlled it for years de facto based on General MacArthur’s General 
Order No. 1.  The island was Chiang and the KMT government’s final hope of survival.

	 At this time, the Truman Administration, disgusted with the KMT, believed that 
Taiwan would eventually be taken by the CCP without America’s intervention. With the fall 
of Taiwan, the U.S. could develop its relationship with Beijing so that the problem of 
whether to recognize the PRC could be solved automatically . Therefore, the Truman 36
Administration refused to provide any military assistance or intervention to save the KMT 
government from its critical condition. However, Chiang still set a goal of “counterattack” 
in Taiwan and waited for proper timing and resources to go back to the mainland. Taiwan 
became the “Counterattack Base (反攻基地)” for the Chinese nationalists. The KMT 
government declared martial law in Taiwan before its retreat to the island and tried to 
rebuild its army with the assistance of former imperial Japanese officers . It also initiated 37
a series of agrarian reforms to prevent the rise of communism on the island and modified 
the organization of the party . However, Taiwan and the KMT government were still under 38
the pressure of the CCP’s possible invasion due to Truman’s attitude and policies toward 
the Civil War.   Chiang’s own position was also unstable since the Department of State 
considered abandoning him altogether , and did not even mention a real 39
“counterattack.”

	 On 25 June 1950, Kim Il-sung and his Korean People’s Army (KPA) crossed the 
border between North and South Korea pushing the government of South Korea to the 
southeast corner of the peninsula within three months even though the U.S. decided to 
intervene in the war through the U.N. right after its eruption. After MacArthur invaded 
Incheon (Operation Chromite), the United Nations Command (UNC) reversed the situation 
pushing the KPA to the border between North Korea and China at the end of 1950. At the 
same time, the newly born PRC decided to send the People’s Volunteer Army, which was 
composed of the PLA to support North Korea confronting the UNC, that was mainly made 
up of U.S. troops and its allies’ forces. Chiang tried to persuade the U.S. to support his 
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military plan to invade the mainland to open a “second front” and to take pressure off the 
UNC.  Alternatively he offered to deploy his Nationalist forces to get involved directly in 
the Korean War. The Truman Administration preferred to utilize the Nationalist’s military 
strength only to monitor mainland China, rather than for the war in Korea, believing this 
would best serve the U.S.’s interests in Far East .
40
	 Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to ensure that there was no 
military conflict there just two days after the eruption of the Korean War. Then, in April 
1951, Truman relieved MacArthur, who supported the idea of the “second front” of his 
command. Chiang lost a vital ally supporting his counterattack goal, but he soon found 
that his best policy was to keep the extent of the mainland counteroffensive acceptable 
and manageable so as to ensure the legitimacy of his rule in Taiwan, which was now also 
the symbol of “Free China. ” After the inauguration of Eisenhower in 1952, the situation 41
on the strait remained the same despite Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, Forester 
Dulles’ anti-communist position, and, during the following eight years, rhetoric in the 
Eisenhower Administration tended to be more belligerent than actively engaged . 
42
	 In 1954, the PLA heavily bombarded Kinmen Island and other islands close to the 
southeast China coast, which were under the KMT government’s control, and then landed 
on the Tachen Islands in November, causing the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Also, the prime 
minister Zhou Enlai proclaimed the goal of “liberalizing Taiwan by force.” The crisis 
precipitated by the PRC was deliberate, as it coincided with Dulles’s arrival in Manila. 
Mao Zedong intended the action to forestall extending the protection of the SEATO (the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) to Taiwan. Such a calculated action, however, 
provided Chiang Kai-shek with perfect justification to push Washington toward the 
desired defense treaty . Responding to the PRC’s bold actions, Eisenhower and Dulles 43
sent the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson to Taiwan to 
negotiate and to sign a mutual defense treaty. After a two-month-long negotiation, the 
U.S. and the KMT government signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 
Washington, D.C., in December 1954. According to the treaty, if the R.O.C. came under 
attack, the U.S. was obliged to provide aid and military support and vice versa so that if 
communist China attacked Taiwan it would entail a military conflict with the U.S. too. It is 
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noteworthy that the Treaty only applied to the islands of Taiwan and Penghu (Pescadores 
Islands),  excluding mainland offshore islands like Kinmen and Matsu, This was to 
discourage the KMT government’s from embarking on any military action on mainland 
China.

	 In contrast, the safety of Taiwan, and of the KMT government, was secured, as well 
its legitimacy to represent China in the United Nations as the Republic of China. That is to 
say, Mao and the PLA could not cross the strait to merge Taiwan as a part of China, but 
nor could Chiang and his KMT government cross the strait to reach his counteroffensive 
goal of becoming the ruler of China again. Taiwan became a counterattack base which 
has never counterattacked , and, in Lin Hsiao-ting’s words, an “accidental state.”
44
The Railways: Japanese Colonial Context 
	 In the accidental state, Chiang Kai-shek owned almost nothing but his broken 
army and the island itself. However, although Taiwan’s economy and its infrastructure was 
severely damaged in WWII and the Chinese Civil War, this island, as a former Japanese 
colony, had its infrastructure, human resources, and an industrial base thanks to 
Taiwanese people, Japanese immigrants, and the Japanese colonial government’s half-
century of development. For example, Taiwan already had widespread power networks 
and railway systems all over the island before WWII. Moreover, during the War, the 
Japanese colonial government introduced heavy industries like chemical industries 
contracting Taiwan as the “South Bound Base (南進基地)” for the invasion of Southeast 
Asia. Many young Taiwanese were brought to Japan as supplement labor manufacturing 
military products in the late stages of WWII so that many Taiwanese received technical 
training from the Japanese . Obligatory education for all, and the higher education 45
system in Taiwan also prepared human resources needed for building the accidental 
state.  After the end of WWII and the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan’s industries still had a 
strong connection with Japan. Therefore, anyone who discusses the technological 
development of the country should not overlook the Japanese colonial context in Taiwan 
and the “Japanese factor” even nowadays, especially in rail transportation technology. 
 In fact, Chiang secretly launched several military actions invading islands in southeast China’s 44
coastal line in the 1950s and 1960s like Dongshan Island Campaign in 1953 and August 6th 
Campaign in 1965, and the KMT government also sent special forces or guerrilla into the 
mainland. However, these actions did not set a goal of permeant occupation of any land or just 
concentrated on information works.
 The Taiwanese documentary “Shonenko 綠的海平線” (2006) reveals the story of these young 45
Taiwanese technicians. The English name of the documentary, Shonenko 少年工, means 
“teenager worker” in Japanese. 
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Nor should one overlook the elite intellectuals and the capitalists who left the mainland 
and  moved to Taiwan, providing the KMT government with a basis for building a “Free 
China.”

	 The railways are useful for illustrating the Japanese colonial heritage and how it 
affected the local context for the KMT government. The history of railways in Taiwan can 
be traced back to 1887 when Taiwan was under the governance of the Great Qing 
Empire. In the Sino-Franco War (1883-1885), the French fleets and troops attacked 
Taiwan and Pescadores, trying to block the Taiwan Strait. Although the French failed to 
invade Tamsui, the most important port in north Taiwan, and Taipei, the capital city of 
Taiwan Prefecture at that time, the Imperial government found that Taiwan had critical 
strategic value for its coastal defense. Thus, it upgraded Taiwan’s administrative level to 
province-level after the end of the war and launched a series of modernization projects 
including coastal fortresses, the postal system, the telegraph system, power network, 
mining, and the railways. The first governor of Taiwan, Liu Mingchuan (劉銘傳), hired 
British engineers to plan and build a railway from Keelung to Hsinchu in 1887. Although 
Liu and his British engineers originally planned to finish the railway connecting the north 
port Keelung and the old capital Tainan in the south, Liu’s successor ceased the 
ambitious plan due to financial restraints so that the railway only reached the principal city 
in north Taiwan, Hsinchu, in 1893.

	 However, after 1895 when the Japanese became the next rulers of the island, they 
found that the railway was in a critical condition because the workers (mainly soldiers) 
had built the railway without following British engineers’ instructions and chose 
inappropriate materials and routes. For example, the bridge crossing the wide Tamsui 
River should have been built with steel, but the Chinese built a wooden one.  The bridge 
only lasted eight years after its completion. The Japanese admired Liu’s ambition, but 
lamented the failure of his project and rebuilt most of the railway in 1898 . After the ten-46
year-long construction period, the Japanese colonial government completed the West 
Coast Line connecting Keelung and the southern port city Takao.  For transporting 47
materials to build the railway, the colonial government built the Tamsui Branch Line 
 Watabe, Keinosuke 渡部慶之助, The Reading of Taiwan’s Railway 臺灣鐵道讀本 (Taipei: Taiwan 46
Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2006).
 Now Kaohsiung. The original Chinese character of Takao was 打狗, meaning “hitting dog” in the 47
Qing period. Japanese regarded the name indecent and changed it into 高雄, naming after a 
place near Kyoto, with the same pronunciation in Japanese. After 1945, the KMT government 
took the "de-Japanization” policy in Taiwan so that it kept the same Chinese character but 
changed its pronunciation into Chinese, Kaohsiung.
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connecting Tamsui harbor and Taipei, This Tamsui Line was the first railway built by the 
colonial government. After the accomplishment of the West Coast Line and Tamsui Line, 
the colonial government sequentially built the Coastal Line of the West Coast Line, the 
Yilan Line, the Pingtung Line, the Taitung Line (east coast), and other branch lines. It also 
planned to connect the Taitung Line with the Pingtung Line in the south and the Yilan Line 
in the north completing a railway network that encircled the island .  
48
 	 The private sector also contributed much to the development of railways in Taiwan. 
The Taiyang Mining Cooperation, which was founded by the Taiwanese Yan’s family from 
Keelung, completed the Pingxi Line for transporting coal from mines so that the first 
railway built by the private sector was built by the Taiwanese instead of Japanese. Then, 
many Japanese also started to build their railways for transporting coal, wood, salt, and 
sugar cane all around the island, and many of these railways also provided passenger 
service. Taipower (Taiwan Power Company) built the Jiji Line for its massive Mingtan Dam 
project in 1921, slightly later than Yan’s Pingxi Line. However, after the mid-1920s, the 
colonial government bought the private railways gradually. Hence, most of the railways 
were owned by the colonial government when the colonial period ended. The exceptions 
were the industrial railways. Then, when the KMT government landed Taiwan, the KMT 
government confiscated all Japanese property no matter whether they belonged to the 
colonial government or private companies so that all railways in Taiwan were under 
government and state-owned companies’ control after 1945. 

	 The railways in Taiwan have two gauges: 1067mm and 762mm. When Liu built the 
first railways in Taiwan, the British suggested using 1067mm due to Taiwan’s mountainous 
geography. Coincidently, 1067mm became standard in Japan for a similar reason. 
Therefore, when the Japanese received the railways left by the Chinese government, they 
decided to keep the same gauge so that the cars and locomotives could be compatible 
between the newly gained colony and the new mother country.  Thus, even today, 
Taiwan’s main lines and the branch lines connecting the main lines are 1067mm rather 
than more poplar worldwide 1435mm. The 763mm gauge is mostly used in industrial 
railways like sugar railways and forest railways for dealing with complex terrain in 
mountain areas at a lower cost. In central and south Taiwan, the widespread sugar 
railways played an important role in mass transportation for decades until the late 1970s. 
One sugar railway connecting the big city in central Taiwan Taichung and south Taiwan 
 This network was completed by the KMT government in 1992.48
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was 262.5km long and was planned to be a strategic railway if the PLA destroyed the 
West Coast Line.

	 Although Taiwan had widespread railway networks as the pictures below show, the 
Allies heavy bombardment and the Japanese empire’s lack of materials for maintenance 
during WWII critically damaged the country’s railway services . Moreover, the KMT 49
government expelled most Japanese technicians and managers, and Chinese technicians 
and managers were not familiar with the Japanese specifications used for the railways in 
Taiwan after WWII. Furthermore, the numbers of Chinese technicians could not fulfill the 
vacuum caused by the expelling Japanese. There were also shortages of materials like 
rails, sleepers, cement, gasoline, and coal, as well as money, so that Taiwan’s railways 
faced a considerable challenge for recovery from the disastrous war . 
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Figure 2.1: Taiwan’s Railways in the 1920s (left) 
 Figure 2.2: Taiwan’s Railways in 1955 (right) 
The situation of the island’s railways when the KMT government retreated to 
Taiwan reflects the whole picture of Taiwan’s economy and society: an island which was 
severely damaged by the war, a failed regime lacking resources, and millions of people, 
including the 6 million local Taiwanese and the 2 million immigrants moving to Taiwan with 
the KMT government. Moreover, this island needed to face the possible invasion from the 
other side of the strait. At this time, 1949 and early 1950, the U.S. refused to provide both 
military and economic resources to its former partner in WWII, so Taiwan, Chiang Kai-
shek, and the KMT government faced a life or death situation. However, the outbreak of 
the Korean War and the U.S. Aid that followed reversed a critical situation.

The U.S. Aid and the CUSA 
	 The so-called “U.S. Aid”, or “Mei Yuan (美援)” in Chinese, refers to the U.S.’s 
technological, economic, and military assistance between 1951 and 1965. This Aid was 
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based on the Mutual Security Act (MSA), which Congress approved in October 1951 as a 
response to the Korean War. The Act authorized economic and military aid to the nations 
friendly to the U.S. to strengthen mutual security and the individual and collective defense 
of "free countries,” including Taiwan. For the U.S.' part, the Aid was divided principally 
into t economic aid, managed by the Economic Cooperation Administration, Mission to 
China and the Agency for International Development (AID),  and military aid, managed by 51
the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG). The AID and the MAAG were overseen by 
the American Ambassador in Taiwan .
52
	 The background to U.S. Aid is the following. The U.S.' military protection 
guaranteed Taiwan and the KMT government’s safety because of the Korean War and the 
later development of a triangular relationship between the U.S., Taiwan, and China.  But 
this only a part of the story about this accidental island state after 1949 and how it started 
to develop its technology including transportation. For Chiang and the KMT government, 
although the security of the regime in Taiwan was ensured, they needed to improve its 
military, economic, and technological power to confront communist China so that “Free 
China” could show its supremacy over its communist rival. For the United States, once its 
“Chinese ally” was secured, it needed Taiwan to be strong enough to prevent the PRC’s 
possible invasion and to contain the PRC’s moves in the game of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, it also needed to show that the members of the "free world” could live a 
better life than those in the communist camp, especially as it had “Free China” on its side 
while the Soviet Union had “Red China” in its camp. Moreover, the U.S. further tried to 
shape how Taiwan would and should improve its military, technological and economic 
power to ensure the security of America’s hegemonic power in the western Pacific. For 
example, on the military side, while Chiang highly valued his Japanese military advisors 
for achieving his counterattack plan, the U.S. kept pressuring him to dismiss this military 
consulting group. As a result, the Japanese military consulting group kept a low profile for 
decades and its actions were also been restricted .
53
	 That being said, the U.S. also provided necessary military resources to the KMT 
government to confront communist China. For example, the R.O.C Air Force (ROCAF) 
 The United States Agency for International Development was founded in 1961 based on the 51
Foreign Assistance Act passed on the same year. Before 1961, the Economic Cooperation 
Administration, Mission to China, which was founded in 1948 based on the Foreign Assistance 
Act signed by Truman, and its subsequent institutes were in charge of the U.S. Aid.
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holds a record in military history: the first to shoot down an enemy plane with a missile. 
On September 24, 1958, ROCAF’s F-86 fighters shot down two PLA’s MiG-17 with AIM-9 
Sidewinder missiles.  The U.S. provided both of the F-86 and the AIM-9. As mentioned 
above, military assistance was included in U.S. Aid.

	 The technological and economic aspects of U.S. Aid followed a similar logic. It did 
not only provide direct financial resources like donations and loans to Taiwan. It also 
provided experts, knowledge, and practical projects, improving the infrastructure and 
economic power of the island. In the process, the U.S. sent American consultants and 
technical officials to Taiwan, ensuring that Taiwan would follow the America path to 
develop its technology and economy, although, as the following chapters show, the U.S.'s 
ambitions might not always have been completely satisfied.

	 Even though U.S. Aid started in 1951, the cooperation between the KMT 
government and the U.S. government in science and technology started in 1927 when 
KMT established the government in Nanjing, China, while Taiwan was still a part of the 
Japanese Empire. However, their cooperation would profoundly influence the 
development of technology, economy, society, and politics in Taiwan after WWII. As the 
KMT came to power in 1927, it rapidly became apparent that this modern Chinese state 
would need to develop strategies to foster and manage technology transfer that could 
assist with national development . From 1927 to 1937, ten years before the total military 54
conflict with Japan erupted, the KMT Nanjing government established patterns that it 
continued to employ even after it relocated to Taiwan. First, it set up institutions to exploit 
the resources from the U.S. or other countries to promote modernization of science and 
technology. The Academia Sinica and the National Economic Commission were typical 
examples. Second, it recruited talented technicians or external advisors into these 
institutions. Third, it established a cooperative relationship with foreign governments or 
foundations through which knowledge and technology could be transferred . Finally, 55
despite reliance on the import of knowledge, especially from America, the KMT 
government adopted flexible strategies to avoid total economic and technological 
dependence on any foreign countries.  This was to enable the government to adapt to 56
changing international and domestic circumstances by adjusting their approach to 
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interacting with foreign states and businesses and creating new institutions when 
needed . The model of the cooperation of science and technology between the KMT 57
government and the U.S. government could be regarded as a prototype of coproduced 
American technological hegemony, as Krige has described, since the KMT government 
consented to introduce American resources and experts and adopted their flexible 
strategies.

The CUSA and the JCRR(1949-1965) 
	 After the outbreak of the war against Japan, the cooperation between the KMT 
government and the U.S. was mainly economic and military assistance via the Lend-
Lease Program and the U.S. involvement in WWII. However, after the end of WWII, the 
Truman administration hesitated to continue to provide aid to the KMT government 
deemed ineffective and corrupt. In 1948 the KMT was facing its devastating defeat in the 
severe Chinese Civil War at the hands of the CCP. Under intense pressure from the China 
Lobby, an advocate group that strongly backed the KMT government in the House and 
the Senate for decades, the KMT government and the U.S. government signed the Sino-
American Economic Aid Agreement in Nanjing. Based on the agreement, the Council of 
United States Aid (CUSA) and the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural 
Reconstruction (JCRR) were set up in Nanjing. Although the CUSA and the JCRR were 
already founded in 1948 and initiated some technical projects and reform programs in 
China, the two institutes started to play vital roles once the KMT government retreated to 
Taiwan.

	 The CUSA was chaired by the Premier (President of the Executive) Yuan, and 
populated by other ministers of government, though it was financially separate from the 
government and ministries, making it semi-autonomous . This kind of special status 58
inside of the KMT government would provide the CUSA and its subsequent institute with 
power and importance that it enabled it to have an impact on the development of 
technology, including mass transportation technology, in Taiwan.

 	 In 1951, once the MSA was terminated, U.S. Aid flooded into Taiwan, and the 
CUSA continued its mission of managing the resources from this source, including direct 
financial and material assistance and technical assistance. U.S. economic aid of more 
than $1 billion equaled 43 % of gross investment during the decade and accounted for 
nearly 90% of the flow of external capital and donations. U.S. military aid freed local 
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resources from the otherwise intolerably heavy defense expenditures . For technical and 59
economic assistance, the CUSA and the Mutual Security, Mission to China  formed the 60
United States Aid Technical Assistance Committee to review technical and economic 
assistance projects and manage financial resources. This committee was composed of 
representatives from both Taiwan and U.S., including two members from the Mutual 
Security, Mission to China, two members from the JCRR, and three members from the 
CUSA. In 1958, the committee was reformed into the Joint Technical Assistance 
Committee with three committee members, and one of each from the Mutual Security, 
Mission to China, the CUSA, and the JCRR. The Committee could also establish 
consulting committees, and the convener of a consulting committee could recruit 
members from the three institutes for suggestions regarding training or technical 
assistance projects. The Office of Secretary of the Committee would review projects of 
technical assistance, recruit trainees, and compose assistance projects. The committee 
members of the Joint Technical Assistance Committee would review the projects brought 
by the Office. The Office would also communicate with the U.N. and other technical 
assistance units.

	 The CUSA and the Mutual Security, Mission to China hired the American 
consultants. G. White Engineering Co. as the consultant for arranging U.S. Aid. According 
to the agreement between White Engineering and the CUSA, White Engineering provided 
services of advisory and consultation assistance, pre-project work, development of 
authorized projects, individual assignments, and engineering and construction on specific 
projects for the CUSA’s program for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and economic 
development in the area of “China," including Taiwan . The fields included electric power, 61
transportation, communication, mining, logging, public works, and general industry. For 
example, White Engineering helped the Taiwanese government to extend its power 
generating capacity by improving or building new generators in the 1950s, and Taiwan 
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59
(1965): Pp. 152. 
 This administration was established in 1948 in Shanghai based on Foreign Assistance Act 60
signed by President Harry Truman. The names of the institute which was responsible for aiding to 
“China” changed several times. In 1948 when it was established, its name was Economic 
Cooperation Administration, Mission to China. It changed its name into Mutual Security Agency, 
Mission to China in 1952. It changed its name again in 1955, becoming International Corporation 
Administration, Mutual Security, Mission in China. Finally, its last name, which was given in 
1962, was Agency for International Development, U.S. Aid Mission to China. 
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中⼼, “the Contract between the CUSA and the Engineering 61
Consultants 美援會與美援⼯程顧問組合約,” May 18, 1958.
40
gained at least 295,850 KW thanks to U.S. Aid before 1955 . Moreover, the American 62
advisors even directed the Taiwan Power Company (TPC), a state-owned and the only 
power company in Taiwan, to improve its organization, accounting institution, and asset 
management . U.S. Aid also provided loans to Taiwanese state-owned companies or 63
private chemistry companies setting up the basis of the chemical industry in Taiwan . 64
The contracts between the CUSA and American advisors reveal that these American 
advisors also contributed their expertise to the food industry, road construction, and 
water supply. Moreover, besides hiring American advisors to provide technological 
services in Taiwan, the CUSA and the JCRR also sent Taiwanese technicians abroad to 
receive training. From 1951 to 1956, at least 1,160 Taiwanese technicians or officials went 
abroad for training or for other educational reasons. For instance, the Taiwan Power 
Company sent its technicians to America to receive training annually ever since. Wang 
Chang-chin (王章清, C. C. Wang), the future deputy of the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development (CEPD), who had been a significant actor in the development of rail 
mass transportation technology in Taiwan was also sent to the U.S. for a one-year 
internship in the Bureau of Public Roads . Wang joined road-building projects in Porto 65
Rico, Florida, and Pennsylvania. He also worked as a research assistant for a senior 
engineer in the Advanced Research Laboratory in the Bureau of Public Roads .   
66
	 The JCRR has played a unique role in the period of U.S. Aid and the following 
decades. When the KMT government tried to persuade the U.S. government to sign the 
Sino-American Economic Aid Agreement, Y. C. James Yen (晏陽初, Yen Yang-chu), an 
educator and organizer dedicated to the rural reconstruction movement, actively lobbied 
Congress on passing the China Aid Act to fund the rural reconstruction movement in 
China. After the JCRR was founded, it launched a program to improve the living standard 
of China’s rural area by rent reduction, the formation of cooperatives, agronomic and 
irrigation projects, and land reform. After the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, the 
JCRR's wide-ranging technical and financial assistance supported the Taiwanese 
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government's successful decentralized rural development strategy. That strategy's 
primary thrust was to raise the production and incomes of the island's thousands of 
small-farm families. It included land tenure reforms that secured families' titles to the land 
they tilled. It also included fostering local farmers' associations (cooperatives) . 
67
	 During these fifteen years, there was almost no serious disagreement between the 
KMT government and the U.S . Both the U.S. and the KMT government regarded 68
communist China as a primary threat to the “free world,” and the U.S. was willing to 
support the KMT government to antagonize China although it still did not encourage 
Chiang Kai-shek’s counterattack plan. The fact that President Eisenhower visited Taipei in 
1960 reveals the close relations between the U.S. and Taiwan. At the same time, because 
of the damage caused by WWII and the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan lacked technological 
power and infrastructure, and U.S. Aid contributed much to Taiwan’s economic growth, 
social stabilization, and massive infrastructure like power systems. Therefore, in many 
technological fields, Taiwanese engineers and technical officials highly relied on American 
resources and experts.  The best way to exploit limited resources was also heavily 
determined by American officials and consultants. Technological development in Taiwan 
did not only reflect its power but also its relations with the U.S.

	 The U.S. began to decrease its direct aid gradually when the time came in the 
1960s because Washington believed that Taiwan’s economy was strong enough to 
develop independently. In fact, after 1962, most of the U.S. Aid came to Taiwan in the 
form of loans. The decision, which began to take shape at the end of the 1950s, to 
terminate American economic aid to Taiwan derived both from the success of the effort, 
and the domestic U.S. need to discontinue a costly enterprise to free funds for other 
programs . In fact, the financial resources included the loan from the U.S. Aid and 69
coordination money. Therefore, as the previous section showed, the two governments 
used the existing funds to found the Sino- American Foreign Economic Development 
(SAFED) fund for future technology projects. Before the birth of the SAFED, in 1963, the 
CUSA was reformed as the Council for International Economic Cooperation and 
Development (CIECD) for applying and managing the resources of U.S. Aid (up to 1965), 
and as the SAFED (after 1965), and other technological and economic resources. The 
advent of the CIECD and the SAFED signaled the end of U.S. Aid. Taiwan, with its strong 
 Butterfield, S. H., U.S. Development Aid - An Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the 67
Twentieth Century. (Santa Barbra, CA: Praeger, 2004), Pp. 48. 
 Chang, “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress,” Pp. 105.68
 Tucker, Taiwan, Pp. 62.69
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economic growth in the 1950s and the 1960s, “graduated” from depending on U.S. Aid, 
and became an excellent example of the superiority of the American model of 
technological and economic development. However, this does not mean that Taiwan 
gained its total autonomy in technological development after 1965. Instead, it began to 
co-produce American hegemony in the domain of transportation studies and planning, 
that were shaped by American companies and consultants.

U.S. Aid and Taiwan’s Railways 
	 The transportation infrastructure was also an essential part of U.S. Aid. The most 
famous examples were the Xiluo Bridge (西螺大橋) and the MacArthur Thruway. The 
Japanese colonial government started to build the Xiluo Bridge in 1937, but the 
construction was suspended because WWII led to a shortage of steel. With the funding 
from U.S. Aid and help from White Engineering’s consulting, the bridge was completed in 
1953, becoming the second-longest bridge  in the world at that time. This bridge was 70
the first road bridge crossing the Zhuoshui River (濁水溪).  Before it was built those who 
wanted to cross the river needed to ride on trains or boats. The MacArthur Thruway was 
Taiwan’s first highway connecting Taipei and the northern port city Keelung. With the 
support of U.S. Aid, this road was completed in 1962 a month after General MacArthur’s 
death so that the KMT government decided to name this road in his honor . The 71
MacArthur Thruway and Roosevelt Road became only two roads that were named after 
foreigners in Taipei City.

 Its length is about 1,939m only shorter than the Golden Gate Bridge in the world at that time.70
 This highway was partially merged into the National Freeway No. 1 and partially merged into 71
local roads in Taipei and Keelung. The bridge at the start point of the highway, after the 
reconstruction in 1994, is named “MacArthur Bridge No.1 (麥帥一橋),” and the bridges completed 
in 1996 next it is named “MacArthur Bridge No. 2 (麥帥二橋)” in memory of this highway and 
General MacArthur.
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Figure 2.4: The MacArthur Thruway  73
	 The railways in Taiwan were also funded with U.S. Aid, that was badly needed after 
the damage caused by wars. U.S. Aid helped the Taiwan Railways Administration (TRA) 
which replaced the Department of Railways, Government-General of Taiwan 台湾総督府鉄
道部 in charge of the railways. 1067mm gauge was used to rebuild the railway services. In 
1948 after the KMT government and the U.S. signed the Sino-American Economic Aid 
Agreement in Nanjing, the U.S. sent teams to Taiwan to assess the situation, and then 
provided 1.5 million dollars as a loan to the TRA for purchasing materials and equipment 
for rebuilding railway services in Taiwan. Although continuous aid ceased when the U.S. 
decided not to support Chiang in the civil war, the TRA used the previous loan and its 
Taiwanese technicians to replace sleepers and rails, to fix locomotives and to rebuild 
bridges destroyed during wartime. Then, after U.S. Aid started to flow into Taiwan with the 
outbreak of the Korean War, the TRA obtained more Aid to buy eight steam locomotives, 




rebuilding its service. In 1951, the annual ridership and tonnage of freight both surpassed 
the peak in the colonial period . 
74
	 After the TRA recovered its service role, it continued to exploit U.S. Aid to refine 
and to expand its facilities and equipment. The TRA unified and modified the specs of 
rails and sleepers, and replaced them to improve the quality of transportation. Moreover, 
the TRA also used U.S. Aid to purchase new locomotives from the U.S. and Japan. In the 
late 1950s, the TRA tried to buy diesel trains to replace old steam locomotives and to 
introduce a central train control system (CTC) into Taiwan for more efficient operation. To 
buy the diesel trains, the TRA paid  NTD230,000,000 for the passenger cars and used 
NTD880,000,000 for spare parts for the trains. U.S. Aid also attributed 2.09 million dollars 
for the installation of the CTC system .
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Figure 2.5: The type CT 270 locomotive purchased with the U.S. Aid  76
 Yu, “U.S. Aid,” Pp. 58.74




Besides the purchase of hardware like locomotives, passenger cars, wayside 
facilities, and the control system, U.S. Aid also sponsored the TRA to send its technicians 
and managers to receive training aboard. Moreover, the Taiwanese government and the 
Agency of Mutual Security, Mission to China hired American consultants to help the TRA 
to improve its financial, operational, and management systems. The consultants were 
mainly hired by White Engineering, that was in charge of the execution of the projects 
supported by U.S. Aid, and then sent to the TRA to provide professional services . 77
However, American consultants’ experience was not always brought in by the TRA. For 
example, the TRA disagreed with the American advisor who used to work on the 
Pennsylvania Railway as vice president as regards the usage of trains and operating 
focus. It did all it could to persuade the American advisor to follow its suggestions, rather 
than adopt his proposals. For example, the American advisor suggested  that the TRA 
focus more on freight and short distance passenger transpiration due to his experience in 
the Pennsylvania Railway. The TRA persisted with its policy of relying more on intercity 
passenger service .
78
	 In sum, U.S. Aid contributed much to the recovery of Taiwan’s railway service and 
its improvement. However, we find that the railways in Taiwan kept their Japanese specs, 
and U.S. Aid only helped its recovery and its improvement of the same track instead of 
thoroughly changing them as urged by the American consultants involved in the projects. 
Moreover, we also find that U.S. Aid did not directly get involved in any new line 
construction or comprehensive plan of the railway system. The TRA built some new lines 
during this period but only followed the plan left by the Japanese, for example, the 
Neiwan Line. One obvious American factor in the TRA was the locomotive and diesel 
trains bought from the U.S., though it also bought trains from Japan. The other American 
factor that is revealed in the TRA’s management and operation is the training received by 
technicians and managers sent to the U.S. However, even today, the TRA still uses the 
Japanese index system for its maintenance and procurement, and the TRA seemed not to 
follow the American advisor’s suggestion for its operation in the 1950s and the 1960s. 
Therefore, despite U.S. Aid’s contribution to the recovery of the railway service in Taiwan 
and its improvement, the TRA and its railways did not yet walk in the tracks of 
“Americanization.” And this is not even to mention the idea of technological hybridity that 
I discuss in the introduction and later chapters. U.S. Aid saved Taiwan’s railways as it 
 Yu, “U.S. Aid,” Pp. 82-89.77
 Yu, “U.S. Aid,” Pp. 101-102.78
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saved the KMT government and the island itself, but it did not transform them as it 
transformed other technological fields at the same time. All the same, I must emphasize 
that U.S. Aid and the background framing it produced already set the stage for the 
American hegemony of science and technology of transportation. The Americanization 
and the future hybridity did not happen on the TAR’s track before 1965 but would happen 
later at a higher level: the production of knowledge.

U.S. Aid and the American Hegemony of Science and 
Technology 
	 If the contribution of U.S. Aid to Taiwan’s transportation, especially railways, was 
mainly on recovery or construction of particular cases like the MacArthur Thruway, the 
question arises: what is the meaning of U.S. Aid for the technological hybridity of rail 
mass transportation? First of all, we can easily find that U.S. Aid provided not only 
financial and material resources to Taiwan but also its technical consultants and experts 
in practical projects. Furthermore, these consultants did not merely do all the jobs for 
their clients, and instead, they co-worked with Taiwanese technical officials and engineers 
so that the Taiwanese could learn how Americans practice their jobs in different 
technological fields. Besides, many of the projects supported by U.S. Aid would send 
technicians and managers to the U.S. to receive education and training. Therefore, 
although Taiwan’s railways or transportation system  remained on the stage of recovery of 
individual construction cases, other technological fields like power, agriculture, and the 
textile industry already took the path of “Americanization.”   The Cold War context and the 
institutions it spawned for the execution of the U.S. Aid was in place, and these 
institutions and context can be regarded as the origination and background for the future 
Americanization of transportation science and the subsequent hybridity. 

	 To understand the meaning of U.S. Aid in our discussion of technological hybridity, 
I argue that we need to put U.S. Aid into an analytic frame of the U.S.’ global strategies in 
the Cold War. U.S. Aid’s emphasis on technical assistance to boosting the receiving 
countries’ technological power by following American models, echoes Truman’s 
inauguration speech about his foreign policy. Thus when he mentioned the fourth object 
of his foreign policy announcing the so-called “Point Four Program:”

	 “We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their 
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economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the 
knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent 
among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material 
resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our 
imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are 
inexhaustible."

	 By emphasizing the problem of “underdevelopment” among the members of the 
“human family,” the president conveyed the idea that the destitute societies of the non-
Western world were not trapped in a necessary condition of “backwardness” by the 
particularities of race or culture. The transmission of investment capital, technical 
knowledge, and activist values, moreover, could dramatically accelerate their productivity 
and progress, enabling them to leap the gap toward liberal modernity.    Development 
would alleviate the desperation in which radicalism flourished . America’s scientific and 79
technological advancement here, in the Cold War, became not only the means to confront 
Soviet competition in many different fields, including the economy, military, and culture. It 
was also an indispensable part of its global strategy. This part of the strategy was based 
on the view of American exceptionalism— the idea that the United States had a unique 
role and mission in history and that America’s interests were not narrow and parochial but 
embodied the interests of all with the goal, as defined by Woodrow Wilson, ”to make the 
world safe for democracy. ” The U.S. exploited its predomination of resources and 80
knowledge to attract the neutral countries like India to join the “Free World” or at least not 
to join the communist campaign.

	 Nonetheless, I need to add two points. First, American technical assistance was 
not limited to the non-Western countries or neutral countries; instead, the U.S. also 
provided technical assistance to its allies and west European countries. Second, despite 
exploitation of its immense military, economic, and technological power, the U.S. did not 
merely strengthen its allies or make non-Western countries productive preventing the 
growth of radicalism, but also tried to insert the “American model” into countries to 
reshape the economic, scientific, technological, social, and political orders. John Krige’s 
case studies of the international cooperation of science and technology in Europe provide 
much insight. In Western Europe, before Truman announced the Point Four Program, the 
 Latham, Right Kind of Revolution, Pp. 11.79
 Krige, American Hegemony, Pp. 6.80
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Marshall plan not only provided economic aids to Western European countries for 
economic and social recovery but also for rebuilding their science . After the Point Four 81
Program was announced, Krige keeps pointing out, the U.S. government provided 
financial aid, experts, collaboration projects, and education and training to help Europe to 
reconstruct its scientific communities and knowledge-producing mechanisms. The U.S. 
was also dedicated to integrating transnational scientific institutes, and American 
foundations like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations also joined in the reconstruction of 
science in postwar Europe . The goal of using scientific and technological power was to 82
shape a global environment with the political order which did not threaten its dominant 
status. Krige calls this kind of effort and power the American hegemony of science and 
technology, and the U.S. used the hegemonic power globally in the Cold War period for 
decades. By sharing knowledge, Americans tried to use its dominant power to shape the 
world . 
83
	 One of the essential characteristics of the American hegemony of science and 
technology is the co-production of both the U.S. and the aid receivers’ consent for 
building the hegemonic power. The power gap between the U.S. and its technical 
assistance-receiving countries was not only a threat but also a lure to these countries. 
However, when one speaks of consensual hegemony, it does not mean that the 
Europeans always agreed to do what the representatives of the United States suggested 
or always accepted the proposals that they made. On the one hand, the local elites and 
scientists accepted American aid and the American model with their consent and 
cooperation when they found the American model appealing to their requirement; on the 
other hand, they might turn the American model down or find alternative options. In 
Krige’s case studies of postwar Europe, Europeans willingly cooperated in the 
reconstruction of their scientific capacity; they had little choice, and they were given 
enough latitude to adapt the American model to local circumstances, or even to react 
against it all together. Latham also finds that postcolonial leaders in South Asia often 
followed Soviet models of development plans and the promotion of foreign and domestic 
investment and they frequently stressed the crucial role of a powerful central government 
in controlling a large public sector while glad to receive the U.S.' assistance .
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	 Returning our focus to the discussion of U.S. Aid in Taiwan. Taiwan or the R.O.C. 
was a country that should not be overlooked when we discuss the Cold War in Asia, 
especially when we focus on the transnational history of science and technology. It has 
been America’s foremost economic, political, and strategic partner for decades either as 
an ally confronting communist China during the 1950s and 1960s or as leverage of the 
U.S.-China relations during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Taiwan received much 
technical assistance from the U.S. during the Cold War and, with that assistance, became 
one ‘emerging’ country with strong economic growth and considerable technological 
power. Furthermore, especially in the period of U.S. Aid, the KMT government, facing the 
critical issue of survival and the enormous weight of American power, built the institutions 
needed for co-working with American consultants and technical officials. The government 
surrendered partial autonomy to its protector in exchange or financial resources, 
materials, knowledge, and military protection so that the accidental state could not only 
survive the communist threat but also gain technological power until the moment when it 
retrieved its autonomy. For the U.S., it could consolidate its ally next to China confronting 
communist competitors and shape the showcase of the American model without eroding 
the legitimacy of being the leader of the "free world” by leaving Taiwan partial autonomy 
and some control of its economic and technological policy. 

	 Thus I argue, first, that the history of Taiwan’s technological development and of 
American technical assistance in Taiwan need to be examined under the structure of t 
U.S. global strategies revealed and initiated by the Point Four Program in the Cold War. 
The approach followed by scholars like Krige and Latham in their studies of Europe and 
South Asia can also be exploited in the case of Taiwan. Furthermore, the idea of American 
hegemony of science and technology would be useful when we talk about the U.S.’ 
technical assistance in Taiwan. As the discussion in the later chapters shows, the U.S. 
used its predominant financial and technological resources to help Taiwan to build its 
profession of transportation planning and inserted the American model of transportation 
studies and planning into Taiwan with the technical consultants, technical documents, 
education training, and technological artifacts. At the time, Taiwanese technical officials 
and political leaders were also willing to receive American resources and to follow 
American advisors’ suggestions forming the coproduction of the American hegemony of 
science and technology of transportation. Furthermore, transportation technology was 
not the only instance, and we may find a similar situation in agriculture, the textile 
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industries, defense industries, and many technological or industrial fields. In this sense, 
“U.S. Aid” exemplified the American hegemony of science and technology.

	 The case of railways shows the variation of the development track between 
different technological fields, although the recovery and improvement of the railways 
should recognize U.S. Aid’s support. As regards the development of the railways and 
transportation technology in Taiwan during the period of U.S. Aid, we cannot find 
indisputable evidence showing that American support led to the Americanization of 
Taiwan’s railways or the whole transportation system. Instead, the Japanese context left 
by the colonial period played a more prominent role when the TRA started to learn from 
America in the management phase and bought trains from America. However, we cannot 
just conclude that the railways were an exception to the American hegemony of 
technology; instead, we can conclude that U.S. Aid built the institutional and political 
stage for the Americanization of transportation studies and planning in Taiwan. In fact, 
before 1965, the most critical mission for the TRA was to recover, extend, and improve its 
service, meaning that it did not have enough time and resources to reform the whole 
railway system into the American model. Frankly, rebuilding the whole network along  
American lines was unrealistic. Thus, Taiwan’s railways received U.S. Aid, but the 
coproduction that occurs in hegemonic power relations did not happen yet. We need to 
move our focus to the period of the CIECD and the SAFED from 1965 to 1979 to see how 
hegemony was built and how it worked in detail in the field of transportation technology. 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Chapter 3: The Transportation Planning 
Board (TPB) 
The Founding of Transportation Planning in Taiwan 
and the Transportation Planning Board 1966-1972

“On education, in fact, that was the most satisfying and pleasant part for me although I 
accomplished it unintentionally[…… ]the main reference was the things that the guys in the 
University of Pennsylvania used in urban planning projects at that time, and I taught urban planning 
and transportation all together discussing their relations. (提到教育這部分，事實上也是我覺得最
滿意也及安慰的事情，也是無⼼插柳......主要就是參考賓州⼤學他們當時都會區計畫那套東
西，我上課就是把都市計畫跟交通⼀起講，講兩者關係如何)” Dr. Chiang, Yu-sheng, 2010. 
“The central government should perform more leadership in transportation planning and 
coordination. If the newly founded Transportation Planning Broad would like to be effective, it 
needs to have professional experts, and they should have strong analytical ability. (中央政府應在運
輸計畫與配合⽅⾯發揮更多之領導⼒。新成⽴之運輸計畫委員會如欲產⽣效果，即需有專職
之⼯作⼈員，且需具有堅強之分析能⼒)” Edward Prentice, American transportation economist, 
1970.  
Dr. Chiang Yu-sheng’s Story 
 In 1968, Chiang Yu-Sheng , a graduate student of the Private Chinese Culture University 85
(PCCU) majoring in architecture and urban planning, was invited by his advisor, Yeh Chang-Chu 
(葉昌鑄), to his office in downtown Taipei City. Chiang was quite nervous about this invitation 
since he had been absent from Prof. Yeh’s class for almost half of a semester, spending most of his 
 Dr. Chiang, Yu-sheng 姜渝生 (1943-2011) was a professor of transportation and urban planning 85
in National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan. Before he went to Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology pursuing a Ph.D. degree in transportation planning, he worked as an assistant in 
UHDC from 1968 to 1970 and chief of planning group in TPB from 1970 to 1975 when are the first 
five years of TPB. The material about Dr. Chiang's experience comes from his interview in a 
booklet that was sent in his funnel in memory his contribution to transportation and urban planning 
in Taiwan. He was also a poet publishing his works in literary magazines.
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time running his literary magazine. However, Prof. Yeh told Chiang that he had the highest score in 
the midterm exam of his class, and he also appreciated his writing, so he invited Chiang to join the 
transportation group as a writing assistant in the Urban Housing and Development Committee 
(UHDC) of the CIECD (Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development, formed 
from the Council for U.S. Aid, CUSA). To deal with the financial pressure on his literary magazine, 
Chiang agreed. In this role he worked with Prof. Yeh, his Taiwanese teammates, and international 
consultants deployed by the U.N., completing his master’s thesis, Research on the 
Transportation Demand in Taipei (台北運輸需求研究).  This led to a career as an urban and 
transportation planning scholar. In the preface of his master thesis, he writes: 
“I learned mechanical engineering but obtained nothing, then I turned to 
architecture also gaining nothing. So, I happily studied urban planning.  However, with 
calm observation and thinking, I found that there are so many urban issues that it is 
difficult to study even one-tenth of them, so I decided to specialize in urban transportation.  
Here I finally realized that human dwelling, life and death, and moving and remaining 
where you are, follow certain rules. It is not determined by destiny but, at least, human 
nature makes it inevitable. Thus I began to study the development and limitations of 
human behavior and the knowledge of management as methodology, so that I could 
gradually exploit the knowledge and enjoy my studies for years.”
In 1970, Chiang and the entire transportation group in the UHDC were transferred 
to the newly founded Transportation Planning Board (TPB) in the Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication.  This institute had played a vital role in the history of transportation in 
Taiwan, contributing their experience and learning to transportation studies and planning 
with the international consultants. However, Chiang found that he needed to learn more 
than he could get in the TPB, so he left it and went to MIT to pursue his Ph.D. degree in 
transportation planning in 1975. After his return, Chiang became a leading scholar in 
Taiwan, dedicating much time and effort to many urban and transportation planning 
projects for decades.  Sadly, he passed away from cancer in 2011 at the age of 68.
Chiang’s early career occurred during an essential moment in Taiwan’s 
transportation studies and planning, and it shows how Taiwanese and international 
consultants founded the profession and how the transnational knowledge of transportation 
evolved in Taiwan. In the second half of the 20th century, the birth of a metro system, or 
even a line, started to be based on scientific studies of population, traffic flow, economic 
activities, and regional development rather than business or political leaders’ instincts and 
rather elementary traffic engineering calculations. Transportation studies and planning, 
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what we can call the making of the knowledge of streets and a city, would decide whether, 
which, how, and when a metro line would be built. Therefore, we cannot ignore the history 
of transportation studies and planning in Taiwan if we want to write the history of Taipei’s 
subterranean railway and the Taipei Metro. Furthermore, the institutions for technology 
transfer built while U.S. Aid flowed and the U.S. played a hegemonic role in Taiwan, as 
well as the changes in  U.S.-Taiwan relations,  created a suitable environment for the 
making of hybrid knowledge and technology in the Taipei Metro and  influenced the 
development of transportation studies and planning in Taiwan. In fact, Taipei’s 
subterranean railway and the Taipei Metro can be seen as the extension of the history that 
Chiang had experienced.    
The UHDC and its Transportation Group 
	 When U.S. Aid ended in 1965 the KMT government had anticipated the change 
and had prepared for the moment. It reformed the CUSA as the CIECD to gain more 
resources for Taiwan’s technological development. Changing the name meant changing 
the mission. Although the chairs of the CIECD were not the Prime Minister (except for the 
first chair, Chen Cheng, who was also the final chair of the CUSA), the CIECD retained its 
semiautonomous status within the government. Its financial resources were taken from  
the government budget and the chairs of the committee, Yen Chia-kan and Chiang 
Ching-Kuo, who succeeded Chiang Kai-shek as the president of the R.O.C. as presidents 
after Chiang’s died, were at the highest level of the regime. Thus even though U.S. Aid 
ended, the institution built using U.S. Aid lasted Moreover, the reformation reflects the 
KMT government’s efforts to seek resources for technological and economic 
development in Taiwan rather than America. The KMT government lost the whole of China 
in the Civil War, but the R.O.C. had had China’s seat in the U.N. and was one of the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council until 1971. The KMT 
government had already applied for some technical assistance projects from the U.N. in 
the 1950s . From 1960, the KMT government also applied for the United Nations Special 86
Fund for more considerable financial and technical resources, and it applied for the 
program of transportation and infrastructure in 1965 when U.S. Aid ended.

	 Like the technical assistance projects in the U.S Aid program, the U.N. Special 
Fund also deployed consultants to Taiwan working with Taiwanese engineers and 
 Wu, Shu-Fong 吳淑鳳, “The Examples of the Historical Materials of the U.N.’s Technical 86
Assistance to Taiwan in the Academia Historica 國史館藏聯合國技術援臺史料” in Academia 
Historica Research Newsletter 國史研究通訊 No.2 (2012): Pp. 175.
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technical officials. At the same time the CIECD sent Taiwanese to developed countries to 
receive education and training. For instance, the Taiwanese government applied to a 
project for the development of livestock industries on hillsides to the U.N. Special Fund, 
that was approved in 1960 before the advent of the CIECD. In this project, the Taiwanese 
government established a research center in the Livestock Institute, Taiwan Province 
Government, and two demonstration pastures. The demonstration pastures were used to 
show how a hillside pasture should be run and to train professional technicians. The U.N. 
also deployed two international advisors to Taiwan to study the potential of the 
development of hillside livestock industries, and Taiwanese officials also took the chance 
to invite the international advisors to provide short-tern education training and workshops 
for them hoping that every Taiwanese technical official and technician could work 
independently after the international advisors left. Besides, the project also provided 
scholarships to those who joined the project to receive further training aboard . CUSA’s 87
archive also shows that the U.N. Special Fund helped the Taiwanese government to study 
and to plan the development of the Wu River and the Zhuoshui River, including economic 
studies of land reclamation with international experts .
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Before we move our focus to the UHDC and its transportation group, we need to 
look at urban planning and transportation planning in Taiwan before 1965. Although Taiwan 
lacked experts in urban planning when the UHDC was established, Taiwan still had a basis 
of urban planning left by the Japanese. In 1900, the Japanese colonial government 
devised the first urban planning project in Taiwan’s history for the newly founded Taichung 
City and proposed another project for the capital Taipei City. Then, in the following 
decades, the Japanese devised and implemented 72 urban planning projects in Taiwan, 
and established their laws for urban planning. After the KMT government retreated to 
Taiwan, it adopted the Japanese projects and laws for over two decades. Some plans are 
even used a half a century later. For example, Daan Forest Park, which is also called  
“Taipei’s Central Park," is often called “Park No.7” because the Japanese planned this park 
as the seventh park in Taipei City, and Taipei City Government completed it in 1994. Wang 
 Wu, “Examples,” Pp. 176-177. 87
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中⼼, “the Contract between the CUSA and the Engineering 88
Consultants 美援會與美援⼯程顧問組合約,” November 19, 1962.
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Chang-chin (abbreviated as C.C. Wang ), who was the director of the Bureau of Public 
Works in Taiwan Provincial Government  at that time, mentioned: 89
“Urban planning is fundamental for the construction for cities, and so-called public 
works, without urban planning, will seem groundless, especially for the construction for 
cities……At that time, the city’s and country’s government neither had the budget nor the 
professional human resources needed so the Bureau of Public works had no choice but to 
take on the job of urban planning “ 90
Wang’s words reveal the plight of lacking experts for urban planning in the KMT 
government. Moreover, thanks to Taiwan’s strong economic growth in the 1950s and 
1960s, the lack of human resources and professionals became even worse.   Wang’s 
colleague, Lin Tzu-yu (林子瑜), points out the problems:
“Because of Taiwan’s development at this time, the direction of people’s movement 
was obvious: dramatic urbanization brought shock, and even some sections between 
Taipei and Taoyuan of the Provincial Highway No.1 were still unpaved with only four lanes, 
not even to mention central and southern Taiwan……Without urban planning, the 
government could not acquire land for broadening roads. The other issue is population. 
People rushed into cities in a short time, and most of them were young people who moved 
out of rural areas due to a lack of jobs. They mostly needed to build their home in the 
cities, hence the problem of a shortage of schools emerged. Again, without urban 
planning, we did not know where to build new schools and could not levy land, either. ”  91
For the transportation part, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication 
(MOTC) and the Taiwan Provincial Government had technical offices to set rules and 
specs for traffic engineering. The TRA also built some branch lines following the Japanese 
colonial government’s plans. Moreover, at this time, Taiwan did not have any 
comprehensive transportation plan nationwide, not to mention a plan or even 
 According to the KMT government’s definition and the constitutional structure of the R.O.C., the 89
KMT government was the only legal government representing China even though it only ruled 
Taiwan, Pescadores, Kinmen, and Mazhu. The KMT government sill kept Taiwan Provincial 
Government 臺灣省政府 and Fujian Provincial Government 福建省政府 (for Kinmen and Mazhu) 
symbolizing its legal ruling position of whole China and the connection with China instead of 
reforming its government’s organization to fit the size of the land it ruled. After 1998, most of the 
affairs of the two provincial governments were replaced by other institutes, and the two provincial 
governments kept downsizing. In 2018, the Taiwanese government terminated all budgets for the 
provincial governments and only kept the positions of government and the name to comply with the 
constitution.
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transportation studies at the municipal or regional level. The KMT government did have a 
basis for urban and transportation planning, but, ironically, the basis exposed how the 
government lacked experts, professionals, and resources because even the law for urban 
planning was inherited from the Japanese without significant changes.
In this critical situation, the Taiwanese government submitted applications for 
projects to the UN Special Fund.  The U.N. approved the projects in 1966. After approval, 
CIECD established the UHDC for implementing urban planning projects, transportation 
planning projects, the legislation of urban planning, and for human resources planning. 
The secretary of the CIECD held the position of chairman of the UHDC, and the ministry 
of the interior served as convener. C.C. Wang took the position of executive secretary 
while serving in the Bureau of Public Works in the provincial government as the director. 
The UHDC had 17 to 19 committees and ten research groups with foreign advisors who 
were dispatched by the U.N. The U.N. advisory group was led by Donald Monson who 
was an adviser to President Truman's Commission on Urban Problems and engaged in 
many urban planning and urban renewal projects in the U.S., Europe, and South 
America . Donald Monson’s wife, Astrid Monson, an urban sociologist, was also a 92
member of the advisory group, and she worked for the UHDC without charge. These 
international advisors would cooperate with Taiwanese counterpart experts in different ad 
hoc groups, and many young people who majored in urban planning or related 
professions would be recruited into these groups . This is how Dr. Chiang, his 93
colleagues, and his advisor Prof. Yeh started to work in the UHDC.

Table 3.1: the members of the UN Advisor Group 
The Members of the UN Advisor Group*
Unit Title Name Nationality 
UN Chief Advisor Donald Monson US
UN Deputy Chief Advisor Karl J. Belser US
UN Transportation Advisor Lewis R. Coyle US
UN General Research Advisor Alfred Schinz Germany
UN Urban Society Advisor Paul E. Kovennock US
 Chen, Shiang-Qin 陳湘琴, “A Historical Research on the “Urban Planning Act” Presented by 92
Urban and Housing Development Committee (UHDC)and U.N. Advisor Group 都市建設與住宅計畫
小組（UHDC）和聯合國顧問團研議台灣「都市計畫法」之歷史研究“ in Journal of Environment & 
Art 環境與藝術學刊, NO.9(2011): Pp.47-67. 
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*    The chart is generated by Chen, Shiang-Qin, Supra, at Pp. 54. **  Data lost. 
	 After the KMT government submitted its application to the U.N., the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) sent Monson to Taiwan to investigate the situation 
there.  While working at John Hopkins University with a WHO fellowship as a visiting 
scholar, C.C. Wang often went to New York to discuss Taiwan’s case with Monson and 
U.N official Kenneth Watts.  This may have played a role in the U.N. decision to approve 
Taiwan’s application. . 
94
	 C.C. Wang asked international advisors to study Taiwan’s environment, to look out 
for problems specific to the country, and to present working projects and schedules. 
Every advisor and his counterpart needed to report what they did weekly in a meeting 
held with him. At the same time, the international advisors started classes for young 
members in the UHDC and students who studied or worked in related institutes, 
introducing them to urban planning theories and case studies in the advanced countries. 
“ At that time,” C.C. Wang mentions in the interview for the oral history of the early 
development of urban planning in postwar Taiwan. “ The fifth floor of the old Taiwan 
Cement Building on ZhongShan N. Road had an atmosphere of a research institute of 
UN Urban Planning Advisor Edmund T. Ames US
UN Financial and Urban 
Administration Advisor
Alek A. Rozental US
UN Housing Advisor Samuel S. Zadik Israel 
UN Housing Advisor Eric R. Gold Canada
UN Transportation Economics 
Advisor
Edward Prentice US
UN Educational Training Advisor Sigurd Ghava US
WHO Environmental Hygiene 
Advisor
Benedicto L. ?** Not sure
CIECD Land and Housing Advisor Astrid Monson US
The Members of the UN Advisor Group*
Unit Title Name Nationality 
 Academia Sinica, Records of Interviews, Pp. 46. After the application was accepted, one of 94
Wang’s friends working in the Embassy of the R.O.C. suggested that Wang apologize to the 
minister who was in charge of economic affair since Wang got involved in the diplomatic mission 
without informing the diplomat who was supposed to be responsible for it. Wang did so.
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urban planning even though it had no sound of students’ reading .”  During 1966 and 95
1972, the UHDC completed about 250 working events and reports on urban planning, 
housing policies, land exploitation, transportation, administration, environment, industries 
and economy, and other events. The significant examples were the plan for the New Town 
Project of Linkou , the draft of the Housing Law, and the transportation studies of Taipei 96
City .  Furthermore, the supervisors in the UHDC planned to establish a department of 97
urban planning at the National Taiwan University (NTU), where the international advisors 
could hold classes for the new department. Unfortunately, the NTU did not have enough 
space to house a new department. Coincidently, National Chung Hsing University  
(NCHU) planned to build an institute for urban planning and the UHDC helped NCHU to 
establish an institute there. National Cheng Kung University (NCKU) also founded its 
department of urban planning at this time. . In sum the advent of the UHDC boosted the 98
foundation of the profession of urban planning in Taiwan.

	 According to the list of international advisors, most of them came from the U.S.; 
only a few came from elsewhere.  Together they contributed much to the profession of 
urban planning in Taiwan, incubating young experts, setting the standards of urban 
planning, and joining practical projects directly. It is worth stressing that, although the 
reformation of the CIECD and the arrival of the U.N. advisors were the response of the 
KMT to the termination of U.S. Aid,  and intended to secure other sources of technical 
assistance, American expertise remained the primary resource in the process of building 
Taiwan’s profession of urban planning. Although this indicates the Americanization of 
urban planning in Taiwan during the period of the UHDC, some care is needed before 
drawing such a conclusion. For example, one needs to establish the content that the 
American advisors taught their Taiwanese students, to know whether Taiwan’s urban 
plans followed American cases or models when American advisors were involved in the 
projects, and how Taiwanese planners did their research and planning after their advisors 
 Academia Sinica, Records of Interviews, Pp. 47.95
 Linkou District, New Taipei City (新北市林口區) is an administrative district next to Taoyuan City 96
which used to be Linkou Township, Taipei County. Linkou was designed as a satellite city in Taipei 
Metropolitan to release the pressure of overpopulated in central Taipei Metropolitan. In fact, during 
the recent decades, Linkou’s population has risen dramatically due to the accomplishment of 
National Freeway No.1, industrial areas near it, universities, hospitals, and the metro line 
connecting Taipei City and the Taoyuan International Airport.
 Chen, “A Historical Research,” Pp. 50-53.97
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left. Dr. Chiang’s statements and the CIECD’s archives suggest, however, that there was 
indeed a gradual Americanization of the knowledge of transportation.

The transportation group’s missions in the UHDC were to make traffic flow surveys 
and to cooperate with the urban planning group. In these missions, Lewis R. Coyle, the 
advisor for the transportation group, mainly directed the members of the group to calculate 
the numbers of vehicles on roads and rings. Moreover, when C.C. Wang was forming an 
ad hoc group to deal with the problem of the railways crossing through Taipei City, Coyle 
not only attended the meeting but also set the study procedures, including what data the 
ad hoc group needed and how the study should be run. Taking this approach, he 
emphasized that the railway problem could not be disassociated from the overall 
transportation problem in the Taipei area. Coyle thus brought the need for transportation 
research, which was just becoming mature in the U.S., to Taiwan . Also, he brought the 99
Highway Research Record (HRR)  to the UHDC. The HRR presented new transportation 100
research and case studies in America to the members of the transportation group so that 
they could exploit its method and theory in their mission. Dr. Chiang mentions that many 
studies were completed with the procedures and methodology revealed in the HHR. Also, 
as C.C. Wang mentions, Prof. Yeh invited Coyle to offer courses for the members in the 
UHDC, although Dr. Chiang did not attend the course. By working with Taiwanese 
technical officials, Coyle could demonstrate how an American transportation planner did 
research and a planning project using his experience working in American cities. By 
bringing his experience and the journals to Taiwan, young Taiwanese experts like Dr. 
Chiang would directly absorb the knowledge and methodology based on American case 
studies. 
Dr. Chiang’s words exhibit how consultants planted American experience in the 
transportation group's works. During his service in the transportation group, Dr. Chiang 
decided to choose "Research on Transportation Demand in Taipei City” as his masters 
thesis topic. He believed that he needed to follow the experience of American 
transportation research by making home visits so that he could understand urban citizen’s 
transportation behavior. With the data collected from home visits, he could form a 
quantitative model of transportation in Taipei. Prof. Yeh agreed to his plan and recruited 
 Academia Sinica Archive 中央研究院近代史檔案館, “CIECD Central File” 行政院國際經濟合作發99
展委員會 36-10-001-070.
 HRR was a transportation research journal published by the Transportation Research Board, 100
the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine debuted in 1963. It became the 
Transportation Research Record (TRR Journal) in 1974. 
61
many college students in PCCU to help Dr. Chiang’s study. Prof. Yeh also used a set of the 
same methods to investigate traffic flow and transportation behavior in Taipei City. In one 
of the most important research reports of the transportation group of UHDC, 
“Comprehensive Transportation Research in Taipei Area," Prof. Yeh, in 1969, followed the 
approaches of transportation studies in Detroit, Chicago, and Philadelphia to investigate 
the usage of land and building, traffic flow, and citizen’s transportation behavior. Prof. Yeh 
and his students ran 14,562 home visit surveys, a 15 hour-long car blocking survey, and 
attraction point surveys of taxis and buses. Coyle’s primary job in 1969 was to consult and 
to help the operation of this research project. For example, when the transportation group 
faced a problem of building their predictive model of traffic flow, Coyle asked one of the 
officials of the Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation to send 
two copies of “Traffic Assignment Manual” to Taiwan. Thus the transportation group could 
follow the direction of the manual to complete their model, and we can see, again, that an 
American advisor brought written documents from the U.S. into the transportation group 
for his Taiwanese students to learn how to do research.
However, Dr. Chiang points out that Coyle was not an expert in transportation 
planning but rather of traffic engineering and investigation. For example, once he met 
Coyle in Prof. Yeh’s office, and Coyle asked him what the definition of a “trip" was, this 
being the basic idea of transportation planning. Dr. Chiang told the interviewer: “ the 
advisors in the UHDC contributed a lot in ideas, policies, and the institution of 
transportation planning, but they did not contribute that much to planning practice and 
planning method, maybe, because of advisors’ background, at least in transportation 
planning.”  If we go back to read Coyle’s study procedure, we can also find that he mainly 
provided the concept of how to do transportation research instead of explaining practical 
planning methods. That being said,  Dr. Chiang might be partially wrong because, as he 
mentioned, he was not familiar with the other American advisor in the transportation 
economy group in the UHDC, Edward Prentice. 
The Birth of the TPB 
The SAFED 
	 Before we enter into the story of the TPB and Edward Prentice, we need to follow 
the history of the Sino-American Fund for Economic and Social Development (SAFED)  101
since the SAFED fueled the birth of the TPB and many technical assistance projects of rail 
 This Fund had lasted until 2006 when it merged into the newly funded National Development 101
Fund.
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mass transportation. Besides reforming the CUSA as the CIECD, the other action the 
KMT government took to deal with the termination of U.S. Aid was the establishment of 
the SAFED. The U.S. began to decrease its direct aid gradually by the 1960s because the 
U.S. believed that Taiwan’s economy was strong enough to develop independently. In 
fact, after 1962, most U.S. Aid came to Taiwan in the form of loans. The decision, which 
began to form at the end of the 1950s, to terminate American economic aid to Taiwan 
derived both from the success of the effort, and the domestic U.S. need to discontinue a 
costly enterprise to free funds for other programs . In fact, the financial resources 102
included the loan from U.S. Aid and coordination money. The two governments used the 
existing fund to found the SAFED, which directed $200 million in local currency assets 
generated by established aid programs into economic development rather than allow 
such monies to be absorbed by other areas of the budget  for future technological 103
projects. In 1963, the CUSA was reformed as the CIECE for applying and managing the 
resources of the U.S. Aid (before 1965) and, the SAFED (after 1965), and other 
technological and economic resources. Moreover, the KMT government founded the 
Committee of the SAFED which was composed of the president of the Central Bank of 
the R.O.C., the Minister of Finance, the Minister of the Economy, and the Comptroller of 
the Executive to manage and to review project spending of the SAFED's money. The 
CIECD and the JCRR were in charge of executing the projects. As with U.S. Aid, the 
projects supported by the SAFED focused on agriculture, R&D, education, industrial 
improvement, technical transfer, and infrastructure. For example, nuclear plants, the 
development of Kaohsiung Harbor and Keelung Harbor, Zengwen Dam which is the 
biggest dam in Taiwan, water supply, many industrial projects, and education projects all 
received the SAFED’s support . 
104
	 One other feature of the SAFED was that it was not part of the Taiwanese 
government’s main budget system until 1983, enjoying the independent status within the 
government. With this status, the CIECD and the JCRR could implement the projects that 
they preferred to launch cutting-edge technological projects. Li Kuo-ting (李國鼎, 
abbreviated as K.T. Li ), the important technical official in the KMT government, mentions 
that how the SAFED’s money was used did not need to be approved by the U.S., unlike 
 Tucker, Taiwan, Pp. 62.102
 Tucker, Taiwan, Pp. 109.103
 Li, K.T. 李國鼎 and Yang, Su-feng 劉素芬, K. T. Li: My Taiwan Experience 《李國鼎：我的台灣104
經驗》. (Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing 遠流出版, 2005), Pp. 147-187.
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U.S. Aid .   However, I have found that there was both a Chinese version and an English 105
version of the standard forms for applying for the SAFED’s support. Therefore, I suspect 
that American consultants or technical officials might at least have been involved in the 
process of reviewing or assessing each project practically.

	 In sum, the establishment of the SAFED combined with the reformation of the 
CIECD extended the institutions built for managing U.S. Aid, though some changes need 
to be noted. First, the SAFED guaranteed the semiautonomous status of the CIECD after 
its reformation and the termination of U.S. Aid. Like the financial resources from U.S. Aid, 
the SAFED remained out of the ordinary budget system of the KMT government, meaning 
there was a higher priority for the projects supported by it. Thus, officials at the top of the 
KMT government could make decisions for technological and economic development 
without having to deal with objections from other departments within the government. 
The SAFED also provided flexibility for technical officials to execute their duty in the 
projects.

	 Second, the SAFED was rooted in U.S. Aid so that it would extend the technical 
projects consulted by American advisors in the first years after its establishment. Hence, 
Americanization in technological fields would be easily constructed with American 
advisors' efforts and Taiwanese technical officials’ learning. Third, nonetheless, unlike 
U.S. Aid and the CUSA, American technical officials were  not involved in the decision- 
making and execution of the SAFED and the projects supported by it, as K.T. Li mentions. 
Instead, Americans joined the technological projects as consultants hired by the 
Taiwanese. That is to say, the KMT government and its technical officials gained 
autonomy in this change, and the autonomy revealed and emphasized the consent phase 
of the process of importing American models. Therefore, I argue, although the U.S. Aid 
period ended in 1965, the period of “receiving aid from America” remained, and the co-
production of American hegemony of science and technology continued. The early 
development of the TPB supports this argument. 

The TPB 
	 On September 22nd, 1969, the U.N. signed a contract with Nathan Associates Inc., 
an American economic consultant, for its Special Fund project in Taiwan. According to the 
contract, Nathan Associates Inc. needed to send a transportation economist to Taiwan, 
helping the Taiwanese Government to execute a transportation economic research 
project for nine months. The Taiwanese government was obligated to provide members to 
 Li and Yang, K. T. Li, Pp.177.105
64
form a project group working with the economist. Edward Prentice was the economist 
dispatched to Taiwan, and his research team was the “transportation planning group” in 
the UHDC. Prentice arrived in Taiwan in November 1969, starting his investigation at 
once. After nine months, the Taiwanese government extended the project for one more 
month, and the SAFED paid the cost of the extension .
106
	 In the 10-month-long project period, Prentice investigated Taiwan’s economic 
development, transportation demand, and transportation infrastructure, pointing out that 
Taiwan’s transportation infrastructure was not compatible with Taiwan’s strong economic 
growth. He and his colleagues provided some suggestions for Taiwan’s transportation 
construction at all levels, including international trade, hardware development, fee rate of 
transportation service, and the organization and human resources needed for 
transportation planning.

	 At the beginning of the research report, he mentioned that the most difficult 
challenge was to find one “Chinese” transportation economist to work with. He turned to 
the help of Donald Fritz, a transportation economist from another American consulting 
firm, De Leuw Cather International so that they could complete the project. At that time, 
De Leuw Cather was consulting on the project of National Highway No.1, that was in the 
planning stage .  Subsequently, he strongly suggested that the Taiwanese government 107
establish a professional institute for transportation planning so that the decision-making 
of transportation policy would not be bogged down in government bureaucracy. He went 
on to recommend to the Taiwanese government that the new professional institute should 
have a high-level economist with master or Ph.D. degree and 15-year-long experience of 
service for transportation policies, an economist, a statistics expert, a financial expert, a 
data collector, an engineer of transportation systems, and three transportation engineers 
with experience of road, railway, and sea transportation, respectively. Moreover, he also 
recommended that the Taiwanese government hire a high-level economist focusing on 
investment, a system economist for statistic’s and evaluation, a financial expert, and a 
system engineer from international companies for less than two-year-long service in 
The Transportation Planning Board, the Summary of the Transportation Economic Report for 106
Taiwan, the R.O.C. by the U.N. Advisor Edward Prentice.
 The National Freeway No.1 is also called Dr. Sun Yat-sen Freeway. The freeway connects the 107
northern harbor city Keelung and the southern harbor city Kaohsiung passing Taipei, Taichung, 
and many cities on the west part of Taiwan. The project of the freeway was initiated in 1970, and 
most of the MacArthur Thruway was merged by it. In 1978, the freeway was open to the whole 
line. 
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Taiwan . Interestingly, according to the report, the decision to establish the TPB was 108
already made when Prentice wrote the report. We may argue that the idea to establish a 
professional institute emerged when Prentice was working on his research with Taiwanese 
colleagues. 

	 Fu Chai-Chi (傅家齊), the first executive secretary of the TPB write these words in 
the first article of the Transportation Planning Journal Quarterly (運輸計畫季刊) :
109
	 “Transportation includes railways, shipping, harbors, and aviation, and these parts 
are related to each other, so the planning of transportation needs to be comprehensive. 
Especially our transportation infrastructure seems backward with the strong economic 
and social growth in the decade…...the opinion of establishing a transportation planning 
and negotiating institute began in 1950, and the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communicate (MOTC) established a transportation planning communication group to 
promote the research, planning, and communication of transportation construction. This 
group was merged into the CIECD, becoming the transportation group , and the CIECD 110
hired the transportation economist, Mr. Prentice, establishing a transportation planning 
group  for research on transportation economics in Taiwan with the UN Special Fund. 111
The report suggested that our government establish a professional transportation 
planning institute for gaining more power for transportation construction……MOTC  
merged the transportation group, the transportation planning group and the Technical 
Office, into the TPB to meet the urgent need of transportation system planning. Thus, our 
government can execute comprehensive transportation planning with experts from home 
and abroad .”
112
	 On August 1st, the Transportation Planning Board was established. With this 
decision, Dr. Chiang, Prof. Yeh, and most members of the transportation group moved 
from the UHDC to the TPB, and the transportation group was dismissed while two 
members stayed in the UHDC helped the CIECD in the U.N. Special Fund projects. Many 
of Prof. Yeh’s students who graduated from PCCU were members of the planning 
 The Transportation Planning Board, the Summary of the Transportation Economic Report for 108
Taiwan, the R.O.C. by the U.N. Advisor Edward Prentice.
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department in the TPB, and Fu asked Prof. Yeh to be the chief of the department. He 
refused, citing his age, recommending Dr. Chiang to be the chief. Therefore, Chiang 
became the first chief of the planning division of the TPB. Because the transportation 
group in the UHDC was a temporary institute in the KMT government, we can the  TPB 
Taiwan’s first professional institute in charge of transportation studies and planning. 

 	 The TPB was inside the MOTC, and the Minister of Transportation and 
Communication served as chairman. 19 committee members represented related 
ministers and local governments such as the MOTC, Taiwan TRA, Taipei City 
Government, the Ministry of Defense, the JRCC, and the CIECD. The committee 
members gathered once every two months to discuss the issues brought by different 
divisions within the TPB. When the TPB was established, it had six divisions: the 
information division, planning division, transportation engineering division, industry 
division, economic division, and secretary division . The main missions of the TPB were 113
setting transportation policy, deciding the priority of transportation construction, 
transportation, and economic research, analyzing existed transportation infrastructure 
and services, reviewing transportation service fees, and feasibility studies of 
transportation construction projects. The divisions of the TPB would present their reports 
or suggestions to the committee for review, and once they were approved, the reports or 
suggestions would be sent to the CIECD or Executive Yuan (the Office of Prime Minister) 
for approval. After the CIECD or Executive Yuan’s approval, the projects or suggestions 
would be put into a legislative procedure and would be costed. The committee members 
and the operational process of the TPB show that the TPB did have a certain degree of 
power to make decisions about transportation projects, especially its close relationship 
with the semi-autonomic institute CIECD. Furthermore, we need to note that the financial 
resources supporting the TPB came from the SAFED instead of the regular budget in the 
government. 

 	 Like the UHDC, TPB also hired international consultants to help their research and 
planning projects, with many of them coming from American companies in the first few 
years of the TPB. For example, the TPB hired Dr. Mowell, a transportation planning expert 
from Nathan Associates, as an advisor of comprehensive transportation planning using 
the loan from the World Bank in 1972. Moreover, Donald Fritz, the economist from the De 
Leuw Cather Inc. who helped Prentice to complete his transportation research project, 
was hired by the TPB as an advisor, and we find his articles or speeches printed in the 
 Fu, “Introduction,” Pp.4.113
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Transportation Planning Journal Quarterly. The way that foreign advisors cooperated with 
Taiwanese technical officials was similar to how the UHDC cooperated with the advisors. 
First of all, one critical approach was to introduce or to translate American transportation 
planning studies, manuals, and official documents bringing knowledge of transportation 
planning into the TPB. Even today, I can find many transportation planning studies or 
manuals of highways in the library of the Institute of Transportation . For instance, I 114
found that the TPB edited, in 1971, “Readings in Model Split," which collects papers 
about the Split Model, a quantitative model for calculation of traffic flow on freeways in 
urban areas, and a case study in Phoenix. Moreover, foreign advisors would give 
speeches or publish papers in Transportation Planning Journal Quarterly to spread their 
experience of their profession. Lastly, and maybe the most important, many foreign 
advisors would join the TPB’s projects directly.

	 In the first three years of the TPB, the Board seemed to follow an 
“Americanization” approach as the transportation group in the UHDC. Things changed 
after 1972 when the TPB started to run its enormous mass transportation projects for 
Taipei Metropolitan. From February 21st to 28th, 1972, U.S. President Nixon visited 
Beijing, and at the end of that year, the Republic of China lost its highly important and 
symbolic role as the single representative of China in the U.N. and on the U.N Security 
Council. This diplomatic catastrophe for Taiwan and the decline of the U.S.-Taiwan  
relationship lay ahead in the 1970s, ushering in a new phase of American hegemony in 
science and technology that did not amount to  Americanization.

Nixon, Autonomy, and Hybridity  
The EPC and the CEPD  
	 The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 in 1971 and Nixon's visit to 
Beijing changed the U.S.-Taiwan relations and Taiwan itself, but the dramatic change did 
not happen overnight. In the late 1960s, the antiwar and civil rights movement were 
increasingly influential in the U.S. creating substantial political pressure on Lyndon B. 
Johnson.  Richard Nixon won the presidential election in 1968. In his first year in office, he 
announced what later was called the Nixon Doctrine, a broad framework for Asia’s future 
without massive U.S. troop deployments . Meanwhile, on the Soviet side, Leonid 115
Brezhnev tried to stabilize his domestic power through tighter central planning, more 
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restrictive controls on intellectuals, and intensive militarization, crushing the ideological 
challenge developing in Czechoslovakia by sending tanks to repress protestors in the s-
called Prague Spring on 20 August 1968. To the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) Brezhnev’s actions were perceived as a potentially mortal threat to China, heralding 
invasion and an effort to install a more pliable regime in Beijing . In fact, the 116
deterioration in  Sino-Soviet relations had started earlier because of Nikita Khrushchev’s 
De-Stalinization policy, suspension of technological and economic assistance to China, 
and his capitulation in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally, a military conflict broke out 
between the PLA and the Red Army on the Zhenbao (Damansky) Island where both China 
and the Soviet Union claimed sovereignty in March 1969 .
117
	 The political situation in both the U.S. and China created an incentive to build a 
closer relationship. Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and a small group 
of top aides focused on the advantages for the U.S. in a new relationship with China with 
regard to handling the difficult process of reaching an acceptable peace agreement to 
end the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and in dealing with the Soviets in arms 
limitation and other negotiations from a position of greater strength. A new order in Asian 
and world affairs featuring positive US-China relations seemed much less costly and 
more compatible  with  U.S. interests than the previous confrontation with and 
containment of China .  Through “Ping-Pong Diplomacy” and some back-door 118
diplomacy between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, the U.N. General Assembly passed 
Resolution 2758 ensuring that the PRC would replace the R.O.C. as the only formal 
representative of China in the U.N. This included the R.O.C.’s seat of the Permanent 
Members of the United Nations Security Council. In the next year, Nixon visited China and 
the U.S. and China signed the first of three Joint Communiqués ensuring the 
normalization of U.S.-China relations. Eight years later, the Carter Administration 
terminated formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the KMT government. With 
that, the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty became invalid, although  Congress did 
pass the Taiwan Relations Acts promising to ensure Taiwan’s security, and establishing 
informal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Taiwan.  
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 After the conflict, China controlled the island, and Russia admitted China’s sovereignty on the 117
island in 1991.
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	 For Taiwan’s technological and economic development and the CIECD, the most 
significant impact was the loss of the resources from the U.N. Moreover, although, before 
1979, the diplomatic relations between the R.O.C. and the U.S. remained, and the 
cooperative programs for technological and economic development continued (for 
example, the construction of Sun Yat-sen Freeway (National Highway No. 1) and many 
projects supported by the SAFED), the fact that the KMT lost its legitimacy as 
representing China was a source of great uncertainty for the government. Not to mention 
that Nixon and Kissinger’s moves led to huge doubts about the reliability of the U.S. For 
the KMT government, it provided a strong incentive to improve its technological power 
and decrease its dependency on the U.S.

	 As the “brain” of the technological and economic development in the government 
with substantial financial resources out of the government budget system, the CIECD 
changed its mission. In 1973, the CIECD was reformed as the Economic Planning Council 
(EPC), and then reformed as the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) 
in 1977. The EPC and later, the CEPD were still in charge of the execution of the projects 
funded by the SAFED, and enforced their  power to plan Taiwan’s technological and 
economic development. Moreover, the CEPD also played the role of integrating ministries 
in some critical technological and economic issues. For rail mass transportation 
technology, the CEPD determined whether and how a metro system project would enter 
the construction stage. This institute remained one of the leading institutes until 2014 
when it was reformed as the National Development Council (NDC), though its role was not 
limited to the exploitation of the resources from the U.S.

Transportation Technology in the Changing Period 
	 The change in U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations brought about by Nixon and 
Kissinger in 1972 did not terminate overnight the process of building the profession of 
transportation planning by leaning from American advisors.  However, we see some signs 
of the beginning of the technological hybridity of transportation technology in Taiwan. 
Many transportation projects consulted by American companies and advisors kept going, 
and the TPB still hired American advisors and introduced American knowledge for 
building the profession of transportation planning in Taiwan. But the KMT government did 
not lose its formal relationship with the U.S. after 1972. Furthermore, unlike in the Truman 
era, Nixon did not seek to abandon the KMT government and Taiwan, and the military 
protection guaranteed by the Mutual Defense Agreement remained so that American 
technical assistance and advisors did not need to leave Taiwan immediately. Nonetheless, 
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the change in  diplomatic relations subtly changed the import of knowledge and 
experience into Taiwan in the 1970s. 

	 In the early 1970s, the KMT government launched a series of enormous 
technological and economic projects with the so-called Ten Major Construction Projects 
(十大建設) to strengthen’s Taiwan’s power and to ensure the survival of the regime. Many 
of them were products of the cooperation with American consultants and companies. For 
example, the construction of the first nuclear plant started in 1971 with the cooperation of 
GE and Westinghouse. For transportation, the KMT government launched the projects of 
Taichung Harbor and Suao Harbor  to deal with Taiwan’s steady expansion of international 
trade. It also initiated the project of the new international airport at this time. The National 
Freeway No.1, as I mentioned, was planned and constructed with the American company 
De Leuw Cather consulting. Also, although the TPB was not involved in the freeway 
project, De Leuw Cather’s advisor Donald Fritz did not only help Prentice to diagnose 
Taiwan’s transportation systems, but also worked with the TPB closely, providing 
education training, technical documents from America, and giving lectures introducing 
concepts of transportation planning to Taiwanese technical officials.

	 All the same, the KMT government and its Taiwanese technical officials did not 
follow the American model wholly once Taiwan gained partial autonomy with the 
termination of U.S. Aid and more durable technological power. In contrast, at the same 
time, the TPB and many technical officials in the KMT government seemed to be willing to 
learn how Americans made knowledge or to complete massive technological projects 
with the help of Americans. The TPB’s Transportation Planning Journal Quarterly at the 
time when the TPB was founded provides some clues since the contents of the journal 
reveal the technical officials’ concerns and thinking. First of all, we can find many articles 
focusing on the issues related to the major transportation projects like airport traffic 
analysis, electrified railway, and harbor charges. Second, we see the introduction of 
theories or case studies from America. Some of them were published in Chinese 
translation, and some were in English, and they include articles by American advisors like 
Donald Fritz. Third, one thing that needs to be noted is that many articles about Japanese 
experiences appear in the journals. In vol.1, no.1, we can find “Report on Harbor Charges 
and Related Problems in Japanese Ports” and “Traffic Forecasting Method in Japan with 
Some Implications to the Problem of Transportation Planning in Taiwan.”  In vol.1, no.2, 
we also find “Achievement of High-speed Railway Service in Japan” and “Cost Allocation 
of Urban Street and Railway Grade Separation Investment in Japan.” In an article 
introducing the World Bank’s loan policy for transportation projects, a section translating 
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the manual of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund  (海外経済協力基金) showed 119
how to apply for the loan from the fund in Japanese Yen. With the loan from Japan, the 
countries would not only receive the financial support from Japan, but also gain Japanese 
materials, machines, and technical assistance .
120
	 Moreover, the CIECD and the TRA’s achievements shows that when the top of the 
KMT government decided to consider rebuilding the railways in Taipei City under the 
ground instead of in an elevated form in 1972, the top level of the government searched 
for alternative technical assistance to that provided by the U.S.. The deputy of the CIECD, 
Fei Hua (費驊), wrote from Tokyo mentioning that he had discussed the issue of rebuilding 
the railway in Taipei City and the future subway system with Dr. Kaku Mao-Lin (or Kuo 
Mao-Lin, 郭茂林) who was a famous Taiwanese architect working in Japan. He pointed 
out that, as regards the underground railway, first, if an underground railway was built 
20m-deep beneath the ground, the cost would be three times more than one built 1.5m-
deep. Second, the Taiwanese government could send engineers to Japan to study actual 
cases, and the TRA would be responsible. Third, Dr. Kuo’s Taipei office could cooperate 
with Dr. Kuo’s Japanese firm to introduce the cases to be studied. For the future subway 
system, first, Dr. Kuo recommended one urban transportation expert of the University of 
Tokyo, Prof. Yasojima (八十島), to come to Taipei studying Taipei’s transportation for one 
week. Second, the CIECD could hire Prof. Yasojima. Third, the Taiwanese government 
could send related data to Dr. Kuo, and he could submit it to Prof. Yasojima so that he 
would study it before coming to Taiwan . Furthermore, a meeting held by the MOTC 121
passed a resolution that the CIECD would ask the West German government to 
recommend consultants to Taiwan joining the feasibility research stage of the project to 
rebuild the railway in Taipei City underground. German consultants would serve in Taiwan 
in the same way in which they consulted for TRA’s container freight rail study. Then, the 
MOTC sent an official document to the CIECD to ask the German authorities to 
 It was merged with the Japan Export-Import Bank (日本輸出入銀行) into the Japan Bank for 119
International Cooperation (国際協力銀行), and it was a part of foreign aid in Japan.
 The Transportation Planning Board,“The World Bank’s Future Loan Policy for Transportation 世120
銀未來運輸貸款的政策” in Transportation Planning Journal Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1971): 
Pp.122-123.
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recommend consultants to join the subterranean railway project. The MOTC also 
provided a summary of the project .
122
	 In sum, although the TPB and other institutes in the KMT government did not 
cease to cooperate with American consultants after the change in U.S.-Taiwan relations 
brought by Nixon’s move, Taiwanese technical officials and top levels of the KMT 
government began to think and even to take action to exploit alternative resources for 
Taiwan’s infrastructural projects. These attempts, I argue, were both imposed by its new 
autonomy and sought to enhance that autonomy. The termination of U.S. diplomatic 
recognition and the establishment of the TPB meant that Taiwan at least had a basis for 
transportation studies and planning even though it still lacked experts. Therefore, in each 
project, the technical officials had a certain leeway to seek different possible consultants 
other than those from America. Such attempts can also be interpreted as efforts to 
enhance the autonomy of technological development, especially in the stage of learning 
about transportation systems. First, technical officials could now seek more ideal models 
and experience for the local demand. Second, it led to a clearer recognition in the 
government that a particular knowledge about cities and roads would lead to a particular 
solution to the problems, and the solution would contain technology made by American, 
thus, leading to technological dependence. Third, the change in the U.S.’ diplomatic 
policy stimulated Taiwanese leaders and officials to decrease dependence on America, 
leading to technological hybridity of the rail mass transportation in Taiwan in the following 
two decades.

The Transnational Transportation Planning Science 
	 Taiwan’s technical officials, top-level leaders, and American advisors constructed 
the basis of the profession of Taiwan’s transportation studies and planning in the late 
1960s and the early 1970s. Creating UHDC’s transportation group and the TPB were 
substantial achievements, and the process of the establishment of the two institutes has 
three noteworthy features. First of all, it shows that the history Taiwan’s transportation 
studies and planning can be regarded as a transnational history of transportation studies 
and planning from the U.S. to Taiwan. Second, it suggests that the U.S.-Taiwan relation 
provided momentum for the Americanization of Taiwan’s transportation technology and 
triggered the attempts of hybrid strategies for technological autonomy. Third, the 
establishment of transportation studies and planning can be interpreted as involving the 
co-production, with the Taiwanese experts and sections of the government,  of an 
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中⼼, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” Jan 29, 1972.  122
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American hegemony of the technology of transportation. Put differently these three 
conclusions reveal that the U.S.-Taiwan relations created not only the Americanization of 
Taiwan’s transportation technology but also a breeding ground for the technical hybridity 
of transportation technology.

	 Be it the UHDC or the TPB, we can observe that American advisors and consulting 
companies introduced the way that Americans built their knowledge about cities for 
transportation planning through cooperation in specific projects, education and training, 
and by drawing on an expanding archive of technical documents.  In this way American 
advisors’ experience traveled from America to Taiwan and interacted with the local 
context to generate knowledge for transportation studies and planning. Jonathan Zeitlin 
points out that Americanization after the second world war led Western European 
countries and Japan to reshape their domestic industries in the image of the U.S., above 
all by using the ‘American model’ of  mass production—the high-volume manufacture of 
standardized goods using special-purpose machinery and predominantly unskilled labor
—together with the host of ‘systematic’ management techniques, organizational 
structures and research and marketing services developed for its efficient administration 
and effective exploitation . The transportation planning profession that was injected into 123
Taiwan was also a kind of Americanization, although it did not really involve mass 
production. In the coming age of the automobile in American cities in the 1910s and 
1920s, American engineers developed transportation engineering to reshape American 
cities to cope with the dramatically increase in the number of automobiles.  Then, with 124
the development of highways and the Federal Government’s support for the interstate 
highway systems and the rise of urban transportation in the 1950s and the 1960s, the 
U.S. built systematic methodologies to acquire knowledge that could be used in 
transportation planning including house interviews, integrating traffic flow and land use, 
and model building for urban transportation .
125
	 Although the American model of transportation planning was based on the 
motorization of American cities, in the 1960s and the 1970s, engineers and government 
began to encourage alternatives. Public funding began to benefit other urban 
 Zeitlin, Jonathan, “Introduction: Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking US Technology and 123
management in Post-War Europe and Japan” in Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herrigel ed.  
Americanization and Its Limits (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2000), Pp.2-3.
 Norton, Peter D., Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, 124
MA: MIT Press, 2008)
 Weiner, Edward, Urban Transportation Planning in the United States: History, Policy, and 125
Practice, 3rd edition (New York: Springer, 2008).
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transportation modes. In belated recognition of the interdependence of transportation 
modes, highway engineers renamed their profession transportation engineering . What 126
Taiwanese technical officials like Dr. Chiang learned from American advisors and the 
technical documents from the U.S. were the same patterns: combining land use and 
traffic flow calculation in transportation studies, house interviews, and traffic model 
building. Taiwanese technical officials also learned how to do transportation research 
from the case studies of American cities like Philadelphia, Los Angles, and Phenix. 
Although inevitably American advisors and their Taiwanese students would not entirely 
copy the American way of making knowledge of Taiwanese cities, we can still conclude 
the Americanization of transportation studies and planning in Taiwan.

	 U.S.-Taiwan relations provided the basis of the Americanization of transportation 
technology despite the termination of  U.S. Aid. What supported the establishment of 
Taiwan’s profession of transportation planning was the institutes, the CIECD, and the 
SAFED, which were derived from the CUSA and the money provided by the U.S. What 
maintained the institutes built to manage U.S. Aid was the close U.S.-Taiwan relations in 
confronting the communist regime in the 1960s. During this period, Taiwan not only 
played a role of monitoring China with its strategic position and military power but it also 
exhibited economic and technological achievement by exploitation of the American 
model. Furthermore, the termination of U.S. Aid meant the Taiwanese government gained 
some autonomy for technological development despite their high dependence on 
American advisors. With the resources from U.S. Aid and other subsequent technical 
assistance, Taiwanese technical officials at least acquired organization, knowledge, and 
experience to hire consultants and to launch projects. However, once the U.S.-Taiwan 
relations changed in the 1970s, the increased autonomy led Taiwanese political leaders 
and technical officials to seek possible alternative sources, especially Japan and 
European countries, of technical assistance that were a better fit to local needs and 
enhanced their autonomy. Moreover, these attempts finally developed into practical 
technological hybrid strategies and actions leading to the technological hybridity of rail 
mass transportation in the following years. Even then, in the case of transportation 
studies and planning, we see that American consultants still occupied a significant role.

	 This phenomenon reveals how the co-production of American hegemony of 
transportation studies happened in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. As I mentioned in 
the last chapter, U.S. Aid only helped Taiwan to recover and to improve its transportation 
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infrastructure and railway management,  so that we can hardly conclude that U.S. Aid 
launched the coproduction of the American hegemony of science and technology as it 
did in other fields. However, the establishment of the UHDC and the birth of the TPB 
shows how Americanization of the making of knowledge of cities and streets for 
transportation planning was constructed with Taiwanese technical officials’ cooperation 
and American advisors’ contribution. We especially need to note that the Taiwanese 
government already gained some autonomy to consider and to hire consultants. But, it 
still chose American advisors and companies to help it build the profession and the 
mechanism of producing knowledge for transportation planning. This did not happen 
because America’s overwhelming military power and its protection obliged the KMT 
government to choose the American model instead of others; in fact, it was the 
superiority of transportation studies and planning in the U.S. that attracted Taiwanese 
technical officials to step on the road of Americanization.

	 Krige’s studies on postwar Western Europe reveal that building consensus required 
not only the active collaboration of national elites who shared the economic, political, and 
ideological ambitions of the United States—and had sufficient legitimacy and power to 
impose their conception of the path that Europe should take on those who thought 
otherwise; it also required a subtle refashioning of European identity, a gradual 
implantation of American norms and practices, selectively adapted to local conditions—
and the withering away of any illusions that Soviet Communism could provide the 
liberating life-world that it promised . In Taiwan, we can find a similar development in 127
the UHDC and the TPB. The KMT government not only hired American experts to 
complete particular transportation projects but also believed that the methods Americans 
used for transportation research could reform and improve Taiwan’s transportation 
systems. Taiwan’s newly gained autonomy in the late 1960s and early 1970s led it to 
choose the path of American hegemony of transportation studies and planning; it was not 
imposed from without. What is more the termination of U.S. diplomatic recognition was 
not the end of the American hegemony of technology for Taiwan’s transportation 
technology; instead, it was the beginning. 

	 The consensual characteristic of the American hegemony of technology inherently 
contains the possibility of hybrid knowledge and technology in American technical 
assistance because the hegemonic power allows for a degree of autonomy for the 
assistance-receiving countries. Taiwanese political leaders and technical officials’ 
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attempts to introduce Japanese and German technical assistance in the early 1970s 
indicated the future road of hybridity, especially at the time when Taiwan finally initiated 
the massive practical rail mass transportation projects aiming at changing its capital, 
Taipei, and the KMT government faced disastrous diplomatic developments in the 1970s 
and the 1980s. 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Chapter 4: The “Underground” 
The Taipei Railway Underground Project 1967-1989

“The DEC, the German consultants who were hired by the TRUPO, is the technical consultants of 
the Deutsche Bahn, and it shares the technical specialists with the DB. In other words, the DEC’s 
technical basis has the DB’s strong support, so its technical level and experience are reliable.(地鐵
處所聘⽤的ＤＥＣ也是德國國鐵的顧問，與德鐵共享技術專家。也就是說，ＤＥＣ的技術基
礎是得到德鐵的強⼒⽀援，因此他們的技術⽔準與經驗是很可靠的).” General Tong Ping (董
萍), 1998. 
“Transportation academia and urban planning experts all agree that it is impossible to match the 
increasing demand for roads and parking space in cities, especially in central business districts, 
without destroying urban life functions and the city’s features. Los Angles and Detroit were 
mobilized in their early years. Their mobile-centered policy has already proved to be a total failure, 
and the consequence is silence in the city center after dark, the extension of residential areas to 





Eisenbahn Consulting, 1977. 
“Marching Forward” 
	 In 1990, Lim Giong (林強), the musician who won dozens of musical awards in his 
career including Prix du Jury Cannes Soundtrack Award, launched his first album 
Marching Forward (向前走). It caught the attention many Taiwanese not only for the rock-
n-roll style Taiwanese song but also the video that went with the main song, “Marching 
Forward." Before this song, most of his songs sung in Taiwanese were in a melancholy 
tone with an old Japanese Enka-style soundtrack.  By contrast “Marching Forward” 
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expressed bright hope with its rock-n-roll performance and inspiring lyrics. The lyrics 
describe a country boy riding on a train bound for Taipei to make his career, full of 
boundless hope and ready to fight for his future in the modern city Taipei — especially 
after he stepped into the newly built Taipei Main Station. In this music video, echoing the 
music and lyrics, Lim and his dancers wore blue jeans and white t-shirts singing dancing 
in the vast hall of the Taipei Main Station and aisles on the underground level. Many 
Taiwanese talked about his music, dress, and hairstyle. However, they also talked about 
Taipei Main Station’s huge hall, underground platforms, and its modernized appearance. 
Two years later, Wu Bai (伍佰), another singer who also sings rock-n-roll in Taiwanese, 
released a song that began “Ride on the subterranean railways to here ……“ showing a 128
young man’s anxiety and confusion of being in Taipei. The Taipei Main Station and the 
underground railway became the face of the city after its completion in 1989 since the 
Taiwanese had never ridden on a train in a subterranean tunnel and had never seen such 
a large station building in Taiwan. 

	 The Taipei Main Station and the underground tunnel were so conspicuous that the 
Taiwanese easily regarded it as a symbol of the changing city, though there is much more 
to the railway than meets the eye. First, the subterranean railway had four tracks instead 
of two, though the passengers could not readily know that until they realized that the  
Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) that opened in 2006 used two of the tunnels. Second, two 
“hidden stations” are located between the Taipei Main Station and the Songshan Station, 
and one is located between the Taipei Main Station and the Wanhua Station. These three 
stations are not open to passengers, and they open only for emergencies. The existence 
of the four tracks and the hidden stations are a puzzle that needs explaining. Moreover, 
once the subterranean railway extended to the Banqiao Station and the Nangang 
Station , people would quickly find that the Taipei Main Station was the only station 129
without high-level buildings among all the underground stations in this subterranean 
railway, another puzzle needing an explanation.

	 The answer to the puzzles lies in the history of the design and construction of the 
railway. The construction of the subterranean railway in Taipei and the new station was 
not completed in a few years. Rather, the “march forward” of the railway and the station 
 “Tall Building” 樓仔厝 in Wu Bai’s first album Loving Others is a Happy Thing 愛上別人是快樂的128
事 released in 1992.
 After the completion of the project of the subterranean railway in Taipei City in 1989, Taiwanese 129
government kept rebuilding the railway and stations into underground leading to a 17km-long 
subterranean railway and five underground stations and three emergency underground stations.
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had gone through a decade-long process of strugge and negotiation, and it involved the 
making of the knowledge of Taipei City, technological conflicts, competition with 
communist China, and the dramatic change in U.S-Taiwan relations. These factors do not 
only explain why the subterranean railway took so long to be accomplished but also how 
the railway and the station were constructed. I argue that the project of the subterranean 
railway in Taipei City is the extension of the development of the profession of 
transportation planning.

	 Moreover, this project reveals the technological hybridity of knowledge, functions, 
and styles. Americanization was not the only solution for Taiwan and Taipei to build and to 
rebuild its mass transportation system. Instead, other sources of knowledge and 
technological ideology found a way into Taipei, and the Taiwanese integrated them, 
shaping the railways and stations in Taipei, especially the Taipei Main Station.

Taipei’s Railways during the 1960s and the 1970s 
	 When the KMT government retreated to Taiwan, there were several railways in 
Taipei and its suburban area. The West Coast Line (縱貫線), which has been the central 
intercity railway since its completion, crossed Taipei City from east to west, connecting 
the harbor city Keelung to the north, Yilan to east, and central and south Taiwan to south. 
Besides the mainline, five north-south branch lines connected it for industrial purposes 
and commuting. The northward Tamsui Line connected the Taipei Main Station, Shilin (士
林) residential area, Beitou hot spring resorts, and the old harbor town Tamsui (淡水). The 
southward Xindian Line, which was the first railway built by the Japanese private section 
in Taiwan, started from the Wanhua Station passing National Taipei University, the 
municipal water facilities finally reaching Xindian so that the coal in the southern outskirts 
of the city could access the West Coast Line. This line also transported people who 
wanted to enjoy the lake resorts in Xindian. The other two lines in Taipei and New Taipei 
were mainly for industrial and military purposes, so people living in the city did not know 
very much about them. 

	 In 1965, the TRA stopped the Xindian Line’s service because of the exhaustion of 
coal resources and the decreasing number of passengers, and most of the traffic carried 
on the railway was displaced to the road system. Therefore, the main line, or the West 
Coast Line, and the northward branch line, the Tamsui Line, were the only two railway 
lines in Taipei City. Although the Xindian Line became the first branch railway demolished, 
the TRA railway passenger service entered its golden age at that time. In 1968, the 
ridership of railways in Taipei City reached its peak: 7,490,101 person-trips in the year. 
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Among the stations, the Taipei Main Station undoubtedly had most ridership, and, the 
Tamsui Line’s Beitou Station’s ridership was more than other stations on the West Coast 
Line claiming the second place . This fact shows that the Tamsui Line as a commuter 130
railway contributed much to Taipei’s mass transportation. 
 Figure 4.1: The Railways in Taipei before 1988  131
 Taipei City Archives 台北市文獻委員會, The Economic Chronography of Taipei City, No.6, 130
Chapter of Transportation 《臺北市志卷六經濟志交通篇》. (Taipei: Taipei City Archives 臺北市⽂獻
委員會, 1988), Pp. 246-248.
 The Transportation Planning Board, The Improvement of the Railways in Downtown Taipei 131
Report 《臺北市區鐵路改善研究報告》. (Taipei: Transportation Planning Board 交通運輸計畫委員
會, 1977), Pp. 16. The author adds the English names of places, stations, and railway lines and 
the English of map titles.
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	 Nevertheless, the peak only lasted for a short time. The number of automobiles 
and scooters dramatically increased with the population growth in Taipei Metropolitan, 
with Taiwan’s strong economic growth, and the building of more roads. An increase in the 
number of automobiles symbolized the economic achievement of the island country and 
the growing city, but it ironically created a congested traffic situation at the same time. 
One of the founding fathers of Japan’s high-speed train the Shinkansen, Shima Hideo (島　
秀雄), observed the situation when he visited Taipei in 1969. In his two-week stay, he 
found nothing but a total mess of Taipei’s traffic. Especially in the morning and at sunset, 
the whole city was almost paralyzed. If Taiwanese did not figure out a solution to the 
severe situation, the traffic in Taipei City would be not only chaotic but completely 
blocked by traffic jams when Taipei’s population reached 2.5 million . When Shima 132
visited Taipei, Taipei’s population was about 1.5 million. The population reached 2.5 
million in 1985, just 16 years since the father of the Shinkansen gave his advice. The 
increase in population did not mean an increased ridership of railway services. The 
ridership of the railway in Taipei City decreased to below half in only four years  showing 133
that people tended to use cars and scooters instead of trains.

Table 4.1: The Growth of Population of Taipei City  134
	 The decline in  ridership and the growth of automobiles and scooters changed 
people’s attitudes toward railways. In 1968, the Economic Daily News released an 
editorial arguing that the solutions to traffic congestion in Taipei were increasing roads’ 
surface area, building parking lots and expressways, replacing aging cars, and solving the 
Year 1905 1945 1966 1968 1975 1981
Population 100,000 335,000 1,178,427 1,604,543 2,043,318 2,220,436
Growth rate X 335% 352% 36% 27% 8.6%
 The United Daily News 聯合報 “Building Rail Rapid Transit System in Taipei: the Interview of 132
Japanese Engineering Expert Shima Hideo 建立台北鐵路捷運系統 訪日本工程專家島秀雄一席談.” 
The United Daily News, May 21, 1969.  
 Taipei City Archives , Economic Chronography of Taipei City, Pp. 248.133
 Sources: The Improvement of the Railways in Downtown Taipei Report (1977) and The 134
Comprehensive Report of the Metro Plan for Taipei Metropolitan  《臺北都會區大眾捷運系統計畫
綜合報告》. (Taipei: Transportation Planning Board 交通運輸計畫委員會, 1983). The population 
before 1967 did not include the population of Neihu, Nangang, Muzha, Jingmei of Beitou, and 
Shilin, so the population growth between 1966 and 1968 included the growth caused by Taipei 
City merging these townships. However, in the 1960s, these townships were not that populous 
like today, so the population growth at that time was intense. 
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problem of level crossings. This editorial especially pointed out that the “unnecessary 
railway” Tamsui Line should be demolished . In the early 1970s, whether or not to 135
demolish the Tamsui Line became a hot issue in newspapers and among citizens. The 
United Daily News released a series of articles discussing this issue , and the TRA also 136
considered removing this branch railway . One of the articles even took the Xindian Line 137
as an example to show how successful development had been after the branch railway 
vanished. The level crossing issue was the main reason for advocating the demolishment 
of the Tamsui Line, and, in fact, these actors also argued that the West Coast Line in 
Taipei caused the same problems. First, the railways and the level crossings in the city 
caused traffic congestion. Second, the railway also split economic actives and 
development on one side of the track from that on the other. Level crossings in the 
crowed city were also dangerous for vehicles and pedestrians. 

These opinions implied that Taipei City should welcome an automobile era by 
building more roads and parking lots rather than keeping the disused railways. This idea 
echoed the trend of mobility policy in American cities at that time. Moreover, Dr. Chiang, 
in his interview, also mentioned that many diplomats living in Shilin needed to enter 
downtown Taipei City by passing through the level crossing so that the congestion 
problem was annoying. The West Coast Line still played a vital role in intercity 
transportation and freight so that they only persuaded the KMT government to remove 
the Tamsui Line, but the problems caused by level crossings still needed to be solved. 
Thus, the newly founded profession of transportation studies and planning needed to face 
its first challenge of solving the traffic problem in the capital city. Perhaps to the surprise 
of the members of the profession, this challenge lasted for decades.
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Figure 4.2: A level crossing damaged by a bus in Taipei City in 1971  138
The Death of the Elevated Railway Project 
	 In 1967 , the deputy of the Council of International Economic Cooperation 139
Development (CIECD), K.T. Li (Li Kuo-ting, 李國鼎), and the minister of transportation, Sun 
Yun-suan (孫運璿) instructed C.C. Wang to study how to solve the traffic and safety 
problems caused by the 18 level crossings in Taipei City in a meeting of the CIECD. As 
the previous chapters show,  like K.T. Li and Sun Yun-suan, C.C. Wang was highly trusted 
by the top of the KMT government, especially the future national leader Chiang Ching-kuo 
so that he was sent to the U.S. to share programs several times and had the power to 
reach the U.N. directly. Moreover, he was also assigned to a provincial level political 
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 C.C. Wang mentions the meeting was in 1968, but the archives of the CIECD shows that C.C. 139
Wang’s ad hoc group for the issue of the railways in Taipei held the first meeting on September 
13, 1967, and the record shows the CIECD’s meeting determining to set an ad hoc group was one 
day ahead of the ad hoc group meeting. Thus, when C.C. Wang received his assignment was 
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position to accumulate experience. At this time, he also started to be assigned to special 
missions of transportation programs. As the commissioner of the Public Works 
Department, Taipei City Government at that time, C.C. Wang ran an ad hoc group and 
invited his former colleagues in the UHDC, international advisors and local experts in the 
UHDC, to study this issue . The UHDC and the TRA shared the cost evenly . 
140 141
Initially, C.C. Wang and his experts thought they could simply solve the problems 
by building grade separations rather than moving the railways to different places or 
adopting other expensive options.  However, they found that they did not have enough 
space to build ramps for grade separation in the crowded city. The group also found it 
difficult to rebuild the railways underground because of  financial constraints imposed by 
the government at that time, and because they feared they could not deal with the 
emission problem in underground tunnels  (all trains in Taiwan were powered by either 
coal or diesel before the mid-1970s). To build elevated railways for the West Coast Line 
and the Tamsui Line did not cost too much, while problems of noise and view could be 
solved by engineering. Thus building an elevated railway seemed to be an appropriate 
option to solve the level crossing problem. As I mentioned in chapter 2, the American 
advisor Lewis Coyle joined this group, providing the research agenda for the feasibility 
study of building elevated railways in Taipei City .
142
	 While the ad hoc group studied the elevated railways, citizens also presented their 
ideas to solve the level crossing problems. One citizen suggested that the government 
rebuild the West Coast Line to cross the Tamsui River from the Taipei Main Station directly 
to connect to the Banqiao so that the railway and the Wanhua Station could acquire a 
large amount of land for development and traffic congestion in this busy area could be 
solved. The government did not need to spend too much on the construction of tunnels 
or an elevated track . An owner of an engineering company suggested that the CIECD 143
build a “great wall” style building above the railway for kilometers connecting two sides of 
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the railway and boosting business activities . Although these kinds of suggestions were 144
presented to the UHDC and high-level technical officials like the executive secretary of 
the UHDC, Chang Tzu-hsiuan (張祖璿), the technical officials declined the suggestions 
due to their being technically or financially impossible. Rebuilding the railways into 
elevated form seemed to be the best solution for Taipei.

	 Although Dr. Chiang did not join the ad hoc group, Prof. Yeh attended the 
meetings, and Dr. Chiang studied the report for the improvement of the railways in Taipei, 
written by Coyle and the ad hoc group. Dr. Chiang regarded the project as being the first 
professional transportation planning effort made in Taiwan. However, the study was not 
supported with comprehensive transportation studies of Taipei, leading to the difficulty of 
generating solid arguments to support the conclusion that elevated railways should be 
built in Taipei. Calculating traffic flow and evaluating service level amounted to only  
reviewing the existing system rather than planning for the future system. Prof. Yeh told Dr. 
Chiang that the ad hoc group was handicapped by having only a six months do the  
research, as suggested by Coyle. After Dr. Chiang saw the report, he found that not only 
was the time needed for research underestimated, but also that the data in the report 
required that the railways and the stations in Taipei should not be moved. C.C. Wang’s 
story may echo Dr. Chiang’s experience. The experts of the ad hoc group had failed to 
include the prediction of the increased ridership of the West Coast Line, and they asked 
C.C. Wang to go back to the UHDC to solve this problem. After C.C. Wang had heard 
different opinions from his experts, he drew a curve on a blackboard showing the 
predictions of the ridership,  humbly adding that this curve was a product of “empiricism” 
rather than of solid scientific studies .
145
	 C.C. Wang’s story may reflect the limitation of the ad hoc group, and, as Dr. Chiang 
said, the ad hoc group’s limitations led to strong opposition. One retired army general 
published his opinion in a magazine arguing that the West Coast Line should be moved to 
the southern edge of Taipei City and the Tamsui Line should be demolished. He  also sent 
his article to the CIECD asking for support . Moreover, two ministers without portfolio 146
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also opposed the project of an elevated railway . Dr. Chiang also mentioned that the 147
official report caused massive opposition to the elevated railway. 

	 However, C.C. Wang’s prediction curve and the ad hoc group’s efforts were not in 
vain. In January 1968, K.T. Li, Minister Sun, and the director-general Fei Hua showed their 
support for  the elevated railway project in a series meetings among top political leaders 
in the KMT government . Despite the opposition of the two minister without portfolio, 148
C.C. Wang’s project received not only K.T. Li and Minister Sun’s support but also that of 
the prime minister and vice president Yen in the meeting of the Executive Yuan . C.C. 149
Wang presented photos of elevated railways around the world in the meeting to show 
those present how elevated railways looked and how to deal with the noise issue and 
visual shock in cities. Vice president Yen decided to approve the project. He then took 
C.C. Wang to the National Security Council, presenting the project in front of Chiang Kai-
shek for approval. In both of the meetings of the Executive Yuan and the National Security 
Council, C.C. Wang used the “empirical curve” of ridership prediction as data to persuade 
top leaders of the government, and, after his presentation, Chiang Kai-shek approved the 
project. 

In 1969, C.C. Wang received the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships to visit 
America, where he asked American engineers and professors about his “empirical curve” 
because he felt guilty about pushing the project in this way. However, the American 
experts replied to him that they sometimes would take the same approach when they had 
no choice but to believe the information they had, and the curve also needed to be 
empirical so that it could persuade others .
150
	 After the project was approved, the KMT government set up a “directing group," 
led by Minister Sun, to execute the elevated railway project in 1969. The directing group 
decided to apply for a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the CIECD also 
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asked the ADB to recommend engineering consultants to do the feasibility study . In 151
August 1969, the ADB decided to hire the British consultants Freeman, Fox, Wilbur Smith 
& Associates to do the evaluation study, while the ADB would provide a loan to Taiwan 
after the feasibility study concluded that the elevated railway project was feasible and 
worthy . In September, the evaluation study team with eight British experts arrived at 152
Taipei to study the city and the project. In November, the evaluation study team 
recommended the elevated railway project, and American consultants Bechtel and 
Japanese National Railway mailed to the CIECD expressing their interests to participate in 
the project. The ADB approved the loan application for 5 million dollars and sent the 
technical assistance contract to the CIECD in February 1970. The ADB also agreed that 
the KMT government  hire Japan Transportation Consultant Inc. (日本交通技術株式会社) 
supported by the Japanese National Railway for the project, after reviewing the draft of 
contract . 
153
In March, the Asian Development Bank approved $540,000 for the design of the 
elevated railways. The elevated railway project would have two sections; the first section 
was 4 kilometers long from 0.75km of the Wanhua Station to the Huashan Freight Station; 
the second section was 3 km long from the Taipei Main Station to the Yuanshan Station 
on the Tamsui Line . It seemed that the Japanese factor would enter Taiwan’s 154
transportation technology in 1970 since the ADB, unlike tU.S. Aid, was led by the U.S. 
government.

	 However, before the ABD allocated the loan for the design of the elevated railway 
in September 1970, K.T. Li, the minister of finance at that time, informed the president of 
the ADB, Watanabe Takeshi (渡辺 武), that the KMT government had decided to suspend 
the elevated railway project because they were studying the feasibility of the 
electrification of the entire railway system in Taiwan . It was true that the KMT 155
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government started to plan to electrify the West Coast Line in the 1970s, but the 
electrification of the railway cannot explain why the project was suspended all of a  
sudden when everything was ready to start. Although K.T. Li mentioned that the reason 
why they should suspend the elevated railway project while the electrification railway 
project began to be on the way was just a measure being taken “for the time being,”  
technically, Taipei could still complete the elevated railway first and then electrify the 
railway. The electrification of the West Coast Line was completed in 1979, meaning that 
the KMT government had enough time to build the elevated railway first and then electrify 
it along with other sections of the whole West Coast Line. K.T. Li’s explanation  for the 
suspension of the elevated railway project is thus not plausible

	 Defensive reasons may explain the suspension of the project, but some doubts 
remain. In the technical report The Research Report for the Tamsui Line Issue, we can find 
that the KMT government decided to cease the project for civil defense reasons . The 156
Improvement of the Railways in Downtown Taipei Report also  said that the railways in 157
Taipei City should be rebuilt as subterranean railways rather than elevated railways. The 
retired army general also mentioned the transportation in Taiwan would be totally jammed 
if the PLA bombed the elevated railway in his suggestion to the CIECD. Another citizen 
also suggested that the CIECD consider building subterranean railways to protect the 
people from a nuclear attack by mainland China’s  PLA . However, if defense arguments 158
mattered, why did Chiang Kai-shek and the National Security Council approve C.C. 
Wang’s elevated railway project? Notably, the members of the National Security Council, 
including Chiang himself, were experienced officers. Moreover, when the TPB invited 
Japanese and German consultants to study the improvement of the railways in Taipei in 
the late 1970s, the consultants also regarded the elevated railway as the best choice for 
Taipei, and the officials did not use defense reasons to reject their suggestions . 159
National defense reasons might only partially explain why the KMT government 
suspended the elevated railway all of a sudden
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89
	 C.C. Wang's story may provide a clue for this puzzle. When the loan from the ADB 
was about to be allocated, the newly appointed chairman of CIECD Chiang Ching-kuo, 
son of Chiang Kai-Shek and his successor of the KMT government, announced the 
suspension of the elevated railway project and pointed out that an underground railway 
would be the only option for the improvement of the railroad in Taipei City. He also 
warned C.C. Wang:  “ Do not mention an elevated railroad anymore! ” The decision to 160
suspend the project seemed to come from the top of the KMT government. Kao Yu-shu 
(高玉樹), the minister of transportation and communication at that time, elaborated in his 
oral history interview: “ Suddenly, an order coming from the top asking that everything 
should be stopped. Finally, we realized that the Communists had built a subway line in 
Beijing , and someone reported it to the Old President (Chiang Kai-shek). The Old 161
President said, 'If Communists can make it, we can make it, too!’ and ordered an 
underground railway instead . ” Although I cannot find other evidence to verify Minister 162
Kao’s words, we can still find that the KMT government decided to build a subterranean 
railway in Taipei in the late 1970s, despite the advice of international consultants. Three 
years later, Chiang Ching-kuo personally asked C.C. Wang to study the subterranean 
railway option in Taipei  showing that the insistence of building an “underground” 163
system came from the top of the regime. In sum, the elevated railway project in Taipei 
was not suspended but actually died in September 1970, and it is plausible that Chiang 
Kai-shek and his son killed the project, perhaps because of political competition with 
communist China. Japan’s contribution to Taiwan’s rail mass transportation technology 
was, in any event, delayed. 

The Fate of the Tamsui Line 
	 The death of the elevated railway project brought the issue of the Tamsui Line back 
into the picture because this branch railway line still occupied space in the crowded city, 
and its level crossings still blocked traffic flow. Moreover, the proposed resolution of these 
problems, elevated railways, was gone. Those  advocating the demolition of the railway 
were heard again. As we saw in the  previous section shows, the those who favored 
demolishing the railway appeared in 1968, and their voices became stronger after the 
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elevated railway project was stopped for about one year. Facing people who clamored for 
removing the Tamsui Line, the TRA promised that it would establish a team to evaluate 
different options for the railway. The TPB, the professional transportation planning 
institute within the KTM government, took on the mission of evaluation of the Tamsui Line 
instead of the TRA.

	 While the TPB was studying whether to remove the branch railway, opponents 
began to lobby for keeping it.  One legislator argued that the government should keep the 
Tamsui Line because the Provincial Government planned to rebuild Tamsui Harbor and  
the branch line would play an essential role in transporting freight . The next January, 164
Taiwan Provincial Council also suggested keeping the Tamsui Line because of the 
Provincial Government’s Tamsui Harbor plan . The plan to rebuild Tamsui Harbor did not 165
materialize, but other reasons supported the existence of the Tamsui Line. In 1973, the 
executive secretary of the TPB, Fu Chia-chi, indicated that the Tamsui Line should not be 
demolished, and it should be a part of the future metro system of Taipei . A 166
transportation journalist also supported the existence of the Tamsui Line since Taipei City 
lacked buses to compensate for the demand fulfilled by the Tamsui Line . We need to 167
note Fu's opinion since his voice represented the TPB’s viewpoint. The TPB, according to 
its study written by its international consultant, released its conclusion about the future of 
the Tamsui Line in the December of the same year suggesting that the Tamsui Line should 
be maintained for its irreplaceable commuting function and that it should be integrated 
into the future metro system .
168
	 However, Minister Kao and his colleagues in the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication (MOTC) did not agree. On September 8, 1974, the United Daily News 
reported that the conclusion of the Tamsui Line’s future made by the TPB did not satisfy 
the MOTC. The MOTC transferred this case to its technical office for review, and 
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concluded that removing the railway and building bus land on the same route would have 
the highest economic effect. In the December of the same year, Minister Kao said building 
a bus expressway to replace the Tamsui Line railway was an excellent idea . Then, in 169
January 1975, the TPB completed a confidential report providing the same conclusion 
that Minister Kao and the MOTC had arrived at: removing the railway and building bus 
expressway on its route. This report provides comprehensive studies of the area where 
the Tamsui Line passed, arguing that the railway had played an essential role in 
commuting between Tamsui, Beitou, Shilin, and downtown Taipei City. It agreed that if the 
government removed the railway, rebuilding a road on the route, the route would generate 
severe traffic congestion. But rebuilding it as a metro line or building an elevated or 
subterranean railway to solve level crossing problems would face major financial 
obstacles. Therefore, the report concluded, it was preferable to remove the railway and 
rebuild it as a bus-only expressway first and then, when the government had enough 
money, integrating the route into the future metro system would be the best choice . 
170
	 There are two odd points about this report. First, the TPB concluded that it was 
preferable to keep  the Tamsui Line in 1973, but the MOTC, the nominal upper level of the 
TPB, refused to accept this conclusion, asking its technical office to modify the study. 
Remember that the TPB was a professional institute supported by the SAFED and the 
CIECD so that its budget did not come from the MOTC. Furthermore, the committee 
members of the TPB included high ranking officials from other ministries and local 
governments. We should also note that Minister Kao was an exclusive member of the 
cabinet led by Chiang Ching-kuo because he was the only local Taiwanese without party 
membership of the KMT. Before Kao became the minister of transportation and 
communication, he defeated KMT’s candidates twice in municipal elections in Taipei City, 
so he was a dissenting voice to the authoritarian KMT government. Second, no team 
member’s name is given in the report, as was usually the case with such technical 
reports. According to United Daily News, the TPB hired an international consultant to 
write the report, but we cannot find any authors other than  “the Transportation Planning 
Board” in the report. These two points strongly imply that was considerable disagreement  
between the TPB and the MOTC.

	 These internal conflicts meant that this report did not answer the question of 
whether the Tamsui Line should be demolished or not but rather fueled the conflict. In a 
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symposium with officials and local leaders discussing the Tamsui Line and the report, 
many opposed the conclusion of the report arguing that the MOTC just wanted to 
demolish the railway and that integrating it into the future metro system was just an 
excuse to calm down its opponents. The TRA also opposed the conclusion and argued 
that if the central government’s goal was to reform the Tamsui Line into a metro line, it 
was not necessary to demolish the railway; it should simply upgrade it in anticipation of a 
detailed plan . Minister Kao reinforced his support for building a bus-only expressway 171
on the Tamsui Line’s route in an interview. He argued that it was the most economical 
solution for the Tamsui Line because the government did not have enough financial 
resources to build a metro system in Taipei before the completion of all Chiang Ching-
kuo’s “Ten Major Construction Projects . However, the Taiwan Provincial Government 172
mentioned that the Tamsui Line should be kept rather than removed even though it also 
mentioned that the plan of the Tamsui Harbor would not be continued . Finally, at the 173
end of 1975, C.C. Wang, as Minister Kao’s deputy at that time, announced that the future 
of the Tamsui Line would be determined after a comprehensive transportation study for 
Taipei’s mass transportation . Thus the Tamsui Line escaped the fate of being 174
demolished. 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Figure 4.3: The Route of the Tamsui Line Railway  175
 This map was made of the Red Line of the Taipei Metro, which is on the same route as the 175
Tamsui Line railway.
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Figure 4.4: The Research Report for the Tamsui Line Issue 
In 1976, Minister Kao resigned as the minister of transportation and was assigned 
as the minister without a portfolio because of a train accident on the West Coast Line. 
This buried his idea of the bus-only expressway connecting Tamsui and Taipei in the 
archive.  Some people think that Kao’s idea of the bus-only expressway and its timing, 
1976, was inspired by the completion of the first bus rapid transit (BRT) system in the 
world that opened in 1974, the Rede Integrada de Transporte (RIT) in Curitiba, Brazil.   
However, no evidence can prove this, though his idea of the bus-only expressway, 
according to the TPB’s report, shares many similarities with the RIT, e.g. the independent 
right-of-the-road for buses and especially designed stations. Actually, Minister Kao never 
mentioned Curitiba when he stated his idea of the bus-only expressway. If his idea had 
95
been implemented, this bus-only expressway might have been regarded as one of the 
pioneering BRT systems,  as was Curitiba’s RIT. 

Like the death of the elevated railway project, the story of the Tamsui Line shows 
how politics interacting with the making of knowledge of the city influenced the planning 
for mass transportation in Taipei. Minister Kao’s unusual political situation and the TPB’s 
semiautonomous status decided the fate of the Tamsui Line. Minister Kao once had a 
chance to realize his innovation in the local context by combining the TPB’s ability of 
knowledge-making and the MOTC’s administrative power. However, as a dissenting voice 
within an authoritarian government, his action undoubtedly faced stiff challenges from his 
colleagues who were trusted by top people in the government, ensuring its failure. 
Furthermore, the Tamsui Line was integrated into a broader picture of Taipei’s, even of 
Taiwan’s, future mass transportation development, as C.C. Wang revealed: it involved 
solving more than mere level crossing problems. The TPB and the technical officials like 
C.C. Wang aimed at not only building a subterranean railway to satisfy Chiang Kai-shek 
and his son’s political ambition but also planning the whole mass transportation system of 
Taipei Metropolitan so that they could change the city, the country, and the way how they 




Figure 4.5: The Tamsui Line Railway in the 1980s  176
“Underground” Suspended Simultaneously  
	 It was not only Minister Kao’s innovative bus-only expressway that faced a 
setback, but also the subterranean railway project in Taipei City, even though the top of 
the KMT government pushed it. The death of the elevated railway project in Taipei City 
meant the birth of the subterranean railway project, and the timing of both the death and 
the birth coincidentally happened when, in the early 1970s, U.S.-Taiwan relations began 
to decline. In January 1972, a meeting of the TRA suggested  that the minister of 
transportation, Minister Kao’s predecessor, ordered that the railways in Taipei City should 
be underground, and a feasibility study should be the first step. Although the minister 
requested the TRA to take responsibility for this project and to hire experienced 
consultants, the TRA thought the TPB might be more suitable for the project since this 
project seemed too big and complicated for the TRA. The meeting also mentioned, as 




mentioning that he had discussed the issue of a possible project for building the 
underground railway with the famous Taiwanese Japanese architect, Kaku Morin (郭 茂林, 
Kuo Mao-lin in Chinese). Kaku did provide not only his professional opinions to Fei but 
also introduced a Japanese expert to Fei for consulting on the underground project and 
the future metro system . Furthermore, the MOTC then asked the CIECD to ask the 177
West German government to recommend suitable consultants to studied the 
subterranean railways in Taipei . As I argued earlier, Taiwanese technical officials’ series 178
of actions indicate a determination to pursue technological autonomy.

	  The government remained engaged. Like the elevated railway project, C.C. Wang 
formed an ad hoc group (abbreviated as the subterranean railway group) whose members 
included C.C. Wang himself, Prof. Yeh, an international consultant from the American 
company Nathan & Associates, the executive secretary of the TPB, Fu Chia-chi, and 
officials from the MOTC and the TRA to study the subterranean railway project in 1972. 
The first meeting confirmed the conclusion that the CIECD needed to ask the BRD 
government to recommend German experts from among the consultants supported by 
the Deutsche Bahn —Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting (DEC) — because the DEC was 
joining the project for the electrification of Taiwan’s West Coast Line railway and had 
experience in building a subterranean railway .  Initially, Deputy Fei agreed to send a 179
letter to ask West Germany . However, only three days after the first meeting of the 180
subterranean railway group, he told the MOTC that it should hire experienced consultants 
on its own rather than ask the CIECD for help . 
181
Why did Deputy Fei and the CIECD change their minds suddenly? The CIECD’s 
following document to the MOTC suggests a possible answer. In June 1972, the CIECD 
sent a document to the MOTC mentioning that it had received a letter from the Japanese 
consultant, Pacific Consultants International (パシフィックコンサルタンツ株式会社, PCI), 
and that PCI had the experience of consulting Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities’ subway 
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projects so that it believed that the PCI could be an excellent choice as consultant on the 
subterranean railway project. Thus, the CIECD recommended the MOTC to let the PCI 
compete for the business of consulting on the project . Although many other 182
consultants put in requests, including companies from the UK, Belgium, and the U.S., 
according to the archives, the CIECD did not recommend them as it did the PCI . 183
Therefore, I firmly believe that the CIECD or at least Deputy Fei himself preferred the 
Japanese company to consult on the project, especially when we realize Deputy Fei’s 
connection in Japan. 

That being said, C.C. Wang’s subterranean railway group did not accept the 
CIECD’s recommendation. The group hired six committees to review the companies 
joining the bidding, and they concluded that the American company Parsons & 
Brinckerhoff (P&B) was the best among the international consultants .
184
	 P&B’s victory seems to signal a reinforcement of the American hegemony of mass 
transportation technology. However, Deputy Fei's actions and the fact that the TRA hired 
the German firm DEC as consultant on its projects later is significant. Taiwanese technical 
officials started to introduce alternative resources for their making of knowledge and even 
for practical projects rather than follow their American advisors as they used to do before 
1972 when the KMT government started to face its diplomatic setbacks. Furthermore, 
when the technical officials of the Taipei City Government and a journalist saw the P&B’s 
report, they complained that the P&B did not understand Taipei City’s environment, and 
their opinion appeared in a national newspaper. The China Engineering Consultants 
Incorporated (CECI, 中華顧問工程司), the cooperator of the project and the consultants 
founded by the MOTC, asked the TRA to clarify and to defend the P&B’s project . This 185
story shows that Taiwanese technical officials had doubts about the American consultants 
and the confidence to challenge them. Finally, although the P&B completed its study, 
providing a plan to build a 5km underground railway for the West Coast Line and a 3km 
one for the Tamsui Line in November 1974, the KMT government dropped it for financial 
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reasons . The improvement of Taipei’s railways remained the same, and the 186
subterranean railway project, like the Tamsui Line issue, needed a total solution to be 
implemented and to be changed. This solution had to be much bigger than an 
engineering plan.

 Carter, Mass Transportation, and the Deutsche Bahn 
Planning Made by Taiwanese Only 
	 In February 1973, the American consultant of the TPB suggested that Taipei City 
Government initiate a comprehensive study of the transportation system in Taipei 
Metropolitan. After receiving the suggestion, Taipei City Government thought that the 
development of the city progressed while it had no solid transportation plan, so Taipei 
City Government expressed its will to take on planning jobs and asked the MOTC to 
provide resources to assist it. Taipei City Government estimated the study would cost 
about NTD24,000,000 (about 6,000,000 US dollars according to the currency rate at that 
time) for two years (1974 and 1975), and it hoped that the CIECD, the MOTC, and the City 
Government could share the cost evenly so that the three institutes would spend 4 million 
NTD (about 100,000 US dollars at that time) in 1974. The MOTC and the CIECD accepted 
Taipei’s request for financial support, but the CIECD thought “Taipei Metropolitan” 
included not only Taipei City but also Taipei County  and other local governments under 187
Taiwan Provincial Government so that Taipei City alone could not deal with such an 
integrating work. Thus, the CIECD recommended the MOTC and the TPB to be in charge 
of this mission, and it also suggested that the TPB applying for funding from the 
SAFED .
188
	 In September 1974, the MOTC and the TPB applied for funds from SAFED and the 
newly reformed succeeding institute of the CIECD, the Economic Planning Council (EPC). 
The first lines of the application cited Chiang Ching-kuo’s words in a meeting of the 
Executive Yuan in April 1974: “On transportation, the main mission is to develop mass 
transportation……this is an urgent job, and the MOTC should take action immediately.” 
Then, it mentioned that the number of automobiles increased with the growth of income 
in Taiwan so that the disfunction of car-centric transportation was already leading to 
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pollution in cities. Furthermore, this situation also wasted much land and energy, and both 
land and energy were rare in Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan needed to develop mass 
transportation to replace cars .
189
	 The transportation planning project included transportation networks in the 
metropolitan area, an analysis of urban development, transportation data analysis, long-
term plan studies, and transportation system evaluation. The terrain covered included 
Taipei City, Taipei County, Keelung City, Yilan County, Taoyuan County, and parts of 
Hsinchu County, meaning that about one-third of Taiwan would be studied. The SAFED 
and the EPC approved the application and provided the funding as the TPB asked. The 
project, unlike similar projects earlier, did not hire any international consultant to help with  
the research process or provide education training although one document mentioned 
that the TPB might budget for international advisors if necessary in the future; instead, the 
EPC and the TPB decided to do the research and planning with technical officials and 
local experts. 

In August 1975, the Chinese Institute of Engineering held a conference on urban 
construction, whose content related to mass transportation planning.  The draft of the 
proposal of the project of the mass transportation planning for Taipei Metropolitan 
attracted the Executive Yuan’s attention. In the same month, the publishers went to the 
Executive Yuan to present their works to the vice-premier. The vice-premier ordered the 
EPC and the TPB to operate the project by following the works presented by the local 
experts. Again, as C.C. Wang did previously, the TPB formed an inter-ministerial group for 
the project of mass transportation planning for Taipei Metropolitan (abbreviated as the 
mass transportation group) including members from different but related ministry and 
local governments. The executive secretary of the TPB at that time, Huang Chia-he (黃嘉
禾) was the convener of the group. In one meeting of the mass transportation group, 
Huang encouraged members of the group to join the researches and planning or to 
deploy other technical officials to the project . No one mentioned hiring international 190
advisors in this massive planning project, revealing the confidence of the technical 
officials and Taiwanese experts.
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Figure 4.6: The Range of the Mass Transportation Planning for Taipei Metropolitan  191
	 Besides technical officials within the government, the mass transportation group 
also contracted with local consultants to run sub-projects. For example, the state-owned 
CECI got the contract to analyze Taipei’s urban development, one local consultant was in 
charge of studying transportation fee rates, and newly founded MAA (亞新工程顧問公司) 
was in charge of studying new mass transportation system at that time . Although no 192
document reveals that the EPC, the TPB, or the whole KMT government intentionally 
used only technical officials and local Taiwanese experts to do the massive and decisive 
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transportation planning projects, no evidence shows any international advisor or 
consulting company involved in this project before 1977. In the meeting records of the 
mass transportation group, we do not see any international advisor appear even though 
an American advisor in the TPB bolstered the project. Therefore, I think that the technical 
officials and political leaders intentionally did not invite international experts into the large 
scale transportation planning project. My informant, who started to work for the SAFED 
and the CEPD in 1979, may verify my argument. He mentions that the TPB and some 
local experts believed that they could complete the project without any assistance from 
international consultants so that the TPB did not hire any international advisor for the 
project. However, even the technical officials in the TPB knew that the outcome was not 
satisfactory, so they had no choice but to invite foreigners back . In the era when the 193
KMT government was losing its ground in the international system, Taiwanese political 
leaders and technical officials tried to use only local experts to plan Taipei’s mass 
transportation system pursuing autonomy. However, they had no choice but to turn to 
international consultants again. Interestingly, they were not American.

The Return of the PCI and the DEC  
	 In early 1977, the TPB started to negotiate with the German DEC about sending 
advisors to Taiwan to help the Taipei Area Mass Transportation System Planning Studies, 
and, in February, after several negotiations, the DEC agreed to deploy three experts to 
Taiwan . In the document asking the EPC and the Executive Yuan to agree with the 194
plan, the TPB stated that “the Taipei metropolitan mass transportation system studies 
involve many complicated factors on a massive scale so that asking international advisors 
to help in proper timing would be a good option……We do not have anyone with 
experience of planning, designing, and constructing a mass transit system, so we need to 
hire international consultants and their experience.”

 On April 18th, the three German advisors, Horst Weigelt, Alfred Wild, and Dietrich 
Lehnert, started their works with Taiwanese technical officials . Horst Weigelt was the 195
most senior member of the consulting team, and he was the head of the department for 
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the new rapid railway in Hamburg with special expertise of mass transit systems, new 
transport systems for city and long-distance traffic, and system engineering for transport 
and rapid transit planning. Alfred Wild was a project manager for the management 
assessment of research for the mass transit system. The leader of the team, Dr.-Ing. 
Dietrich Lehnert was a technical expert for the planning, design, and reconstruction of 
mass transit systems, railway stations, sidings, and the marshaling yards at the DEC. 
Each of the advisors worked in Taiwan for about one or one and a half person-months, so 
they did not do the study from zero but provided turn keys to help Taiwanese technical 
officials reach reliable and satisfying conclusions and plans for Taipei’s future mass 
transportation systems. The German consultants helped the TPB to generate some solid 
suggestions for the mass transportation system planning, including building a metro 
system and rebuilding the railways on the same routes. In the beginning, the German 
consultants preferred an elevated railway , but they finally listed all recommended 196
options for the Taiwanese government to choose from .
197
	 German consultants brought many vital ideas and planning philosophies into 
Taiwan despite their short period of  service. First of all, they strictly criticized the 
American model of urban and transportation planning. Final Comment Report of Taipei 
Area Mass Transit System Planning Work Program states, “transportation academia and 
urban planning experts all agree that it is impossible to match the increasing demand for 
road and parking space in cities without destroying urban life functions and the city’s 
features. Los Angles and Detroit were mobilized in their early years. Their mobile-centered 
policy has already proved to be a total failure, and the consequence is silence in the city 
center after dark, the extension of residential areas to suburbia, and the waste of precious 
land resources for building roads .” Compared with the words in the UHDC period, they 198
suggested that American cities were no longer worth learning about since they had failed 
socially. Although Taiwanese engineers and technical officials still used the research 
methods learned from American advisors in the institute, which was founded with 
American resources and suggestions, they turned to follow Germany’s ideas and 
philosophy of how to build a mass transportation system in a city. We can also find that 
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the DEC brought the concept of a “Central Station” or “Transportation Center”  to the 199
TPB so that they could plan to reconstruct the Taipei Main Station into a center of urban 
transportation for the whole metropolitan area. Also, a commuter railway, transforming the 
existing railways into a metro-like transit system instead of building an independent metro 
system, was another new concept brought by the DEC. Therefore the DEC strongly 
suggested not removing existing railways but building a detour instead . These two 200
concepts, or designs in practice, are commonplace in Germany, even the whole of 
Europe. Moreover, with the assistance of the German advisors, the TPB got the first 
recommended network for Taipei’s future metro system, and we see that it brings in the 
concepts of “central station” and “commuter railway as a part of the metro system” for 
two apparent features (see Figure 3.7). First, most of the metro lines would reach the 
Taipei Main Station. Second, the east-west purple line with the mark of “S1” refers to the 
West Coast Line, and the north-south purple line refers to the Tamsui Line with the mark 
of “U1”. The purple lines mean the metro lines would open during 1982 and 1987, and  
“S1” and “U2” mean S-Bahn and U-Bahn . Therefore, the DEC not only planned to 201
integrated the Tamsui Line into the future metro system but also planned to rebuild the 
West Coast Line as the “S-Bahn” in Taipei as a part of the metro system.
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 In German, Stadtschnellbahn, S-Bahn, means “rapid urban railway,” and Untergrundbahn, U-201
Bahn, means “underground railway.” However, when British consultants planned the Taipei Metro, 
they regarded the “S” as “suburban” so that this line was called “suburban line” in the 1980s. 
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Figure 4.7: The metro network recommended by the DEC  202
	 Two things need to be noted. First, although their service was brief, the 
requirement of hiring the German advisors was submitted to not only the minister of the 
EPC but also the prime minister and the highest leader of the country de facto at that 
time, Chiang Ching-kuo  revealing hiring German advisors to deal with Taipei’s mass 203
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transportation was an important issue. Second, the archives show that the short-term 
service cost the KMT about 2 million NTD (about 115,000 West Deutsche Mark)  204
meaning this service occupied almost 10% of the enormous two-year-long study project. 
The price also shows the importance of the German advisors in the whole project and 
how difficult it was for the TPB researchers to work alone. If the technical officials were 
not confronted with tough challenges in their studies, they would not have needed  to ask 
the most senior member of the government, Chiang Ching-kuo, to spend such a big 
budget on hiring the advisors who would work in Taiwan less than two months.

	 Besides the DEC, the TPB and the TRA also hired the Japanese consulting 
company, the PCI, to study the elevated railway in Taipei City at the same time. In this 
study, the PCI was asked to help the TPB to evaluate the most suitable height of the 
elevated railway, concluding that 15 meters would be the answer. Before the PCI came to 
Taiwan, the DEC already suggested that 15 meters would be the best choice for the 
elevated railway , so the TPB hired the PCI was to check whether the DEC’s conclusion 205
was right or not. The TPB further invited advisors from both the DEC and PCI to work 
together to write The Improvement of the Railways in Downtown Taipei Report revealing 
the Taiwanese technical officials’ supervising strategies despite their weaker profession of 
transportation planning. 
	 In a meeting in 1978, the TRA and two deputy ministers of transportation did not 
agree with the PCI’s conclusion that 15 meters would be the best choice, and they also 
questioned the idea of an elevated railway. The chairman of the organizing body, the 
CECI, even suggested ending the study, and the minister of transportation agreed . In 206
addition to this opposition in this meeting, the Department of Defense vehemently 
opposed building 15-meter-high elevated railways in Taipei City because it thought the 
high-level elevated railway could cause massive damage if the PLA bombarded it. Thus, 
the DoD strongly recommended building a detouring railway instead of improving the 
existing railways . The TRA presented a document depicting the opposition to the 207
elevated railway in detail, stressing the difficulty for arranging the flow of trains and effects 
on its freight business. However, the TRA also opposed the project of the subterranean 
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railway for the same reasons and suggested leaving railways on the ground, solving level 
crossing problems by building a separate intercross . K.T. Li, who was minister without 208
a portfolio at that time, also stated the PCI’s study could not gain general consent among 
all officials, but he also expressed his opposition toward the MOTC’s suggestion of 
building a detouring railway. K.T. Li wisely understood that the conflict was not going to 
solved easily in such a chaotic atmosphere. So, he said: “We already decided to hire 
international consultants to do more studies so that I hope relevant agencies can take an 
objective attitude toward different options letting experts do their job and can listen to 
experts’ opinions discussing with economic and technical perspectives. On the final 
decision, the CEPD or higher level will conclude taking political factors into 
consideration .” 
209
Within the KMT government, which was an authoritarian regime at that time, who 
was higher than K.T. Li, who had been minister of finance, minister of the economy, and 
was a powerful minister without a portfolio? There must have been very few. In this sense, 
the top of the KMT government might not want to reproduce an American hegemony of 
transportation technology again, even though they needed to hire international 
consultants for help, because the U.S. seemed not to be trustworthy. Therefore, using 
German and Japanese consultants could be seen as a strategy to maintain Taiwan’s 
autonomy while building its mass transportation systems.

The DEC’s total Victory  
	 On October 5, 1978, the prime minister, Sun Yun-suan, held a meeting in the 
Executive Yuan to discuss the railway issue in Taipei. The meeting concluded that the 
MOTC would hire experienced consultants to do further studies and that the consultants 
needed to evaluate the three possible options: the elevated railway on the same route, the 
subterranean railway on the same route, and the detour railway . Although the Council 210
for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), which was reformed from the EPC in 
1977, and the Executive Yuan’s document did not directly reveal the “consultants” as 
being the DEC, the terms of reference for the consultant which was passed from the 
MOTC to the CEPD was for the DEC. The DEC would cooperate with the state-owned 
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local consultants CECI . However, Fu Chia-chi, who was the counselor of the CEPD, 211
passed a note to C.C. Wang, who was the deputy minister of the CEPD, pointing out that 
the MOTC and the TPB seemed to consider the subterranean railway the best option if 
there was no serious technical problem. Moreover, the CEPD would not express any 
opinion if the MOTC insisted so . Before the DEC and CECI presented their final report 212
of the evaluation of the three options, they completed the technical feasibility study for 
the subterranean railway in Taipei concluding that there was no technical problem that 
could not be overcome i.e.  the subterranean railway was the best choice . Therefore, 213
although the top-level leaders like Prime Minister Sun, and the minister of the CEPD, Yu 
Kuo-hwa (俞國華), opened a discussion space for the three options, in fact, top leaders 
and the high-level technical officials already preferred the option of the subterranean 
railway on the same route although it was the most expensive option. Two months later, 
the DEC presented the Evaluation Study of Railway Improvement Projects in Taipei City, 
recommending the option of the subterranean railway on the same route. This report also 
suggests making extensive for the West Coast Line in the whole Taipei Metropolitan, 
rebuilding the Tamsui Line as the first section of the future metro system, and starting the 
plan of Taipei’s metro system . Although many citizens sent their opinions opposing the 214
subterranean railway, on July 19, 1979, the Executive Yuan approved the project of the 
subterranean railway.

	 The KMT government did not easily accept the DEC’s plan before it decided to 
choose the underground option; instead, it took a series of actions to review and to check 
the DEC’s studies. First, as the TPB did in 1977, C.C. Wang asked the Chinese Institute of 
Engineering to invite a Japanese railway expert, Yukawa Ryuji(湯川　龍二), to visit Taipei 
and to review the DEC’s on-going study . Moreover, the MOTC also launched a 215
comparative study of the DEC’s plan and the P&B’s plan in April showing the KMT 
government’s attitude of not totally relying on the DEC. Finally, the Executive Yuan chose 
the DEC’s plan, and then, the MOTC hired the DEC as the consultants for the project. The 
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KMT government had a chance to introduce an American model for its railway in the 
capital city, but it decide not to do so.

	 Furthermore, just one month before the Executive Yuan approved the DEC’s plan, 
the American consultants, the De Leuw Cather International, wrote a letter to C.C. Wang 
expressing their will to join the subterranean railway project.  C.C. Wang only passed the 
letter to the deputy minister of transportation taking no further actions. We should note 
that 1979 was the year when President Carter announced the end of formal diplomatic 
relations between the U.S. and the R.O.C. and of the Mutual Defense Treaty along with  
the normalization of the Sino-American relationship,  putting the KMT government in an 
even more critical plight. Though some in the Carter administration were concerned with 
preserving important US ties with Taiwan after normalization with China, Carter seemed 
contemptuous of congressional backers of Taiwan . Furthermore, there was not only the 216
decline of diplomatic relations but also of technical assistance and cooperation. In 
September 1978, the Embassy of the United States in Taipei told the KMT government to 
terminate all technical and economic cooperation programs based on the Sino-American 
Economic Aid Agreement, including the JCRR and the SAFED . The KMT government 217
reformed the JRCC as the Council of Agriculture in 1979 when the U.S. terminated the 
formal diplomatic relations with the R.O.C., meaning that that there would be no official 
technical cooperation with the U.S. on agriculture anymore. Nonetheless, the CEPD cited 
a clause in the Sino-American Economic Aid Agreement to refuse to terminate the 
SAFED, continuing its operation in 1979 .  In defiance, the KMT did not return the 218
SAFED’s money but continued with its projects, and integrated the SAFED into its regular 
budget system. Although the CEPD and the SAFED were still key institutes to determine 
vital technical and economic programs, the semi-autonomous institute derived from U.S. 
Aid started to lose its special status.

	 This was the low-point of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, meaning that the U.S. 
government could not push the Taiwanese government to accept all of their demands, 
and the Taiwanese government would have space to turn down American bids. In the 
case of electrification of the West Coast Line  and the later Taipei Metro, we see that the 219
 Sutter, US-China Relations, Pp. 74.  216
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Committee 中美基金協定及管理委員會,” March 10, 1981.
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U.S. government pressured the KMT government to let American companies get 
business. This kind of situation did not happen in 1979. Although the 1970s was a 
massive setback for Taiwan's diplomacy, it also created a space for Taiwanese technical 
officials to import more diverse knowledge and technology for their future rail mass 
transportation system. For the Taiwanese government, the 1970s was a time to run their 
flexible transnational technology strategy. From the perspective of American hegemony in 
science and technology, the Taiwanese resisted the American model and assistance, 
seeking alternative resources from Germany and Japan when its relationship with the U.S. 
turned sour. The interactions of international politics, conflicts within the KMT 
government, different types of knowledge-making, and practical technological studies 
determined the DEC’s total victory and, finally, the destiny of the Tamsui Line and the 
West Coast Line in Taipei. 

The TRUPO 
	 In 1980, the Chair of Taiwan Provincial Government invited the commander of the 
R.O.C. Army and General Tung Ping (董萍), the president of the Chung Cheng Institute of 
Technology, which was a military school belonging to the Ministry of National Defense 
(MND), to his house for dinner. Although General Tung did not know the chair, he still 
accepted the chair’s invitation. After the dinner, the Chief of General Staff informed 
General Tung that the Chair of Taiwan Provincial Government hoped that he would be the 
Director-general of the TRA. The MND had already agreed this assignment, reporting it to 
President Chiang Ching-kuo. General Tung answered, “I have no personal opinion but to 
follow the order.” So,  he terminated his four-decade-long career as a military officer who 
had experienced the bloody war against imperial Japan and the severe China Civil War 
starting his service in a transportation agency . Almost at the same time, the Executive 220
Yuan established the Preparatory Engineering Office of the Taipei Underground Railway 
Project co-working with the TPB, and General Tung held the concurrent post of the chief 
of the Office as the Director-general of the TRA. 

	 Besides the project of the subterranean railway in Taipei City, the TRA also had the 
project of the improvement of the East Coast Line, that needed to deal with the 
mountainous terrain that the railway would pass through. Therefore, General Tung asked 
the DEC, the general consultants of the subterranean railway project, to provide advice to 
the TRA. The German experts suggested that General Tung invite Austrian experts to join 
 Tung, Ping 董萍, Going Through the Key Age: from Fighting Wars to Dedicating to Construction 220
走過關鍵年代：兵馬倥傯到投身建設 (New Taipei: Tung Ping,1998), Pp.91.
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the project because Austria had a similar environment for its railway and had a rich 
experience of building tunnels for railways. Finally, with the assistance of German and 
Austrian experts, the improvement of the East Coast Line was completed in 1982. 
General Tung rode on the first train after the completion of the project, enjoying the first 
achievement of his service in a transportation agency. However, General Tung 
experienced a heart attack at the end of 1982, almost losing his life. After he recovered in 
the spring in 1983, he presented his reassignment to Li Teng-hui (李登輝), the Chair of 
Taiwan Provincial Government at that time, and the next president of Taiwan, and Chair Li 
agreed. However, the Preparatory Engineering Office of the Taipei Underground Railway 
Project was reformed as the Engineering Office of the Taipei Railway Underground Project 
(TRUPO) to deal with the implementation of the subterranean railway, so General Tung 
accepted the minister of transportation’s invitation and kept serving as the chief of the 
TRUPO. At the same time, he quit the Director-general of the TRA. Six years later, the 
“underground," including the fourth generation Taipei Main Station was completed, and 
General Tung could enjoy another significant achievement of his civil service.

	 From 1980 to 1989, General Tung experienced the most critical period of the 
subterranean railway in Taipei. It was not only because the subterranean railway finally 
became real but also because the TURPO, the DEC, other international consultants, and 
other Taiwanese officials shaped the railway into a technological system with a hybrid 
style leading to the stations and underground tunnels having designs derived from 
Germany, Japan, Britain, and America.

The Taipei “Hauptbahnhof” 
	 When the DEC studied Taipei’s Metropolitan’s mass transportation systems, it 
already brought the idea of the central station, or “Hauptbahnhof” meaning “main railway 
station” in German, into Taiwan, and, the Taipei Main Station would be the result. In fact, 
the English translation of the station, Taipei Main Station, already reveals this idea, and 
Taiwanese technical officials also used “central station” to refer to the future Taipei Main 
Station. When the project went into the design stage, the DEC implemented the idea by 
setting the specs of the future Taipei Main Station. The DEC produced a volume 
describing the TMS (Taipei Main Station) planning principles that show how it designed 
the new station. First, because the DEC thought that the space available for the new 
TMS, its building, plaza, and other necessary facilities, was minimal due to the existing 
and planned future roads, and buildings, the planning of the new TMS had to be made 
with utmost care to make optimal use of the limited space available for necessary 
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functional areas. The DEC also mentioned that the new TMS should be given a logical, 
clear and clean design as an integrated transportation center so that the station would 
serve not only the railway but also the future metro system and other transportation 
systems and that the passengers of different means of transportation would not collide 
with each other. The passengers of the railway and the metro system would also 
interchange inside the station.

	 The site chosen for the station was on a stretch of earth above a submerged body 
of water that could disturb the station and tunnel structure. The DEC recommended using 
additional concrete to overcome its troublesome effects rather than building a higher 
station on stilts. The DEC did not want the station itself to attract too many people 
causing congestion. Thus, the DEC and the TRUPO-TPB team designed the new Taipei 
Main Station with three floors on the ground and three underground floors. Moreover, the 
DEC and the TURPO also designed the new station with a Chinese Palace appearance to 
be a landmark for the city . 221
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” October 11, 1984.221
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Figure 4.8: The DEC’s conceptual design of the Taipei Main Station . 222
The idea of pouring concrete rather than building a higher station caused many 
concerns for the Taiwanese officials because it would cost more money without 
generating any future income or business benefit. Thus the idea of building the Taipei 
Main Station with a high-level architecture rose. Facing the concerns, the TRUPO hired 
the CECI to study the possibility of building a higher station. As General Tung stated to 
the Executive Yuan, the CECI’s study supported the DEC’s idea, concluding that building 
a high-level station would cost more than it would earn. However, it recommended 
building a high-level building near the station to exploit the land’s value   Despite the 223
CECI’s study and the DEC’s additional explanation , the Prime Minister Sun asked the 224
TRUPO to consider building a seven-story station instead of pouring concrete beneath 
the station to overcome disturbances caused by underground body of water . The TRA 225
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” October 11, 1984. The 222
Chinese sentence under the picture means “original plan: taking Chinese roof with glazed tile and 
caisson ceiling, a pure Chinese style architecture.  
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” November 14, 1984.223
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also suggested moving its headquarters into the new station so that the land of its old 
center could be developed for business use, and it was willing to pay 900,000,000 NTD 
for building an additional four floors . Fu Chia-chi, the counselor of the CEPD, even 226
mentioned a possible option of building a 20-story or higher station to exploit the value of 
the land in downtown despite his doubts about the idea .  At the same time, the “Taipei 227
Mass Rapid Transit Group (TMRT)” which was planning the Taipei Metro with the British 
Mass Transit Consultants (BMTC) also opposed the DEC’s design. First, the BMTC said 
that the design with three levels underground would cause for pedestrian traffic and had 
the added inconvenience of transferring to the metro system  although the Prime 228
Minister Sun asked the TURPO if it was possible to build three levels underground reduce 
the budget . Second, the BMTC and the TMRT believed that mass transportation 229
systems should be highly integrated with the city’s business development rather than 
merely providing transportation service. The Japanese and American experts asked for 
advice also did not buy into the DEC’s design .
230
	 After the TRUPO and the DEC negotiated with the TMRT and the BMTC on the 
underground issue, the BMTC successfully persuaded the DEC that the Taipei Main 
Station would have four levels underground for railways and metro’s platforms and a 
concourse level . Moreover, t Prime Minister Sun finally determined that the new Taipei 231
Main Station would be a seven-story building with four floors underground, and the TRA 
would move into the station building . Nonetheless, the TRUPO cut one floor off causing 232
the Taipei Main Station to end up as a six-story central station with four floors 
underground due to the DEC’s strong insistence .
233
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	 Thus did the Taiwanese get the first underground station ever in Taiwan with a 
broad plaza, a vast lobby, limited business facilities, and six floors above ground. 
Because of the decision to build only a six-story station, the TURPO had no choice but to 
pour tons of concrete to stabilize the station preventing it from water damage . 234
However, as we will see in the next chapter, the Taipei City Government finally built two 
Japanese style underground cities with the Taiwanese Japanese architect Kaku Molin’s 
design and two American style underground malls thanks to the American metro 
consultants’ advice, leading to many business activities attracting many people aiming at 
neither riding trains nor using the Taipei Metro. One surprising thing is that Taipei City is 
still waiting for the high-level building near the Taipei Main Station today even though 
Taipei City Government followed the CECI’s recommendation and planned a space for 
it . The station finally was  the product of the negotiation between German ideas for a 235
station and other rival concepts. It shows how an artifact can have a technological style 
that is generated by integrating different ideas and styles which may conflict with each 
other. 
Figure 4.9: The lobby of the Taipei Main Station 
 The interview with the TP03.234
 The location for the planned high-level building is the Taipei Main Station of Taoyuan Metro 235
which is the station of the metro line connecting the Taoyuan International Airport and downtown 
Taipei City. The station and the metro line opened in 2017, and it is about 300m from the TRA 
Taipei Main Station. Taipei City Government opened bids to invite companies to build the high-
level building above the metro station, but it failed several times due to corruption, business fraud, 
and national security issue caused by Chinese capital. 
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Figure 4.10: The appearance of the Taipei Main Station  236
 

S-Bahn, or Not 
	 In October 1983, the TMRT and the BMTC completed the study report of the Taipei 
Metro. Their studies inherited the DEC’s study of Taipei Area’s mass transportation 
system, including the idea of the S1 Line. The TMRT and the BMTC recommended a 
metro network which was based on the DEC’s study , and it integrated the subterranean 237
railway as the Blue Line of the system naming it “S Line," referring to “suburban line.” 
However, the BMTC was very skeptical of the DEC’s “track sharing strategy," meaning 
that the intercity trains, freight trains, and the metro trains all used the same tracks. In 
contrast, it suggested that the Taiwanese government build two tunnels for four tracks so 
that the S Line would not interrupt intercity trains and freight trains . As we may see in 238
many cases in the U.K. or in those that used British consultants like Hong Kong’s MTR 
 “臺北車站-維基百科，自由的百科全書” https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/臺北車站. Accessed on 236
October 28, 2019.
 The Transportation Planning Board, The Comprehensive Report of the Metro Plan for Taipei 237
Metropolitan 臺北都會區大眾捷運系統計畫綜合報告 (1983): Pp. 19-20, and Pp. 43-44.
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” February 12, 1984.238
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(Mass Transit Railway), British planners do not exclude the design of using intercity 
railways as a part of a metro system, but tend to separate intercity trains and metro trains 
by building additional tracks.

	 Facing the British challenge, the DEC argued that “track sharing” means nothing 
else than using the same and existing track facilities and signal systems for rail-bound 
commuter services and other railway services, although the DEC was not in charge of 
planning the Taipei Metro. To cope with the increasing transportation demand in a 
conglomerated place like Taipei, the government needed to add additional commuter 
trains that called for greater track capacities.  To make full use of the given track 
capacities, the simultaneous operation of commuter and all other railway services have to 
be organized accordingly, at first by proper coordination of train schedules. Thus, track 
sharing is primarily a matter of organizing railway operations. The DEC emphasized that 
track sharing had worked efficiently in Germany’s S-Bahn, and doubts about track 
sharing were simply due to misunderstanding the concept . The DEC was not opposed 239
to building two additional tracks for the subterranean railway, but it thought that by 
organizing trains accordingly, all railway service could adequately run on the West Coast 
Line in Taipei City. Moreover, it also pointed out that track sharing would make the S Line 
open to service faster and that, according to the TRUPO’s plan, all railway services, 
including intercity, metro, and freight, would only share the two tracks for about four to 
five years. Therefore, because of lower cost, it supported its original design .
240
	 The British and German consultants at least all agreed that they should integrate 
the railway into the metro system.  The Americans took an even more radical attitude 
toward the German S-Bahn idea. In 1985, the CEPD hired the American consultants 
Taipei Transit Consultants (TTC), which was mainly composed of the DMJM (Daniel, 
Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall) to integrate the metro plans presented by the TPB/BMTC 
and Taipei City Government (see the following chapters). The TTC strongly suggested that 
Taipei exclude the subterranean railway from the metro system instead of building an 
independent Blue Line on the east-west Zhongxiao Road, replacing the role of the S Line. 
Therefore, the DEC and the BMTC’s plans to build new commuter stations on the West 
Coast Line would be unnecessary. The TRA also stated, earlier than the advent of the 
TTC, that the West Coast Line in Taipei was almost full with intercity service and freight 
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” March 6, 1984.239
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service, so track sharing and even the S-Bahn like subterranean railway was completely 
unfeasible .
241
	 General Tung and the TRUPO sent their argument supporting the DEC’s idea, and 
their concept for the  Taipei Main Station, to the CEPD, insisting that track sharing was 
feasible and the S-Bahn like S Line would be the most efficient option. General Tung 
failed to convince the CEPD. Counselor Fu wrote many notes on the TURPO’s document 
expressing his disagreement with its argument . Fu even wrote a note to the minister of 242
the CEPD at that time, Chao Yao-tung (趙耀東), arguing that the S-Bahn service was only 
feasible by buying new trains and organizing services well, without sacrificing service 
quality of the Taipei Metro. Moreover, he pointed out that the DEC failed to provide a 
solution to level crossings in the section of the West Coast Line which was not to be 
rebuilt as an underground yet.  If the government took the DEC’s design, it would cost a 
great deal of money to build grade separation of roads and the railway, or it would face 
traffic congestion and development gap caused by level crossings. Counselor Fu also 
criticized the BMTC for its indifferent attitude toward the DEC’s design, although it did not 
wholly agree with the idea of track sharing. Minister Chao agreed with Counselor Fu’s 
statement so that the CEPD sent Fu’s statement to the MOTC as the CEPD’s opinion .
243
	 Finally, the CEPD approved the TTC’s metro network killing the idea of building the 
S-Bahn in Taipei. However, when the decision was made in 1986, the construction of the 
subterranean railway was already on its way. Therefore, two interesting things happened. 
First, in the extension project of the subterranean railway in Taipei City, the TURPO kept 
building tracks in the two tunnels, and this arrangement starts from the Banqiao Station 
to the Nangang Station lasting for about 16km. Also, one of the two tunnels with two 
tracks was rebuilt as a part of Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) after 2000 so that the high-
speed rail could reach downtown Taipei City and its east end, Nangang, without an 
additional massive construction program in the crowded city. We may conclude that the 
THSR should thank the death of the “Taipei S-Bahn” for the gift of tunnels and the tracks. 
Second, the TURPO still completed the supposed-to-be commuter stations, but the TRA 
has never opened the stations, arranging them as stations for evacuation in an  
emergency. Therefore, Taipei has three ‘secret’ stations buried underground and hopes 
that they will never be used.

 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” May 25, 1984.241
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” November 27, 1985.242
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Subterranean Railway 地下鐵,” February 12, 1986.243
119
	 Was the DEC’s idea wholly wrong? Or, was the German-style S-Bahn not suitable 
to Taiwan? About two to three decades after the TURPO was reformed as the Railway 
Reconstruction Bureau (RRB) in 2002, the RRB built S-Bahn like elevated or subterranean 
railways in Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung, and even a part of New Taipei City calling the 
projects “metro railways” due to cheap cost and the TRA’s competition with the THSR for 
intercity transportation service. The RRB also planned similar projects in Taoyuan and 
Chiayi. This is another story and issue to be discussed in the 21st century.

Hybrid Knowledge and Style 
	 In the 1970s, the American hegemony of mass transportation technology ended, 
and the hybrid knowledge of Taipei and its transportation replaced it, leading to the hybrid 
technological style of the subterranean West Coast Line in Taipei. Two factors contributed 
to the end of technological hegemonic power. First, the increasing autonomy of Taiwan’s 
transportation studies and planning profession. Gaining the ability to make knowledge 
transformed Taiwanese technical officials’ consent to the American hegemony to the 
ambition of walking their way and adopting the strategies of introducing alternative 
knowledge resources. Second, the decline of the U.S.-Taiwan relations created the space 
for Taiwanese to extend the autonomy gained from their American teachers, trying to do it 
themselves and hiring other teachers. If Nixon and Carter did not turn the U.S.-Taiwan 
relations to the ice point, the American hegemony of transportation technology might 
have lasted since the U.S. retained its superiority to Taiwan at that time, and there many 
American engineering consulting companies like the De Leuw Cather and the P&B were 
doing business in Taiwan.

	 When Taiwanese technical officials established the TPB and the profession of 
transportation studies and planning, as the previous chapter states, they revealed their 
intention to lower the dependence on American hegemony of the profession by 
considering a Japanese technical assistance program and hiring the DEC to consult the 
TRA’s operational problems. However, Taiwanese technical officials and their leaders did 
not suddenly change the orientation of the transportation profession from the U.S. to 
others. Instead, in the earlier projects, including the elevated railway project in Taipei and 
the study of the Tamsui Line, they still relied on American advisors’ help to generate the 
knowledge of the railways and the city helping the political leaders to make decisions. C. 
C. Wang’s ad hoc group for studying the subterranean railway projects even chose the 
P&B to consult the project. Nonetheless, when the TPB started its ambitious program for 
the mass transportation system in Taipei Metropolitan in 1976, not only American 
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consultants were absent but also other international consultants. When it found it too 
challenging to complete the program without international consultants’ assistance, it 
turned to German and Japanese companies rather than American companies. Therefore, 
Taiwanese technical officials effectively withdrew their consent to the co-production of the 
American hegemony of transportation technology. However, they failed to do everything 
on the planning of Taipei’s mass transportation systems alone and asked German and 
Japanese experts for help leading to hybrid knowledge of mass transportation 
technology, especially rail transportation.

	 To the objective circumstances in the 1970s, the decline of the U.S.-Taiwan 
relations created a space for the Taiwanese to disrupt the  American hegemony of 
transportation technology. In the 1950s and 1960s, the KMT government had no choice 
but to introduce American resources and models into Taiwan for improving Taiwan’s 
technological and economic power to confront communist China. The driving force was 
the close U.S.-Taiwan relations created by the Korean War and the following Cold War 
context. After the context changed with Nixon’s visit to Beijing and Carter’s termination of 
formal diplomatic relations between the two governments, not only was the driving force 
of Americanization weakened. So too was the power of the U.S. government to influence 
technological choices in Taiwan. The U.S. government obliged the KMT government to 
include American companies in the project of the electrification of the whole West Coast 
Line. Moreover, as we will see in the following chapters, the U.S. government obliged the 
KMT government to change international consultants from a British one to an American 
one and to accept the “the U.S. only” policy of procurement of the metro cars. A similar 
situation did not happen in 1979 when the KMT government was about to launch the 
large projects of the subterranean railway and the Taipei Metro. Thus, I argue that Carter’s 
diplomatic policies not only caused a disaster for the KMT’s diplomacy and legitimacy as 
the ruling power in Taiwan but also created a space for Taiwanese technical officials to 
pursue different technical assistance other than that provided by America so generating 
the hybrid knowledge of mass transportation studies and planning.

	 When the TRUPO started to implement planning in the early 1980s, the Taiwanese 
technical officials did not rely on their consultants entirely. Instead, they used consultants 
from other countries to review the German designs, and they also had acquired the 
confidence to express their concerns. When American intervention appeared in the 
mid-1980s in the Taipei Metro project, technological hybridity happened both in planning 
and following practical designs. The Taipei Main Station was the product of the process of 
hybridity. Its architecture was the outcome of the negotiation of the German idea of the 
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central station, with inputs  from British, Japanese, and American experts  and the local 
demands in Taiwan. Although these ideas and demands might even conflict with each 
other, the Taipei Main Station still became a station serving people in the transportation 
systems for decades, and it is the example of how a hybridity of technological style 
emerged. The subterranean railway with two tunnels, four tracks, and three mysterious 
hidden stations also illustrates technological hybridity of functions and styles. The story of 
the TRUPO, the subterranean railway, and the main station shows that a technological 
system can be a consequence of technical practice, making of knowledge, technological 
ideas, the needs of political economy, and, as I keep emphasizing, the development of 
international politics, especially in a technological catching-up country like Taiwan. 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Chapter 5: Taipei Metro I                                              
Mobilization of Knowledge and People: 1979-1997

 “We already knew that the Executive Yuan was about assigning Chi Pao-cheng (齊寶錚) to 
be charged in the project of the Taipei Metro, and I just guessed the reasons why he made an 
appointment with me. As we sat in Sheraton’s coffee shop, he directly told me: ”Hsiao Lai (小賴, 
Paul Lai’s nickname), let’s work together! (我們已經知道⾏政院原則上決定派齊寶錚負責台北
捷運這個專案，當然那時候我只是懷疑他為什麼突然找我。我們在喜來登的咖啡廳⾒⾯，他
⼀坐下來來就說:「⼩賴，我們⼀起打拼!」)” Paul Lai, 2019 
 “The MRT will become a showcase for the Republic’s technology, with the potential to 
attract an increasing volume of foreign contracts for ROC suppliers. The MRT will serve an 
important function in the technological education of the nation by providing a resource of specialist 
skills and experience in transit engineering and operation.” BMTC (British Mass Transit 
Consultants), 1982. 
	 In the following three chapters, we discuss the history of the Taipei Metro. Our 
focus is different in each chapter, although they do overlap in important ways.  This 
chapter highlights the mobilization of knowledge and people for designing and building 
the Taipei Metro and how the Taiwanese learned and benefited from the international 
consultants, mainly American and British consultants; the next chapter focuses on the 
tension and conflicts between Taiwanese and international consultants and the strategies 




	 Taipei Metropolitan or Taipei area mainly refers to Taipei City, New Taipei City 
(Taipei County before 2010), and Keelung City and sometimes includes Taoyuan City 
(Taoyuan County before 2014), and part of Hsinchu. The core of the metropolitan, 
downtown Taipei City and satellite cities belong to New Taipei City, is located in the Taipei 
Basin surrounded by mountains to the east, west, south, and volcanos in the north. Taipei 
City itself is divided into  northern and southern sections  by the Keelung River. Beitou, 
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Shilin, and Neihu (內湖) are in the north part of Taipei. These three districts have dense 
populations in the residential area, and in fact they were the suburban area of the city for 
decades until the 2000s. Beitou has a national park which is famous for its volcanos, and 
a hot spring resort on the edge of the volcanos while also being a residential area. The 
Japanese colonial government specially built a branch line railway of the Tamsui Line to 
reach the hot spring resort. Shilin was the zone where Chiang Kai-shek lived, and 
embassies of other countries were situated there,   Many people living there commute to 
downtown Taipei City. Neihu, once an agricultural area, has been a rising business district 
hosting many companies’ headquarters in the past two decades. The south part of Taipei 
City is the core of the metropolitan area and even of the country. The central government, 
business districts, hospitals, universities, and monumental architecture concentrate in this 
area so that jobs, entertainment, dwelling, and public affairs are plentiful. The western 
part of this area is the old downtown of the city, and the city has expanded toward its 
east, finally reaching Nangang, the east gate of the city. Besides Keelung River, Taipei 
International Airport, the downtown airport for Taipei like Hanada Airport for Tokyo or 
Ronald Reagan Airport for D.C. Washington, also roughly divides the two parts of the city.

	 Although New Taipei City surrounds Taipei City, the most apparent boundary 
between the two is the Tamsui River and its tributaries. People from central and south 
Taiwan coming for education and jobs build their new home on the left bank of the Tamsui 
River, leading to many satellite cities of Taipei City, and these cities are even more 
populous than Taipei City. On the outskirts of these cities, industrial areas contribute jobs 
and economic outcomes to the metropolitan zone and even to the country. For example, 
Foxconn, the biggest consumer electronic products manufacturer, was born in Tucheng 
(土城) which is about 15km away from downtown Taipei City. Therefore, in such a big 
metropolitan conglomeration, people and vehicles move day and night for everyday life 
and business actives, causing colossal traffic flows in both the east-west direction and 
the north-south direction crossing rivers and streets.

	 At the dawn of the Taipei Metro project in the late 1970s and the 1980s, Taipei was 
a city suffering from traffic congestion, lacking parking space, and poor quality mass 
transportation. After experiencing oil shocks twice, Taiwan’s economic growth remained 
strong due to Taiwan’s thriving manufacturing industries. During 1975 and 1985, Taiwan’s 
GDP per person had grown from 981 dollars to 3,315 dollars. With the strong economic 
growth, urbanization also became faster, leading to the population growth in Taipei 
Metropolitan. In 1972, about 1.89 million people lived in Taipei City, and, in 1980, Taipei 
City’s population reached 2.22 million. Moreover, the satellite cities in Taipei County, also 
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gained tens of thousands of people at the same time. New residents transformed many 
small towns into industrial areas and residential districts with dense populations leading 
to heavy traffic caused by commuting between Taipei City and these newly rising cities. 
Combining population growth and economic growth, the numbers of automobiles and 
scooters in Taipei Metropolitan also dramatically increased. In 1981, Taipei City had 
105,460 cars , and the number increased almost four times, reaching 399,746 in 244
1988 . The increase in the number of cars and people in the city in such a short time 245
caused severe traffic congestion and a critical shortage of parking space. Moreover, 
people living in Taipei stopped using mass transportation, mainly buses, due to severe 
traffic congestion. In the early 1980s, the private automobile ownership increased on 
average by almost 16% annually,  double the rate of increase of buses. The Taipei City 
Government spent three and half years building a new parking deck in downtown Taipei 
providing 1,400 parking spaces. However, Taipei City gained the same number of cars in 
just five days! . After 15 years, what the father of the Shinkansen, Shima Hideo, 246
anticipated in 1965 became a truth: Taipei’s traffic was chaotic in the 1980s. 
 The Transportation Planning Board, The Comprehensive Report of the Metro Plan for Taipei 244
Metropolitan 臺北都會區大眾捷運系統計畫 (1983): Pp. 13.
 Source: The Ministry of Transportation and Communications, R.O.C. https://stat.motc.gov.tw/245
mocdb/stmain.jsp?sys=100. 
 Yang, Tzu-pao 楊子葆, “The Urban Political Economy of Metropolitan Transportation Policy in 246
Taiwan: A Critique of the ‘Taipei Mass Rapid Transit System Program’ 台灣都市交通政策的政治經
濟學分析——台北都會區大眾捷運系統計畫之個案研究” in Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social 
Studies 台灣社會研究季刊, Vol. 3, No. 2-3 (1990): Pp. 52-53.  
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Figure 5.1: Taipei Metropolitan 
The level crossing problems were only a part of the traffic disaster in Taipei.  The 
TPB (Transportation Planning Board) and the DEC (Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting ) did 
studies planning mass transportation for the metropolitan area in 1977, and  concluding 
that Taipei did not only need to bury the West Coast Line railway underground, but also 
needed to build a metro system. Although the DEC roughly planned a metro network in its 
study for Taipei’s mass transportation systems, the KMT government only determined 
that the DEC and the TRUPO (Taipei Railway Underground Project Office) were in charge 
of the subterranean railway while someone else would take charge of building the metro 
system. The only professional institute for transportation planning, the TPB, again, took 





Figure 5.2: Traffic Congestion in Taipei in 1983 . 247
The TMRT in the TPB 
	 In 1979, the TPB started its mission of planning the Taipei Metro. First of all, it 
established the “Taipei Mass Rapid Transit Group (TMRT)” recruiting members from the 
TPB and elsewhere  Wang Ching-jui (王慶瑞), who was the successor of Dr. Chiang as the 
chief of the planning division in the TPB after Dr. Chiang went to the U.S. to pursue a  
Ph.D. degree, became the leader of the TMRT. Wang named the future metro system “Jie-
yun (捷運)," meaning rapid transit rather than underground or subway distinguishing the 
TRUPO’s “underground” project . The first question for Wang and his TMRT was who 248
could help them to plan the system. Although the technical officials knew how to do 
transportation studies and evaluation, the case of the subterranean railway and the mass 
transportation system planning for Taipei showed that they still could not complete a 
planning project on their own. Not even to mention that none of them had any experience 
of planning or even using metro systems. The MOTC (Ministry of Transportation and 
 國立臺灣大學數位人文研究中心。「新版國家文化資料庫 。」2010。http://doi.org/10.6681/247
NTURCDH.DB_NRCH/Collection.
 The interview with TP08.248
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Communication) presented a draft, which was written by Counselor Fu in the CEPD 
(Council of Economic Planning and Development), for improving mass transportation in 
cities, ordering the MOTC to hire experienced consultants for the metro project . Hiring 249
international consultants was needed to start their planning mission. So, the TMRT faced 
other questions. Who would be the consultants? How did they find an appropriate 
consulting company to work with? Although the TPB had the experience of cooperating 
with international consultants like the DEC and the De Leuw Cather, it did not know which 
consultants had abilities and experience to consult a transportation system, which was 
just as incredibly complicated as a metro system. 

A possible candidate was suggested to the Taiwanese government. Emanuel 
Cassuto, a close friend of Giulio Andreotti who was the prime minister of Italy from 1976 
to1979, secretly visited Taipei, meeting C.C. Wang twice to seek opportunities to serve 
the Taipei Metro project for Centre Européen de coopération Internationale, which was a 
French company, and other Italian companies . The TPB and the CEPD decided not to 250
hire them as the international consultants for the metro project, however.

	 In 1980, one young technical official joined Wang’s team. He was the son of a 
diplomat with a degree in transportation planning in the U.S., David Poo (濮大威). 
Because of growing up outside Taiwan for most of his childhood and teenage years, 
David Poo was a native English sparker. Thus the TMRT asked him to write technical 
documents for hiring international consultants. David Poo asked his classmates and 
professors at college and graduate studies who had the experience of hiring consultants, 
or hired them as consultants himself,  to help him write the technical documents. Two of 
David Poo’s senior classmates flew to Taiwan to tutor him, and he used the manual of the 
Fédération Internationale Des Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC)  to draft the documents. First of 
all, David Poo and the TPB presented the qualification documents and posted 
advertisements to invite engineering companies to bid. Five companies were put on the 
shortlist. The TPB set up a committee with members in and out of the TPB to evaluate 
these companies. The British Mass Transit Consultants, which was a joint venture led by 
Freeman, Fox, and Partners, won the first place for its experience of Hong Kong’s MTR 
(Mass Transit Railway), and the American company De Leuw Cather was in the second 
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” May 7, 1979.249
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” October 8, 1978, and May 7, 250
1979.
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place . Besides hiring international consultants, the TPB also aimed to incubate local 251
experts out of the government, so, as it did in the case of the subterranean railway 
project, it hired the CECI (Chinese Engineering Consulting Incorporated) as the local 
counterpart of the BMTC. With this arrangement, not only the members of the TMRT 
could obtain experience and profession bought by the BMTC.  So too could the local 
engineers from the CECI so that the CECI could be home to the  Taiwanese consultants 
of the future. serving the cases in and out of Taiwan. 
	 On the practical level, the BMTC contributed much to technology transfer and 
know-how to plan a metro system. For the former, the technology transfer was based on 
job training, meaning that the BMTC worked with Taiwanese technical officials and 
engineers together rather than merely providing written documents. In the process of 
cooperation, the Taiwanese would see how British experts were doing their calculations, 
making every decision, making plans, and managing the design and planning process. 
For example, members of the TMRT admire the BMTC’s “documentation” very much . 252
Documentation means that every calculation, meeting record, technical decision, and 
plan should be recorded and accordingly organized into files. The BMTC even had one 
expert who did nothing but keep a written record of everything; the BMTC called this 
effort “file engineering. ” Documentation had two purposes. First, the planning process 253
could be efficient and systematic, avoiding duplication and inconsistency. Second, 
technology transfer could also be systematic, and newcomers could find references to 
every detail of the planning. Besides documentation, the BMTC also introduced an 
essential institution for planning a metro system, which was “coordination groups.” 
Because a metro system would involve many factors and professions such as station, rail, 
train control, power system, operation, architecture, and development, each planning 
topic needed the coordination of members in different professions. For example, when 
the planners and engineers were planning a station, the station coordination group and 
traffic coordination group would need to discuss how to design this station’s exits 
location, the width of stairs, and the speed of the escalators since the traffic coordination 
group knew the prediction of the people and traffic flows. The station coordination group 
needed to design where passengers should enter and leave the station .
254
 The interviews with TP05 and TP08.251
 The interviews with TP03 and TP08; Huang, “Awkward Rail,”  Pp.36-37.252
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	 At the conceptual level, the BMTC’s ideas were generated from their experience in 
the U.K. and Hong Kong and were expressed in the metro network and the corresponding 
design. Unlike the DEC’s network based on the idea of central station and transportation 
center, the BMTC and the TMRT presented an “L-shape” network meaning that every 
metro line would be L-shaped instead of straight. The purpose and the outcome of this 
design were to make many transferring stations rather than one central station so that 
passengers would be distributed to these stations. Therefore, take the current Taipei 
Metro network as an example, the Taipei Main Station would not be overloaded because 
passengers could change trains in the stations like the Zhongshan Station, the Ximen 
Station, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Station, and the Dongmen Station. However, 
the absence of a “central station” might also increase the frequency of transfers reducing 
a traveler’s motivation to ride on the metro system. The L-shape design itself can solve 
part of the problem. Again, the network map of the Taipei Metro shows how it works. We 
can find that passengers need to transfer only once from any station to any other station 
except those on the Brown Line. So, the frequency of transfer in the metro system 
decreases.   
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Figure 5.3: The network of Taipei Metro 
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Figure 5.4: The metro networks recommended by the BMTC (left) 
Figure 5.5: The metro networks recommended by the DEC (right)  255
	 Another way to solve the problem of frequency of transfer is the design of “cross-
platform interchange.” The design of cross-platform interchange is to build two tunnels 
(for different directions) of the same line arranged up and down rather than parallel so that 
the two metro lines become parallel between the platforms on different floors when the 
two different metro lines meet at an interchange station. With this design, most of the 
passengers who need to transfer can change lines on the same platform without walking 
upstairs or downstairs, decreasing the effort of making the transfer so that riding on the 
metro system becomes more attractive and the number of rides can increase. This design 
originated in Britain, and the BMTC used it in their projects of the MTR in Hong Kong. 
 The Transportation Planning Board, The Briefing Report of the Metro Plan for Taipei 255
Metropolitan 《臺北都會區大眾捷運系統計畫簡報》. (Taipei: Transportation Planning Board 交通運
輸計畫委員會, 1983), Pp. 5; The Transportation Planning Board, “The Comprehensive Report, Pp. 
4.
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This design combining the L-shape network exhibits the British consultants’ focus on 
operation and management after the completion of a metro system because decreasing 
frequency and efforts of changing lines would attract people to use the metro rather than 
taking the automobile, increasing ridership of the system.

	  As the previous chapter shows, the BMTC and the TMRT did not only work on 
their Taipei Metro project. They embedded their planning and designs into the larger 
picture of Taipei’s mass transportation systems planned by the DEC and its counterpart in 
the TRUPO. Then, they also coordinated with the DEC and the TURPO’s subterranean 
railway project for the issue of the S1 line and the design of the Taipei Main Station. Thus, 
British experience and designs derived from British cities and Hong Kong traveled 
transnationally to Taiwan and were integrated with those coming from Germany and 
Japan, creating the hybridity of knowledge and styles, and the American hegemony of 
transportation technology seemed to vanish totally. However, the change in U.S.-Taiwan 
relations could remove American contributions from Taiwan’s mass transportation, but it 
could also bring it back:  after all, Taiwan and the KMT’s remained vulnerable to mainland 
China’s military threat.

The Return of America: the TTC 
Taiwan and the KMT Government’s Plight 
	 The termination of the formal relationship and the mutual defense agreement 
between the U.S. and the KMT government did not mean that Taiwan lost all military 
protection by the U.S. In March 1979, Congress and the Senate passed the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA). The Act declared that “in furtherance of the principle of maintaining 
peace and stability in the Western Pacific area, the United States shall make available to 
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary 
to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity as determined by the 
President and the Congress” and requires "such determination of Taiwan's defense needs 
to be reviewed by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations 
to the President and the Congress.” The Act also gave power to the U.S. government to 
establish America in Taiwan (AIT) as being in charge of the informal diplomatic relations 
between the U.S. and Taiwan. Although the Act did not guarantee military intervention 
from the U.S. if China invaded Taiwan, Taiwan still highly relied on the American military 
power in the Western Pacific to secure its autonomy and the survival of the regime.

	 The victory of Ronald Reagan as U.S, President in 1980 again brought hopes to the 
KMT government that the diplomatic relations between the R.O.C. and the U.S. would be 
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restored, especially since Reagan heavily condemned Carter's handling of Taiwan during 
the presidential election. However, Reagan backed away from the stance of restoring the 
formal U.S.-Taiwan relationship and declared he would base his policy on the TRA . In 256
1982, the U.S. and China signed the August 17 Communiqué  which stated that 257
America and China would further strengthen cultural, technological, and economic ties 
and that the U.S. government may gradually decrease its sale of weapons to Taiwan. 
Although Reagan presented “Six Assurances ” to Chiang Ching-kuo and Taiwan 258
emphasizing that the U.S. did not agree to set a specific date for ending arms sales to 
Taiwan, and other assurance related to Taiwan’s safety, Reagan’s actions shattered the 
hope of restoring formal relations between the two countries. At the same time, the 
Chinese government proposed the “Three links (三通)," meaning postal, commercial, and 
transportation links for promoting the unification of both sides of Taiwan Strait in 1979 
when the KMT lost its formal recognition by the U.S. Then, in 1983, China’s leader at that 
time, Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), announced the policy of “One country, two systems (一國兩
制)" for the future unification of Hong Kong and Macao pressing the KMT government to 
follow the same principle “to bring Taiwan back to its motherland.” Thus, the KMT 
government was facing China’s military and political threats and in the crisis of its 
legitimacy of ruling Taiwan.  

	 Besides the political pressure from the U.S. and China, the huge trade deficit 
between the U.S. and Taiwan was another problem that the Taiwanese government 
needed to face. In the 1980s, Taiwan’s manufacturing industries became more thriving 
due to cheap but high-quality labor force exporting tons of goods to the U.S. while this 
island country did not have the corresponding purchasing power to buy American 
products. In 1985, the trade deficit between the U.S. and Taiwan was about 11.7 billion 
dollars, and the numbers increased to about 14.3 billion in 1986 and 17.2 billion in 
 Sutter, US-China Relations, Pp. 76.  256
 The Shanghai Communiqué announced in 1972, the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment 257
of Diplomatic Relations in 1979, and the August 17 Communiqué in 1982 are called the “Three 
Communiqué” which are essential bases for the normalized relations between the U.S. and China.  
 The “Six Assurance” were that “we did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to 258
Taiwan,” “see no mediation role for the United States between Taiwan and the PRC,” Nor will we 
attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiations with the PRC,” “there has been no 
change in our longstanding position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan,” “we have no plans 
to seek revisions to the Taiwan Relations Act,” and “ the August 17 Communiqué, should not be 
read to imply that we have agreed to engage in prior consultations with Beijing on arms sales to 
Taiwan.” In 2016, Congress passed the text of the Six Assurance as the resolution. 
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1987 . The U.S. government pressured Taiwan to buy more American products and 259
services to compensate for the trade deficits. However, due to the August 17 
Communiqué and Reagan’s policy concerns, Taiwan could not purchase military 
equipment like F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters: the American products Taipei was eager to 
get the most since Taiwan’s air force was using from the old and notoriously unreliable 
F-104 Starfighter . In this context, massive infrastructure projects like the Taipei Metro 260
became targets of the U.S. government, and, coincidently, the Taipei City Government 
created a chance for Americans to involve in the Taipei Metro.

The Advent of the TTC 
	 In 1982, the Taipei City Government started to study newly developed automated 
guideway transit systems (AGT) that used driverless cars, and set a “medium-capacity 
transit group” to plan a metro system. The system would use an automatic system so that 
the city would have a smaller system in advance of the completion of the TPB and the 
BMTC’s metro system so releasing the pressure of traffic congestion in Taipei . In 1984, 261
Taipei City submitted its plan to the Council of Economic Planning and Development, so 
the CEPD had two metro system plans, one from the TPB and one from the Taipei City 
Government. In one internal note in the CEPD, the counselor Fu Chia-chi provided two 
suggestions about the two metro systems. First, the government needed to launch an 
integration study to solve the conflict between the TPB and the Taipei City Government; 
Second, the CEPD should be in a neutral position rather than hosting the integration 
study, or the CEPD would lose its standpoint of judging the conflict between two 
institutes . Thus, Counselor Fu concluded, the MOTC should be in charge of the 262
integration study. However, the MOTC did not believe the newly developed driverless 
transit was reliable, taking the same position as the TPB .
263
	 In July in the same year, Ralph Stanley, the Urban Mass Transportation 
Administrator in the U.S.  from 1983 to 1987, visited Taiwan. His mission was to 264
 Branch, Foreign Trade Data Dissemination. “Foreign Trade: Data.” U.S. Trade with Taiwan, April 259
21, 2009. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5830.html#1985.
 The R.O.C. Air Force owned 247 F-104 Starfighter during 1960 and 1998, and 114 of them 260
finally crashed, killing 66 pilots. 
 I provide more details about how the medium-capacity transit project started in the chapter 6.261
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” August 6, 1984.262
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” August 23, 1984.263
 The director of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA). The UMTA was formed 264
in 1964, and it was reformed as the Federal Transit Administration in 1991.
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“convince” the Taiwanese government to open the metro project to bids from the U.S. so 
that the trade imbalance between the U.S. and Taiwan could be mitigated. Many metro-
related companies followed Ralph Stanley’s visit to Taiwan forming the “United States 
Transit Trade Mission to Taiwan.” Ralph Stanley and the members of the U.S. Transit 
Trade Mission to Taiwan read both of the TPB and the Taipei City Government’s planning 
reports and showed that the U.S. could help the Taiwanese government to solve this 
conflict . In October, thirteen companies participating in the U.S. Transit Trade Mission 265
to Taiwan formed the “United States-Taiwan Transit Group (USTTG)” in D.C. listing tasks 
for the integration study of the two metro plan. The USTTG also told the CEPD that it 
would apply to the U.S. Trade and Development Program (USTDP) for financial support 
for the integration study Taipei . After the approval of the USTDP, the USTTG signed a 266
memorandum with the CEPD and decided that three of its members, the DMJM, the De 
Leuw Cather, and the TRAAC, to form a joint venture to do the integration study . The 267
officials of the AIT visited the CEPD asking the CEPD’s attitude toward the USTTG’s 
proposal .  268
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” August 23, 1984.265
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” November 17, 1984.266
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” December 4 and 7, 1984.267
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” December 7, 1984.268
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Table 5.1: The members of the USTTG 
	 At the same time, France also sought to enter the metro business in Taipei. The 
director of the France Aisa Trade Promotion Association (FATPA; Association française 
pour le développement du commerce avec L’Asie ), Francis Geronimi introduced the 269
SOFRETU (Société française d'études et de réalisations de transports urbains) which was 
the state-owned transportation engineering consultants created by the RATP (Régie 
Autonome des Transports Parisiens) Group to Yu Kuo-hwa, the prime minister of 
Table 5.1: The members of the USTTG
Name of Firms Products or Service
Bechtel International, Inc. Construction and engineering 
consulting
De Leuw Cather International Ltd. Transportation and engineering 
consulting
DMJM International Construction consulting
General Electric Technical 
Services Co., Inc. 
Power systems
General Railway Signal Company Signal control systems
General Signal Corporation Signal control systems




The Ralph M. Parsons Company Technology systems and infrastructure 
engineering
TRAAC International Consultants Construction consulting




AGT systems, power systems, and 
railway equipment
 It was association formed by the French government in 1978 for promotion of Franco-Taiwan 269
trade, and it had been the first institute set by the French government since Charles De Gaulle 
terminated the formal Franco-Taiwan relations in 1964. In 1991, the FATPA was merged into the 
France Office in Taipei (Bureau Français de Taipei), which is an AIT alike informal diplomatic 
institute representing the French government in Taiwan.
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Taiwanese government. The minister of the CEPD, Chao Yao-tung met the SOFRETU’s 
representative and manager in December 27, 1984. The SOFRETU’s representative 
expressed its interest in joining the integration study of the metro system . 
270
 However, Counselor Fu had already listed three possible options to reply to American’s 
proposal and decided to hire the three American consultants without the support of the 
USTDP . Therefore, Chao had no choice but to express his regret to French . Then, in 271 272
March 1985, the three American companies formed the Taipei Transit Consultants (TTC) 
to cooperate with the CEPD in initiating the integration study for the Taipei Metro. Six 
months later, the TTC finished the study making the metro network with five rail rapid 
transit lines and one automated transit line. Because the decision-making process reveals 
the tension between the U.S. and Taiwan and Taiwan’s strategies, I will provide more 
details on how Counselor Fu and the CEPD made their decision in the next chapter.

 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” December 31, 1984.270
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” December 7, 1984.271
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” December 31, 1984.272
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Figure 5.6: The first phase network of the Taipei Metro recommended by the TTC  273
 The Birth of the DORTS 
Who would be in Charge? 
	 While the U.S. government and American companies tried to get involved in the 
Taipei Metro project, the Institute of Transportation (IOT -  the reformed TPB as of 1985) 
and the BMTC continued their job. First of all, the IOT prepared to hire the BMTC as the 
 The Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government 臺北市政府捷運工程局, 1989 273
Annual Book of the DORTS 《中華民國七十八年捷運年刊》. (Taipei: The Department of Rapid 
Transit System, Taipei City Government 臺北市政府捷運工程局,1990), Pp. 25.
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general consultants for the whole project so that the IOT and the BMTC could work 
together following the British Mass Transit Consultant’s  working list. Then, the IOT asked 
the DEC to review the working list. After months-long negotiations of the working list and 
paying a substantial consulting fee, the IOT signed the contract with the BMTC and the 
CECI, hiring them as the general consultants of the Taipei Metro project in March 1985 
when the CEPD signed the contract for the integration study. At the same time, Taipei City 
Government also hired local consultants co-working with American advisors from the 
consultancy firm DMJM, further planning the Brown line. After the TTC finished the 
integration study, the Executive Yuan announced an importation decision: the Taipei City 
Government would be responsible for the Taipei Metro rather than the MOTC or any new 
institute .
274
 	 In December 1985, the CEPD listed three possible options as to which agency 
would take the responsibility of building and operating the Taipei Metro to the Executive 
Yuan, although the TTC had already provided their suggestion in their integration study. 
The TTC suggested that the Taiwanese government form four institutes, respectively  in 
charge of regional planning, engineering of the metro system, operation of the metro 
system, and supervising all public facilities, including the metro system for Taipei 
Metropolitan. However, the CEPD thought the TTC’s suggestions were only based on its 
experience in the U.S., so it listed alternative options of its own. First, using the precedent 
of how the government built the Shimen Dam (石門水壩), the Executive Yuan set up an 
inter-departmental committee whose members included relevant ministers and local 
governments in charge of the construction of the Taipei Metro. The committee would 
recruit professional human resources to implement the plan, design, and construction of 
the Taipei Metro. When the construction was about to be completed, the Taipei City 
Government would form an agency for operating of the system. Second, the MOTC 
formed a department for the metro system, and, when it came to issues involving 
province and cities, defined a negotiation mechanism to deal with related affairs. Third, 
Taipei City Government set up agencies for construction program and operation .
275
	 The mayor of Taipei City and the Taiwan Provincial Government preferred the first 
option while the minister of transportation and the controller of the ministry of finance 
 The Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government 臺北市政府捷運工程局, 1987 274
Annual Book of the DORTS 《中華民國七十六年捷運年刊》. (Taipei: The Department of Rapid 
Transit System, Taipei City Government 臺北市政府捷運工程局,1987), Pp. 33-35.
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” December 17, 1985.275
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preferred the third option. The CEPD mentioned that the IOT and the MOTC strongly 
opposed the automatic system so that the option of the MOTC setting an agency to be in 
charge of the Taipei Metro project might automatically overlook the automatic metro 
line . At this time, Taipei City Council deleted the responding budget for the 276
subterranean railway project so that the Executive Yuan thought that Taipei City should 
take full responsibility for the project preventing inconsistency between central and local 
government . Therefore, the Executive Yuan decided that Taipei City Government 277
should establish an agency to implement the Taipei Metro project.

“Heroes” from All Around the World 
	 In June 1986, Taipei City Government established the preparatory office of the 
Department of Rapid Transit System (DORTS), and, thanks to C.C. Wang’s 
recommendation, who was the deputy of the CEPD recommendation , Chi Pao-cheng, 278
took office as the director of the preparatory office and then the first commissioner of the 
DORTS. He was the deputy of the Ret-Ser Engineering Agency (RSEA) , an served on 279
the Veterans Affairs Council. In fact, in April, Paul Lai (賴世聲) received a phone call from 
Commissioner Chi, and he invited Paul Lai to have a cup of coffee in Sheraton Hotel, 
Taipei. Paul Lai, the son of the Chief of the General Staff, was the youngest chair of a 
national university in Taiwan at that time. He had a Ph.D. degree in civil engineering from 
MIT, and he was temporarily transferred to the state-owned BES Corporation  as the 280
manager of business development. After he was transferred to the BES, he visited Paris 
to study the metro system in Paris and the TGV, the high-speed rail in France since the 
BES anticipated that it would join the project of the Taipei Metro. Moreover, Paul Lai 
already knew that the government preferred Chi to lead the future DORTS, so, before he 
met Commissioner Chi, he was guessing the reason why Commissioner Chi would like to 
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meet him. When Chi sat on the chair in the Sheraton’s coffee shop, he directly asked Paul 
Lai to be his deputy in the preparatory office. After consideration, Paul Lai decided to 
leave his faculty position at the National Taiwan Institute of Technology  and the BES 281
joining the preparatory office of the DORTS .
282
	 Since the, the massive mobilization of knowledge of engineering and human 
resources in Taiwan started. First of all, Commissioner Chi brought many of his colleagues 
in the RSEA to join the DORTS. At the time, many of the engineers from the RSEA had 
just completed the job of the “Ten Major Construction Project. Therefore, the RSEA’s 
experience also entered the project of the Taipei Metro. For example, Commissioner Chi 
and his colleagues from the RSEA introduced quality assurance institution and 
configuration management into the DORTS for pursuing higher quality of the 
construction . Then, the members of the TMRT, like David Poo, also joined the 283
Department of Rapid Transit System. Many of them were assigned to the office of 
planning. David Poo was assigned to the job of management of the international 
consultants. Many members of the medium capacity transit group and technical officials 
in the Taipei City Government also joined the DORTS. Technical officials working in other 
agencies were also invited or attracted to the DORTS. For instance, the first deputy 
commissioner of the DORTS came from the Freeway Bureau, MOTC, because of his 
profession of electrical engineering. He also introduced some of his colleagues to the 
DORTS .
284
	 Besides these government institutes, many technical officials came from different 
agencies and even from out of the government. For example, the first deputy chief 
engineer, Dr. Konrad Tzeng (曾水田), was on the faculty of the Chung Cheng Institute of 
Technology, Ministry of National Defense, with a military rank. Many retired officers also 
joined the DORTS with Chi from the RSEA because of the RSEA's role of providing jobs 
to veterans. Moreover, some retired officers came from the Combined Service Forces, 
MND, which was the military agency focusing on R&D of weapons and related systems. 
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Ching-lung (廖慶隆), the commissioner of the DORTS in 1993, was faculty of the National 
Taiwan Institute of Technology —  another example of the engineers in the DORTS 
coming from outside of the government. Because Commissioner Chi decided to start the 
construction of all the metro lines in the first phase network determined by the CEPD and 
the TTC at once, the DORTS continually expanded its size. At the end of 1987, the 
DORTS had 562 employees, and 9 of them had Ph.D. degrees. Moreover, 175 of them 
had master's degrees, and 221 of them had a bachelor degree .  In 1989, the number of 286
the employees in the DORTS reached over 1000 .
287
	 For the future cooperation with international consultants to ensure the 
professionalism of technical officials in the DORTS, Paul Lai interviewed every applicant 
for technical jobs in English . Therefore, many engineers with graduated degrees in the 288
U.S. or even Ph.D. degrees entered the DORTS. Indeed, all meetings in the DORTS during 
the construction period of the first phase network were in English only since the 
international consultants could not speak in Chinese except for a few bilingual 
consultants. Commissioner Chi and Paul Lai fought for and got budgets to provide much 
higher wages to the officials of the DORTS than others employees of the  Taipei City 
Government at that time . In their investigation survey of the Taipei Metro, Liu and Lu, 289
journalists of China Times, stated, “heroes came from all around the world” and joined the 
DORTS .
290
	 The project of the Taipei Metro also mobilized many international consultants, their 
professionalism, and experience into Taipei, Before the establishment of the preparatory 
office of the DORTS, the IOT formed the “office of the Taipei Metro” in advance, and it 
had 120 Taiwanese and 50 international consultants from the BMTC . After the 291
establishment of the preparatory office of the DORTS and then the DORTS, the BMTC 
kept consulting Taiwanese for the basic design of the metro system. However, in March, 
the DORTS reopened the bid of the general consultants of the whole project, and the 
American joint venture, the American Transit Consultants (ATC), replaced the British Mass 
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Transit Consultants as the general consultants of the Taipei Metro. The ATC was formed 
by Bechtel, the P&B, and Kaiser Engineering. These consultants were involved in metro 
projects in the U.S. such as Washington’s WMATA (Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority), Atlanta’s MARTA (Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority), and San 
Fransisco’s BART (Bay Area Rapid Transit). Moreover, before the ATC got the business, 
the DMJM won the business of consulting the one driverless line, the Brown Line.  
Therefore, their experience and knowledge of metro systems traveled from North America 
to Taipei. 

	 Besides international consultants, the Taipei Metro mobilized local state-owned 
consultants. The CECI, which was involved in the subterranean railway project and the 
TMRT’s study, continued to work as the counterpart of the BMTC and the ATC. Sinotech 
Engineering Consultants, which was the state-owned consulting company focussing on 
the construction of power plants, especially nuclear power plants, also joined the metro 
project. Sinotech had a joint venture with Bechtel due to their cooperation in the project 
of a nuclear power plant in north Taiwan, and the joint venture also worked as local 
consultants in the projects . Finally, the MAA Group Consulting Engineers(亞新工程顧292
問), which was a newly formed private engineering company established in Taipei and 
Singapore co-worked with the DMJM consulting the design and construction of the 
Brown line. In sum, before the initiation of the implementation of the Taipei Metro, the 
mass transportation system and technology in Taipei only involved those who had 
expertise in transportation studies and planning in Taiwan. But, when this massive project 
was ready to be implemented, much more Taiwanese engineers, planners, and technical 
officials were mobilized as the transnational movement of the knowledge, experience, and 
later artifacts came to Taipei with the British or American consultants. 

Working in the Same Office 
	 The mobilization of human resources and the transnational movement of 
knowledge and experience does not necessarily mean that technology transfer happened 
or that the technological hybridity emerged, but practical mechanisms and strategies 
were needed. The most important policy was “working in the same office (合署辦公).” The 
meaning of “working in the same office” was that the international consultants directly 
joined the project working with technical officials and local consultants in the same office 
 Hu, Yi-chin 胡以琴 and Sun, Yi John 孫以濬, “General Consultants and Development of the 292
Taipei MRT Project 臺北捷運總顧問與捷運工程發展- 回顧與期盼” in Rapid Transit Systems & 
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rather than merely providing educational training or working in separate offices, meeting 
Taiwanese only if they had questions . This policy had three advantages. First, the 293
experienced international consultants could ensure the quality of the designs and the 
engineering because they were directly responsible for the project. Second, Taiwanese 
could directly benefit from international consultants’ experience and profession in the 
actual design work. Taiwanese engineers could see and hear how the consultants built 
traffic flow prediction models, calculated the structure of the architecture, designed the 
stations, and integrated different phases of a metro system. Third, the Taiwanese could 
take positive actions to learn what they wanted to learn from international consultants. 
This policy was not only followed by the DORTS, local consultants, and international 
consultants but also written into the consulting contracts.

	 When the TPB formed the TMRT in 1981, the latter adopted this policy, forming the 
triangular relations of the TMRT, the CECI, and the BMTC. After the DORTS was 
established, it continued this policy and expanded its range. Between 1986 and 1996 
when the design and the construction of the Taipei Metro was implemented, the DORTS 
set up six offices to deal with different technical and management issues: planning, civil 
engineering and architecture, electrical and mechanical system design, construction 
management, operation, and joint development . The international consultants, no 294
matter whether they came from the BMTC or the ATC, would work in each office 
cooperating with the local consultants and the technical officials of the DORTS according 
to their profession. For example, the BMTC and the ATC deployed transportation planning 
experts to the office of planning, building the prediction model of the transportation 
development in Taipei Metropolitan, planning the extensive network of the Taipei Metro 
and drawing up traffic management plans for the roads and streets in Taipei during the 
construction period. Therefore, Taipei got the prediction models, which is Taipei Rapid 
Transit System Model (TRTS), the metro network, and management plans, and Taiwanese 
engineers could gain hands-on experience of the whole process so that they could run it 
independently in the future . Moreover, the contracts with the international consultants 295
were signed about every two years, and the number of international consultants would 
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gradually decrease as the contracts were revised so that the Taiwanese would not 
become over-reliant on the international consultants ensuring technology transfer .
296
	 Taiwanese American consultants, Hu Yi-chin and Sun Yi John, have provided a 
vivid picture of how the international consultants transferred their expertise and 
experience to Taiwanese technical officials and local consultants. The leader of the 
consultants in the office of civil engineering and architecture, Kevin Peterson, was good at 
drawing and, in the coordination meetings of stations, he could rapidly provide striking 
sketches of the arrangement of facilities in stations so that other engineers could easily 
understand the impact of their opinions or suggestions on the stations and their 
surrounding environment . The TRTS model is another example that shows how 297
technology transfer succeeded. After the international consultants helped the DORTS to 
build the first version of the TRTS, and, with the decrease of the consultants and then 
their leaving, the DORTS and local consultants keep developing further versions of the 
Taipei Rapid Transit System model with the extension of the network of the Taipei Metro. 

	 Overseeing the technical offices, the DORTS set up the chief engineers office to 
supervise and manage all technical affairs, and Paul Lai was employed as the first chief 
engineer when the DORTS was officially established. The international consultants also 
set up the project management group and its project manager as the counterpart of the 
chief engineers office. 

	 Besides the offices in the headquarter of the DORTS, there were district project 
offices in charge of different lines of the Taipei Metro. The East District Project Office was 
in charge of the Brown Line. The DMJM and the MAA’s consultants worked with the 
technical officials in this office. 

	 The outcome of the policy of “working in the same office” was not only the metro 
system itself. Taiwanese engineers interacted and learnt from the international consultants 
and acquired documents that could direct how the DORTS should develop the Taipei 
Metro once the international consultants left. First, after the international consultants and 
Taiwanese engineers solved one technical problem or obtained a conclusion of a 
technical issue, they would compose one technical report so that technical officials and 
engineers could use it again if they faced similar issues. Second, the international 
consultants helped the DORTS to complete planning manuals. The planning manuals 
defined the specs of components in the metro systems in detail, so the quality and the 
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design patterns could be guaranteed for consistency . For example, the planning 298
manuals set the standard of the width of the stairs of the stations in the Taipei Metro, 
ensuring that people could move smoothly and could evacuate rapidly in an 
emergency . The manuals also carefully defined the components of every facility in the 299
system and the detailed specs of things like rail, ballast, and sensors, and the engineers 
could follow the definitions and specs to plan and to design the metro system. Before the 
DORTS hired an architect to design stations, they already knew what the functions of the 
stations would be, what the size of different areas had to be,  the  speed of the 
escalators, and even the width of the stairs. Before it purchased components for the 
facilities or trains,  it already knew what kinds of materials could be used in what 
components, and what parts should be purchased for the technological products used in 
the system. Therefore, even without the same international consultants, the DORTS and 
its contractors can now build a new line or new station with the same quality and 
standard. If the international consultants’ experiences in London, Hong Kong, 
Washington, San Fransisco, and Atlanta had not traveled to Taipei, we can imagine how 
difficult  it would have been to compose such detailed manuals. The Brown Line, as we 
will see in chapter 6, faced the painful process of its construction due to the DMJM’s lack 
of experience of building an automatic transit system so that the DORTS could not 
compose such detailed manuals and specs as we find in manuals for the traditional 
railway metro line . 
300
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Figure 5.7: The Planning Manuals of the DORTS 
 Figure 5.8: The Planning Manuals of the DORTS  301
American Experience and Bilingual Consultants 
	 One phenomenon is worthy of note regarding technology transfer in the project of 
the Taipei Metro: the involvement of Taiwanese American and returning-students. Besides 
David Poo, who joined the project of the Taipei Metro in the early stage, many engineers 
had studied and got degrees in the U.S. Paul Lai was another example. He received a 
degree in civil engineering at MIT so that he could easily communicate with the 
international consultants and set up English interviews for the applicants who wanted to 
enter the DORTS. Paul Lai’s policy led to the presence of those who once studied in the 
U.S., meaning the American experience did not only come from American consultants but 
also the members of the DORTS. The DORTS’ technical officials’ American experience 
had advantages for the project. Firstly, those who had the experience of living in the U.S. 
knew more about how to communicate with English-speaking consultants. With the 
policy of “working in the same office,” technology transfer heavily relied on personal 
interaction between Taiwanese engineers and international consultants. If Taiwanese 
 The pictures show the 11th version of planning manuals completed in 1997.301
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found it difficult to communicate or to interact with international consultants, they would 
find it difficult to actively learn from the consultants . Secondly, some of those who 302
studied in graduate programs in the U.S. had experience in the management of projects, 
just what a newly established institute like the DORTS lacked, especially for those who 
served as supervisors . 
303
	 In addition to the engineers of the DORTS, many Taiwanese Americans, Taiwanese 
who studied in the U.S., and Hong Kong people working for American companies also 
joined the metro project as consultants or suppliers. According to Hu and Sun, at least 
twelve ATC’s consultants were Taiwanese American, Chinese American, or Hong Kong 
people . These consultants had bilingual abilities and multiple cultural backgrounds so 304
that they could be intermediaries between international consultants and Taiwanese 
engineers. For example, when technical officials, local consultants, and international 
consultants investigated the location of a future station, technical officials and local 
consultants would put more weight on citizen’s reactions or on whether citizens would 
protest or not.  International consultants often did not understand this due to their 
experience in American cities. At this time, the bilingual consultants could help them to 
understand each other, enabling them to reach joint conclusions . Furthermore, for 305
technology transfer, some Taiwanese technical officials made significant progress due to 
bilingual consultants’ efforts . 
306
American supervisors were often not happy with Chinese-speaking consultants’ 
bilingual ability and cultural backgrounds because they could not understand the 
conversation between the bilingual consultants and Taiwanese technical officials and 
thought that  they were talking about something that they did not want the American 
managers to know. Moreover, those bilingual consultants who had grown up in Taiwan 
would also face tension with some Taiwanese technical officials and local consultants 
because of their higher wages and status . Some of the bilingual consultants or 307
Taiwanese American engineers working for international suppliers stayed or returned to 
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Taiwan, continuing to dedicate their effort to mass transportation projects after the 
contracts were over .
308
	 Besides the BMTC and the ATC, many other international companies, especially 
American companies, were also involved in the construction of the Taipei Metro as 
professional advisors in a specific subproject, as construction management advisors, as 
counterparts of local contractors, and as equipment suppliers. For example, T. Y. Lin 
International’s Taipei branch did not only join the construction of the railway metro lines 
but also joined the driverless system team led by Matra  and participated in the 
construction of the Brown Line. As an American engineering company founded by a 
Chinese American, T. Y. Lin, it had run its branch in Taipei for many years and hired many 
Taiwanese engineers, especially Taiwanese American and Taiwanese who had the 
experience of studying or working in the U.S. “In the 1980s,” said one of my informants, 
“many American Taiwanese and returning-students went back to Taiwan creating an 
international environment. Some of them joined the electronic manufacturing industries 
while some of them joined the transportation system building, and everybody can see 
their contribution .” Although the DORTS, its consultants and suppliers did not have 309
Taiwanese American superstars like Morris Chang (張忠謀), who was one of the founding 
fathers of the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), or Simon Sze (施
敏), who invented non-volatile semiconductor memory with his colleagues, the Taiwanese 
Americans and returning-students did contribute to changing Taipei with their 
professional knowledge, experience, and the artifacts mobilized by them.

Mobilization of Knowledge and People 
	 As the capital city of the island state when Taiwan was a rising economic power 
and undergoing dramatic urbanization, Taipei faced a crucial challenge of traffic 
congestion in the 1980s. To overcome the congestion problem, the KMT government 
eventually  initiated projects for mass transportation systems. One was the subterranean 
railway in Taipei, and the other one was the Taipei Metro. From the TMRT in the TPB and 
the following IOT, the Taiwanese technical officials introduced British consultants into 
Taiwan so that British ideas of mass transportation systems and designs entered Taiwan 
integrated with the subterranean railway consulted by German consultants. The change 
of the U.S.-Taiwan relations again bought change to the development of mass 
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transportation technology in Taiwan. The huge trade deficit between the U.S. and Taiwan 
drove the U.S. government to pressure the KMT government to hire American 
consultants. Therefore, in the stage of realizing transportation planners and engineers’ 
ideas and designs, American contributions returned to Taiwan. At the same time, the 
government started to mobilize Taiwanese professional human resources, including 
Taiwanese Americans and returned-students who had studied their profession in the U.S. 
Hence, the initiation of the project of Taipei Metro was not just the beginning of 
construction of a metro system. However, it was also a transnational mobilization of 
knowledge, experience, and people. The goal of the mobilization was to reshape Taipei’s 
transportation systems and even life in the city.

	 The mobilization of knowledge and people can be categorized into different types. 
First, Taiwanese technical officials mobilized knowledge and people transnationally from 
the U.K, and the U.S. In doing so, their knowledge derived from the metro systems in 
Britain, Hong Kong, San Fransisco, Washington D.C., and Atlanta would travel to Taiwan 
and be integrated with Taipei’s local context. Second, the project of the Taipei Metro also 
mobilized more Taiwanese engineers from agencies within the government, military, state-
owned consultants, national universities, and private companies. On the one hand, the 
Taiwanese engineers contributed their professional knowledge and effort to the 
construction of the Taipei Metro. On the other hand, they were the receivers of the 
knowledge and experience of metro systems that traveled transnationally with the 
international consultants meaning that these engineers would be the future human 
resources of mass transportation technology in Taiwan. As a result, the Taipei Metro was 
also a project aiming at incubation, and the policy of “working in the same office” was the 
strategy championing this goal.

	 Moreover, the Taipei Metro also mobilized Taiwanese/Chinese American and 
returning-students studying in the U.S. Taiwanese Americans and Taiwanese returning-
students, like David Poo and Paul Lai, brought their profession and American experience 
back to Taiwan, and, especially those who worked for the ATC and international suppliers, 
played an important role in helping the communication between the international 
consultants and Taiwanese engineers. Therefore, their involvement was also a part of 
technology transfer and human resources incubation, a phenomenon that echoes Wang’s 
study of American science and technology’s spread in China . Last but not least, we 310
need to note that the U.S. government’s interruption of the project of the Taipei Metro led 
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to American companies’ involvement in the Taipei Metro, which is why so many 
Taiwanese/Chinese Americans joined the projects. The mobilization of these people were 
driven by the changing U.S.-Taiwan relations in the 1980s. 

	 The mobilization also teaches us a lesson. Although the American hegemony of 
mass transportation technology in Taiwan ended in the late 1970s, American supremacy 
in this field over Taiwan still existed. Taiwan could introduce alternative resources like 
Germany and the U.K. to help its development of mass transportation systems, but, once 
the U.S. leveraged its political hegemony over Taiwan, Taiwanese technical officials and 
political leaders, especially those who worked in the CEPD, would again agree to 
introduce American knowledge and experience. The American hegemony of technology 
did not exist, but the way how the hegemonic power operated remained because the 
American political hegemony was remained, though it even though it had retreated for 
some years in Carter’s period.  This does not mean that Taiwan would return to the track 
of Americanization of its mass transportation technology once the project was on the way, 
and the TRUPO and the DEC ad already acquired the land to build the subterranean 
railway. 

	 When the knowledge, experience, and people traveled to Taipei, all of the actors 
realized, materialized, and integrated the knowledge and experience through their 
technical practice making design blueprints into stations, tunnels, elevated ways, power 
systems, signal systems, and even a metro company so that they did not only plan Taipei. 
They also reshaped Taipei. The technological hybridity of knowledge and styles went 
further and deeper. That being said, the mobilization of the transnational knowledge and 
people in the project did not inevitably lead to the hybridity. We need more details about 
the process of hybridization to assess its importance, especially since it involved 
considerable tension and conflict, rather than cooperation,  between Taiwanese and 
American engineers. 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Chapter 6: Taipei Metro II 
Dancing with America: 1979-1997 

“The superiors told me: ‘national security is more important,’ hoping me to weigh national security 
more. The old gentlemen who were friendly to me, such as K.T. Li, talked to me: “many policies 
were determined with the non-technical perspectives so that things could be in line with the national 
interest. Do you get it? (他們跟我講說：「國家安全為重。」希望我以國家安全為重。好像對
我比較友善的⽼先⽣，像李國鼎跟我講說：「很多事情是非技術層⾯做的決策，才會符合國
家利益，這樣⼦你聽不聽得懂︖」)” Anonymous informant, 2019. 
“Our interest is also a direct result of our industry’s unique capabilities to address these problems. 
Equally important, we view American participation in Taiwan’s transit projects as a singularly 
significant opportunity to reduce the growing bilateral imbalance of trade, which would assist in 
relieving the political pressures for protectionism mounting in the USA.” Ralph L. Stately, Urban 
Mass Transportation Administrator (1983-1987), 1984. 
	 In this chapter, we focus on the tension between the DORTS (Department of Rapid 
Transit System) and the international consultants, especially the American consultants. By 
discussing this tension, we look at the DORTS’ strategies to complete the first phase 
network of the Taipei Metro and to incubate Taiwanese metro experts on one hand, and to 
seek alternative resources which it regarded as needed maintaining its autonomy on the 
other hand.  In this way it will become clear how technological hybridity, be it at the 
knowledge phase or the material phase was manifest in the Taipei Metro.

The TTC, the ATC, and Reagan 
Why the TTC? 
	 In 1984, the counselor of the CEPD (Council for Economic Planning and 
Development), Fu Chia-chi (傅家齊), was thinking about how to integrate two metro 
networks proposed by the TPB (Transportation Planning Board) and Taipei City 
Government. Moreover, he was also thinking about how to reply to the U.S. government’s 
proposal of purchasing American professional services to reduce the trade deficit 
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between the two countries. Counselor Fu concluded that an integration study of the two 
systems was necessary, but was unsure which international consultants to hire. With the 
Urban Mass Transportation Administrator, Ralph Stanley’s coordination, thirteen American 
metro related companies including Bechtel, the P&B (Parsons and Brinckerhoff), and De 
Leuw Cather, formed the U.S.-Taiwan Transit Group (USTTG) to provide technical 
suggestions about the integration of the two metro networks to the Taiwanese 
government. Moreover, the USTTG applied to the U.S. Trade and Development Program 
(USTDP) from the Federal government to provide US$500,000 for this study. Stanley 
specifically stated that buying American companies’ professional services for the Taipei 
Metro would compensate for the imbalanced trade between the U.S. and Taiwan. At the 
same time, the German consultants, the DEC (Deutsche Eisenbahn Consulting), and the 
British consultants, the BMTC (British Mass Transit Consultants), were serving the TRUPO 
(Taipei Railway Underground Project Office) and the TPB (Transportation Planning Board). 
Furthermore, other countries like France also showed their interest in providing consulting 
services. Facing this situation, Counselor Fu first excluded the Ministry of Transportation 
and Communication (MOTC) as the agency in charge of the integration study because the 
MOTC strongly opposed the Taipei City Government’s idea of building an automated 
guideway transit (AGT) metro system. Also, the DEC planned the S1 line, which caused a 
severe controversy so that he excluded the German and British consultants since they 
were working for the agencies belonging to the MOTC. Eventually Counselor Fu listed 
three possible candidates as consultants for the integration study .
311
	 First, he accepted the USTTG’s proposal to hire the three American companies, the 
DMJM , the De Leuw Cather International, and the TRAAC International Consultants, as 312
consultants for the integration study. If the Taiwanese government chose this option, the 
USTDP would pay all consulting fees to the American companies, and the USTDP could 
also pay the cost of the local counterpart after negotiation. Second, the CEPD paid the 
consulting fees but still hired the three American companies as international consultants. 
Third, the CEPD paid the consulting fees and opened a bid to all qualified international 
consultants, including American companies .
313
	 For the first option, Counselor Fu found that only six companies were consultants 
among the members of the USTTG, so hiring the American companies as the consultants 
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would undermine the objectivity of the process. Furthermore, if the Taiwanese 
government received the proposal of hiring the American consultants for free, it would no 
longer really be a ‘client’ in the program, and the U.S. would have too significant an effect 
on Taiwan. Against this, Counselor Fu listed two advantages: the CEPD could save 
money, and this option could fulfill the U.S. government’s demand. For the third option, 
Counselor Fu mentioned that the U.S. government highly valued the business. Indeed, 
Ralph Stanley led the members of the USTTG to visit Taiwan in July 1984, and then in 
November and December, the officials of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) visited the 
CEPD twice discussing this case. Thus, if the CEPD opened the bid for this case to other 
countries, the U.S. government would be extremely disappointed. Moreover, to maintain 
the objectivity to review the TPB and Taipei City Government’s metro system proposals, 
the CEPD needed to exclude the German and British companies. Therefore, the French 
state-owned SOFRETU (Société française d'études et de réalisations de transports 
urbains) would be an option due to its abundant experience of consulting metro projects. 
But, the SOFRETU had a deep connection with another French-Egyptian engineering 
company, the Interinfra Group lowering the chance for SORETU to win the bid leading to 
the consequence that American companies including the DMJM, the De Leuw Cather, the 
Ralph Parsons, and the P&B would still win the bid. Finally, opening a bid would spend 
much more time than directly hiring consultants. Therefore, although the CEPD needed to 
spend half of a million US dollars to buy the consulting service without competition, the 
Counselor Fu recommended the second option: the CEPD directly hiring the USTTG’s 
members as consultants of the integration study. The minister of the CEPD, Chao Yao-
tung (趙耀東), agreed with Counselor Fu’s suggestion .
314
Counselor Fu’s reasoning and the CEPD’s decision shows two crucial things  First, 
when the Taiwanese government was thinking about the planning and construction of the 
Taipei Metro, the U.S.’ attitude was weighted heavily. As I mentioned in the previous 
chapter, Taiwan and the KMT government faced a political crisis in the early 1980s after it 
lost most countries’ formal recognition. Facing the rising democratic movement at that 
time, the KMT government’s legitimacy to maintain its authoritarian regime was eroded by 
losing international recognition as the only legal representative of China. Furthermore, 
China also announced its unification project, “One nation, two systems,” at this time, 
weakening the KMT government position. Therefore, American military and political 
protection became even more vital, and the U.S.’ dissatisfaction with the imbalance in 
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trade between the two countries became something that could not be ignored.  Second, 
Counselor Fu noticed the importance of autonomy, no matter as a nation or as a client of 
a metro study project. To satisfy the U.S., Counselor Fu decided to hire the three 
American companies directly. However, he refused to receive American financial support 
in this case because he understood that Taiwan would lose its power of choosing 
suppliers and contractors when the project started to be implemented if Taiwan accepted 
the support. Using the same logic, he excluded German and British consultants for the 
objectivity of being a client. So, Taiwan avoided losing its power and judgment not only to 
the U.S. but also to other countries, so securing its relative autonomy.

The important 6 months  
	 The Taipei Transit Consultants (TTC) was the joint venture of the three members of 
the USTTG, the DMJM, the De Leuw Cather International, and the TRAAC International 
Consultants, and all of them were consultants. The DMJM focused on structure and 
architecture, and the De Leuw Cather, as we saw in the previous chapters, was the expert 
used for transportation consulting the project of the National Freeway No.1. The TRAAC 
was a relatively small consultant based in Washington, D.C., with a Chinese American 
leader at that time. The advisors deployed by the three companies in Taiwan needed to 
integrate the two metro networks, — one by the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication (MOTC) consulted by the British consultants and one by Taipei City 
Government planning to use the newly developed Automated Guideway Transit system 
—, into a single system in only 6 months (from March 1985 to September 1985). However, 
many important decisions were made in the 6 months.

	 First of all, the TTC and its local counterpart, the state-owned CECI, generated the 
first phase of the network for the Taipei Metro and the recommend extension network. 
This network had four essential features. First, it was the network with both a rapid rail 
transit (RRT) system and an AGT system. Second, most of the BMTC’s designs were 
embedded in this network, including L-shape network and cross-platform interchange. 
Third, the S1 line was replaced by the Blue Line, which was parallel to the Taiwan 
Railways Administration’s (TRA)  West Coast Line as the main east-west metro line. 
Finally, the TTC planned to used the Red Line to connect Neihu, the newly developed 
central business district in eastern Taipei, and downtown. Among these four features, only 
the fourth one finally did not become true while the Brown Line using the AGT system 
became the one connecting Neihu, while the other three were implemented becoming a 
part of the Taipei Metro today.     
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	 For the first feature, the integration study of the two networks was not only a 
scientific study but also a political negotiation, a conflict, a competition between the 
technical officials . Although the CEPD initiated the integration study to obtain a neutral 315
position for the decision making, the CEPD could not easily deny all requirements 
submitted by the Taipei City Government, especially at the time when the democratic 
movement was thriving in the 1980s. Moreover, the mayors of Taipei City were mostly 
rising stars within the KMT government such as the president of Taiwan Lee Teng-hui, so 
the CEPD would have difficulty to decline Taipei City’s opinion even though technical 
officials in the MOTC strongly opposed to build an AGT metro line in the system . In 316
fact, besides Taipei City Government, C. C. Wang, the deputy of the CEPD at that time, 
also supported Taipei City’s idea of building a driverless metro system. C. C. Wang even 
arranged for K. T. Li to visit Japan’s AGT systems in Osaka and Kobe, trying to exploit K. 
T. Li’s reputation to gain support. Therefore, before the integration study started, the 
decision to include a driverless AGT system was taken . 
317
	 For the second and the third features, the TTC and the CEPD did not have enough 
time to change the BMTC’s designs too much, so what they could do was to make some 
minor changes and to follow most of the BMTC’s plans. One of the critical differences 
was the cancellation of the S1 Line. The BMTC did not champion the idea of using the 
TRA’s railway to run the metro system, either, but it still put it into its plan due to German 
consultants’ insistence . The advent of the TTC and the integration study provided an 318
opportunity for Taiwanese officials and British consultants to abandon this design so that 
Taipei lost a chance to build an S-Bahn like commuter railway as the chapter 3 shows. 
Moreover, according to the TTC’s American experience, the metro system was supposed 
to run independently rather than including traditional railways. Therefore, the American 
experience matching the TRA’s lack of enthusiasm to run the S1 Line and the BMTC’s 
opposition led to the end of the conflict of the S1 Line.

	 The TTC’s integration study set the basic scheme of the Taipei Metro, and it also 
started the mixture of American and British designs. First, the Taipei Metro’s network 
contained both British and  American ideas about the metro system. Second, the TTC 
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revealed how the U.S. government intervened in the project of Taipei Metro. The 
intervention by other institutions, the USTTG, the AIT, and Ralph Stanley’s actions, more 
or less determined the future. So, the TTC was just a beginning. In the stage of 
implementation, in which all ideas and designs would finally come into physical existence, 
the deeper and broader transnational design mixture showing the technological hybridity 
would emerge before people’s eyes.

Figure 6.1: The Recommended Extensive Network by the TTC . 319
The American Transit Consultants 
 	 After the network, systems, and the agency in charge, the DORTS, were fixed, 
hiring international consultants to help the DORTS to complete the project was the next 
 The Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government, 1987 Annual Book, Pp. 27.319
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step. Before the establishment of the Preparatory Office of the DORTS (abbreviated as 
the Preparatory Office), the MOTC set up an office for implementing the Taipei Metro. The 
office recruited those who came from the TMRT in the IOT (Institute of Transportation), 
and local consultants from the CECI, and the BMTC. Among the consultants, there were 
120 local consultants and 50 international consultants . At the same time, the Taipei City 320
Government also continued to plan the AGT metro systems with the help of National Ciao 
Tung University (NTCU, 國立交通大學) , three Japanese scholars from the University of 321
Tokyo, and the transportation professor of University of Pennsylvania Vukan Vuchic who 
is famous for his studies of metro system planning . Therefore, the planning process of 322
the Brown Line and other metro lines using the RRT system seemed to be separated, 
although the two systems were integrated into one network. In February 1986, when the 
TTC just completed the integration study, Taipei City Government directly invited eight 
American companies to provide technical proposals for consulting the Brown Line. After 
the establishment of the Preparatory Office in December in the same year, the DMJM won 
the contract of consulting the only AGT metro line in the Taipei Metro. 

	 However, the BMTC was still the general consultant of the Taipei Metro except for 
the Brown Line. For about one year, the BMTC and the local consultants helped the 
Preparatory Office and later the DORTS with work of detail design so that the DORTS 
could generate specs to open bids to local and international construction, power supply, 
system, and architecture firms . Hiring the BMTC seems to have been a reasonable 323
decision since the BMTC had been in Taipei for five years, so that it was already familiar 
with Taipei and its Taiwanese counterparts. Moreover, despite the TTC’s integration study, 
the basic structure and most of the designs of the Taipei Metro planned by the BMTC and 
the TMRT were still ensured. 

	 Nonetheless, the 500,000-dollar business of the integration study was not enough 
to satisfy Ralph Stanley and the USTTG’s ambition of compensating for the trade deficit 
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between the U.S. and Taiwan. In September 1985, the AIT forwarded Ralph Stanley’s 
letter to Taiwan’s ministry of foreign affairs, in which Stanley wrote: 

	 “From the time of my visit in 1984, I have often received warm greetings and 
positive responses from Taiwan, indicating a continuous interest in seeking United States 
sources to fulfill Taiwan’s transit needs. Furthermore, I am pleased that the United States 
sources of rail passenger cars are still under consideration in Taiwan. However, there have 
been incidents which are unfortunate. For example, soon after our visit last year, the 
British Consultant, BMTC, was sole-source contracted as the MRT General Consultant 
without competition. We wish to encourage more open opportunities whereby United 
States participation may be possible in Taiwan .” 
324
	 The Taiwanese government understood Ralph Stanley’s message, although he 
said, “the USTTG was never intended to seek contracts, but was conceived of as a 
marketing entity .” In November 1986, the Preparatory Office started to compose the 325
strategies and process of hiring long-term general consultants when it had just signed a 
contract with the BMTC for another six-month service to extend the previous contract 
from May 1985 to September 1986 . This action meant that the Preparatory Office was 326
ready to open a bid for general consultants instead of directly hiring the BMTC after its 
formal establishment as the DORTS. The BMTC was not happy with the development 
since it realized this action was intended to replace it with American consultants, but the 
Preparatory Office did not exclude the BMTC from competing for the bid. It used the 
reason that the BMTC’s contract of serving the Preparatory Office was merely the 
extension of the contract signed by the TPB so that it was necessary to go through the 
bidding process .
327
	 The Taipei City Government selected seven related officials and seven external 
experts to form the committee to review general consultants for the Taipei Metro. The 
committee decided to invite companies to satisfy the following requirement: the three 
best candidates in the bid for the planning of a mass transportation system in Taipei in 
1977 and the bid of the consulting service for the TPB to plan the Taipei Metro in 1980, 
the consultants for the integration study of the two metro networks, the best three 
candidates in the bid of the consultants for the Brown Line, and the best candidates 
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verified by the BMTC in the bid of consulting services for detailed design of the Taipei 
Metro. Thus, the committee invited seven international consultants to compete for the bid 
of general consultants, and five firms submitted their proposal. They were the BMTC, the 
DEC, the DMJM, and the Morrison-Knudsen, the De Leuw Cather and the L. C. Transit 
System Inc., and the American Transit Consultants (ATC) . Then, according to the 328
materials provided by the consultants, the committee chose the three best candidates 
(the BMTC, the ATC, and the De Leuw Cather) for the final round. In the final round, the 
proportion of the scores of the bid was that qualification review of the firms counted 25%, 
service proposal counted 50%, and oral presentation counted 25%  The committee 
members would provide their ranking of the three firms in the oral presentation using the 
sum of the ranks from all committee members to decide the firm’s scores in this part.

	 The competition of the three consulting companies was a competition between 
their experience and political momentum. The BMTC was strong candidate that had 
experience of Hong Kong’s MTR (Mass Transit Railway) and its service in the TPB, both 
most robust resources to secure its business in Taipei. However, Ralph Stanley and the 
USTTG’s actions showed that this British joint venture had weak political momentum to 
help it to win the competition even though many Taiwanese technical officials who once 
worked in the TPB strongly supported it . The De Leuw Cather, which was an American 329
professional transportation engineering consulting company, had the experience of 
consulting Singapore’s MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) and its long-term connection with the 
Taiwanese government. Moreover, it was a member of the USTTG so that it enjoyed the 
political momentum created by Ralph Stanley. But, no matter its achievements in 
Singapore or Taipei, the De Leuw Cather could not bid for the consulting business alone 
due to its limited range of skills,  so it cooperated with the British company L. C. Transit. 
Finally, before the bid for the general consultants of the Taipei Metro, no one knew the 
American consultants, the ATC. The ATC was a joint venture of Bechtel, the P&B, and the 
Kaiser Engineering , and two of them were the members of the USTTG. Finally, although 330
the BMTC got the highest score in qualification review and service proposal, the ATC won 
the bid due to its highest score in the oral presentation .
331
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	 The Bechtel Corporation, even nowadays, is the largest American comprehensive 
construction engineering company, and it has been involved in many infrastructure 
projects worldwide. The Taipei Metro was not its first business in Taiwan. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the KMT government launched the project of nuclear plants after the Oil Shock, 
and the Bechtel worked for Taiwan Power, which is the state-owned and only power 
company in Taiwan, as nuclear plant experts. Furthermore, Bechtel and the state-owned 
consultants belonging to the Ministry of Economy, Sinotech (中興工程顧問), set up a joint 
venture consulting company to serve Taipower’s projects. In the field of metro systems, 
the Bechtel cooperated with the P&B, which was an expert in transportation planning, 
especially rail transportation, in the project of Atlanta’s metro system, MARTA 
(Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transportation Authority), and the project of BART (Bay Area 
Rapid Transit).

	 Moreover, Kaiser Engineering, which was an expert in power and electricity 
systems, also cooperated with the two firms in the project of the BART. The Bechtel itself 
also consulted the project of the WMATA (Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority) 
in Washington, D.C. The three American metro projects, MARTA, BART, and WMATA, 
were the products of the rise of urban transportation planning in the 1960s and the 1970s 
in the U.S. Therefore, the ATC was the agent introducing American experience and 
knowledge of its mass transportation technology into Taiwan.

	 The ATC also had a unique political resource: its connection with the Reagan 
administration. George Shultz, Reagan’s second Secretary of State, started to work in 
Bechtel in 1974 as the vice president and then became the president of the large 
engineering group. The president of Bechtel was the last job that Shultz did before he 
became the Secretary of State, creating massive political momentum for the Bechtel to 
pursue business opportunities globally, especially in cases like the Taipei Metro where the 
U.S. government intervened in an authoritarian regime . With American experience of 332
metro projects and powerful political momentum, the ATC kicked out the BMTC,  gaining 
the business of consulting the Taipei Metro. However, the story above shows that the 
Taiwanese government did not merely replace the BMTC with the ATC but held a bid 
hiring external committee members to review the companies, so Taiwanese technical 
officials still maintained their formal autonomy when facing pressure directly from the U.S. 
No evidence shows how the U.S. government pressured the DORTS and the higher level 
of the KMT government to replace the BMTC with American consultants, but officials of 
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the DORTS at that time all pointed out that it was the U.S. government that made the 
DORTS changed its general consultants , and we have no difficulty in imagining how it 333
would happen given how the TTC appeared in Taipei. We need to note that the ATC was 
not an inexperienced company, but, according to the political economy context of Taiwan 
in the mid-1980s, the sentence I cited from my anonymous informant can more 
persuasively explain the victory of the ATC: “many policies were determined with the non-
technical perspectives so that things could be in line with the national interest. Do you get 
it?” 

The Mixture of American and British Designs 
	 With the policy of “working in the same office," as we discussed in chapter 4, the 
ATC transferred its American experience, knowledge, and designs into Taipei. However, 
like the TTC, the ATC, local consultants, and the DORTS kept many of the BMTC’s 
designs and integrated them with the American designs into one system. Thus, in today’s 
Taipei Metro, people can easily find what designs are British and what designs are 
American. In this section, we focus on the network, the stations, the architectures, and 
the rail.

	 Although the TTC recommended that Taipei to continue to develop the L-shape 
network designed by the BMTC in the future, the Executive Yuan only approved the first 
phase of the network and decided that it would review and approve metro projects line by 
line instead of the whole network at once . Hence, the TTC’s integration study did not 334
secure the L-shape network despite its support for this design. In fact, in the first phase 
of the network, the Red Line and the Green Line would be run as one line directly 
connecting Tamsui and Xindian rather than two lines. In this stage, the L-shape was not a 
reality yet. After the ATC took over as general consultant, its experts and the DORTS 
decided to follow the BMTC’s network planning four L-shape metro lines, the Red Line, 
the Green Line, the Blue Line, and the Orange Line and four stations with cross-platform 
interchange design which accompanied the L-shaped network to decrease passengers’ 
efforts of changing trains when they planned the extensive network. Among all the 
existing lines and lines under construction now , the ATC contributed to all of them 335
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except the Light Green Line, which was planned and designed by the DORTS and 
Taiwanese consultants . Therefore, the ATC secured the BMTC’s network leading to an 336
interesting phenomenon. The German consultants, the DEC, designed the Taipei Main 
Station with the idea of the Hauptbahnhof to fulfill Taipei Main Station’s role as the 
transportation center to deal with massive traffic and people flow gathering in one place. 
However, the BMTC and the two American consultants planned a network aiming at 
distributing passengers to different stations lessening Taipei Main Station’s loading. These 
two designs contradicted each other in abstract, but in practice they worked together 
smoothly as parts of the mass transportation system in Taipei, showing the technological 
hybridity of style and function.








Figure 6.2: The Map of the Taipei Metro and its Future Vision 
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	 In addition to the network, the ATC mostly followed the station specs suggested by 
the BMTC; it did some modifications based on their experience in American cities . 337
First, the ATC set the specs for a station with a larger size for two reasons. The ATC 
abandoned the BMTC’s idea of using overhead lines to provide power to trains and used 
the third rail for  the power supply so that the diameter of the tunnel was supposed to be 
smaller to lower the cost of construction. However, the ATC still set tunnel specs with a 
larger diameter to create more comfortable space for passengers in the trains leading to 
larger stations. Second, for the same reason, other sections of stations which were not 
impacted by the size of tunnels also became larger . The design of a larger station was 338
derived from the ATC’s experiences and philosophy in the American metro systems, 
WMATA, BART, and MARTA, built in the 1970s. American planners of metro systems 
hoped to attract people out of their automobiles to metro systems so that they could 
reshape the way that Americans moved in cities. In their view, be it in stations or trains, 
the environment needed to be comfortable and attractive, or Americans would not ride on 
metro systems, leaving their cars at homes In his study of the history of the WMATA, 
Schrag argues that WMATA was the product of the Great Society liberalism which 
believed that public investments should serve all classes and all races, rather than 
functioning as the last resort . When the technical officials visited the BART through the 339
ATC’s introduction, one BART employee told the Taiwanese in the train with ample space 
and sofa-like chairs, “the BART is going to compete with automobiles so that everyone 
can hold their mobility equally,” thus, “the stations and the trains should be comfortable 
to attract people to use them ”
340
	 The top technical officials in the DORTS, like commissioner Chi and Paul Lai, highly 
appreciated this idea . The BMTC’s design of a station followed a programmatic 341
philosophy focusing more on the station’s functions, building costs, and operation, so it 
paid less attention to architecture and style of stations . The DORTS and the ATC 342
thought differently. The DORTS formed a “station-style group," inviting many influential 
Taiwanese architects to provide suggestions for the styles and architectures of the 
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stations . It even specially held a seminar to discuss the style of the stations on the Red 343
Line because most of the stations on this line are on an elevated track above the ground 
and it believed the visual effect was remarkable. Finally, the seminar concluded that the 
architecture of the stations should exhibit a “modern interpretation of traditional Chinese 
architecture. ” Thus, now we can see the Red Line’s elevated stations and the stations 344
on ground level all follow this instruction with Chinese style appearance and architectural 
language. The DORTS even built the monumental and dragon-like Jiantan Station as the 
symbol of the Taipei Metro. In other underground stations, the DORTS also arranged 
many artworks to make the stations attractive. Nowadays, if we visit the Taipei Metro’s 
stations, which were built later or the stations in other Taiwan’s metro systems, we can 
find that monumental architecture and artworks have become a defining feature of 
Taiwan’s metro system.

Figure 6.3: The Xinbeitou Station  345
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Figure 6.4: The Jiantan Station  346
	 Finally, the ATC also changed the specs of the rails of the Taipei Metro. Initially, the 
BMTC used the Pandrol, which was invented by a British company as fasteners of rails 
and rubber straps to fix rails on the block. Nonetheless, the ATC abandoned this design; 
instead, it used the Vossloh invented in Germany . The ATC thought the Pandrol might 347
be shaken loose by metro trains so that it followed the experience of LA’s metro system 
using the Vossloh. Hence, the DORTS’ construction contractors needed to purchase the 
Vossloh from Germany, leading to the fact that Taiwan’s metro systems set the standard 
of rails of metro systems with German specs instead of either British or American specs 
since no American company produces this component . Besides this fastener, the ATC 348
also modified the design of the structure, adding concrete cubes to absorb stray current 
caused by high-voltage current from the third rail because the stray current would cause 
galvanic corrosion damaging rail and other metal parts on rail .  
349
 TP09 provides the picture.346
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Figure 6.5: The Pandrol Fastener  350
Figure 6.6: The Vossloh Fastener  351
 “Pandrol-Wikipedia” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pandrol. Accessed on November 27, 2019.350
 “Vossloh North America” http://www.vossloh-north-america.com/us/products-and-solutions/351
products-and-services/rail-fastening-systems/dff-systems/. Accessed on November 27, 2019.
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Strategies of the Taiwanese 
	 The ATC was the product of the political momentum of the U.S.-Taiwan relations, 
and, in fact, its experience of American metro systems was still immensely superior  
technologically to the Taiwanese. But, the Taiwanese technical officials and engineers 
were not wholly inexperienced, and there was tension between the American consultants 
and the Taiwanese clients, especially when many Taiwanese who that they were forced to 
receive the American professional service. Taiwanese technical officials could not be sure 
whether the suggestions and designs provided by the ATC were the best or not. 
Moreover, the Taiwanese even found that some of the American advisors were not 
qualified or helpful . For example, in the case of the power supply system for the Red 352
Line, Siemens, which was the supplier of this system, pointed out that the ATC’s design 
might cause harmonic resonance of current so that the power supply system could be 
damaged. Siemens corrected the design solving the problem, but the DORTS paid 
additional money for this modification . In some extreme cases, some of the American 353
advisors got into conflicts with Taiwanese yakuza due to prostitution, gambling, or love 
affairs . Even at the highest level of the relationship between Taiwanese clients and 354
American consultants, the DORTS tried to guarantee its autonomy as the client and the 
representative of the country even though America still held technological superiority — 
as did counselor Fu when he faced the pressure from the U.S. Hence, the DORTS, as the 
TPB did in earlier days, took some strategies to deal with the tension.

	 The first strategy was to use the international consultants to review each other’s 
designs, a strategy that was not something new to Taiwanese technical officials. When 
the TPB hired the DEC to consult the subterranean railway project, the TPB also hired 
Japanese consultants to review the DEC’s ideas. The DORTS followed a similar approach, 
but the particular methods varied in several ways. For planning and civil engineering, the 
DORTS asked the ATC to hire some of the BMTC’s British, Pakistani, and Hong Kong 
experts as advisors continuing to serve the project of the Taipei Metro since the ATC did 
not have enough experienced metro planning experts . Furthermore, these former 355
BMTC’s consultants were highly appreciated by the Taiwanese officials and cooperated 
well with some Taiwanese officials. Thus, after the consultants returned to their consulting 
 The interviews with TP05, TP06, TP07, TP08, and TP09.352
 The interviews with TP03 and TP06.353
 The interview with TP05.354
 The interview with TP05.355
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jobs, the DORTS officials often asked them to review American consultants’ plans and 
designs to make sure it got the best outcomes .
356
	 As for the whole new AGT system, the VAL (Véhicule Automatique Léger), provided 
by France’s Matra, and the consultants lack of experience of AGT system, the DMJM, the 
DORTS took two actions to check and to review Matra’s work. First, it asked the only two 
users at that time of the VAL, Lille in France and Jacksonville, FL, for opinions to deal with 
the system and with Matra. The DORTS weighted Jacksonville’s opinions and experience 
more since it was not a French city . On the other hand, the DORTS also asked the ATC 357
to check the DMJM and Matra’s designs as a favor, although the Brown Line was out of 
the ATC’s worklist according to the contract . In some specific cases of deigns and 358
engineering, the DORTS would hire project advisors instead of seeking the American 
general consultants’ service, and many of the project consultants were Japanese firms .
359
	 Furthermore, after the detail designs of the whole system were ready, the DORTS 
still controlled the power of biding, preventing the American consultants from giving 
favors to American firms except for items that Taiwanese companies could not provide, 
such as signal control system and trains. Indeed, Chang has pointed out that the DORTS 
had the mission of incubating local civil engineering firms in the construction of the Taipei 
Metro, so it separated bids of system and of construction so that Taiwanese firms could 
get the business of civil engineering in the Brown Line . Indeed, the general reports of 360
each line of the Taipei Metro show that there was no tendency in which American 
companies got more contracts in the bids of civil engineering, environmental engineering, 
and design lots than local companies or companies from other countries  echoing my 361
informants’ responses to the question if hiring American consultants caused American 
companies to win more business than their competitors . Local engineering firms, 362
especially the state-owned companies like BES (Bureau of Engineering Service) 
 The interview with TP03.356
 The interview with TP01.357
 The interviews with TP01 and TP10.358
 The interview with TP09.359
 Chang, “Constructing the Taipei Metro Muzha Line,” Pp. 159-224.360
 For example, see The General Report of the Red Line of the Taipei Metro 《臺北都會區捷運捷361
運系統淡水線工程總報告書》.
 The interviews with TP01, TP03, and TP06.362
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Engineering  (中華⼯程公司), CECI, Sinotech, and the CTCI Corporation, played 363
essential roles in building the Taipei Metro. 

	 However, this strategy does not mean that American companies did not have any 
advantages as regards getting new business. When choosing suppliers for the fields in 
which Taiwanese companies had no experience, the ATC’s service would frequently favor 
American companies even though it did not intend to do so. For example, in the bids for 
the signal control system for RRT metro lines, the General Railway Signal Company 
(GRS)  which was a member of the USTTG beat its British competitor,  winning the 364
contract because it was more familiar with American signal control specs, and the ATC 
was also more familiar with its products .
365
	 In this case, the DORTS made a trade-off decision to reserve its and the future 
operator of the system, the Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation's (TRTC), autonomy. The 
DORTS opened a bid for the signal control system for all RRT metro lines rather than call 
for individual bids for each line. This decision had a disadvantage. The signal system 
supplier, the GRS, and later Alstom, became the only supplier of parts of the system and 
the extended lines’ signal system so that the TRTC would pay more for it. However, this 
decision had several advantages. First, trains could run on any line of the network making 
it far easier for the TRTC to schedule train services. The BMTC designed the L-shape 
network and cross-platform interchange for distributing passengers and decreasing the 
effort of changing lines. This design also made it possible for different lines to connect by 
pocket tracks because the tunnels of different lines became parallel when they were close 
to each other in the interchange stations with cross-platform interchange. For realizing 
this feature, the signal control system had to be the same for both. The other advantage 
of this decision was that the TRTC could make train manufacturers compete with each 
other lowering the price of trains because the whole metro network already had unified 
specs of trains so that any train manufacturer could join the bids for an electric multiple-
unit train . Future development seems to verify this strategy. In the bids of type C371 366
and C381 trains, the winner of the bids, the Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI, 川崎重工業株
式会社), contracted with the Taiwanese half state-owned rolling stock manufacturer, the 
 BES means Bureau of Engineering Service which was the bureau within the Ministry of 363
Economics Affairs. At this time, BES Engineering was a state-owned engineering company rather 
than a bureau. This company was privatized in 1994.
 The GRS was acquired by the Alstom in 1998.364
 The interviews with TP02 and TP06.365
 The interview with TP02.366
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Taiwan Rolling Stock Corporation (TRSC, 台灣車輛股份有限公司) lowering its cost so that 
the Taiwanese company could share the business. 

 
Figure 6.7: The Track Arrangement without Cross-platform Interchange  
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Figure 6.8: The Track Arrangement with Cross-platform Interchange 
Japanese American Cars 
	 The DORTS took the strategy of opening a bid for the signal control system for the 
whole RRT network so as to secure its and the TRTC’s freedom to lower the cost of new 
trains and to create opportunities for Taiwanese firms to join the train business in the 
future. However, the U.S. government and American companies did not only aim at 
getting the business of general consultants and building the signal control system; they 
also targeted train manufacturing. Indeed, the consulting service could only provide 
hundreds of jobs for Americans, and these jobs were limited to highly-educated experts. 
The U.S. government wanted to create more jobs for American workers using its political 
leverage in the project of the Taipei Metro to reach its goal of reducing the trade deficit 
between the two countries. Train manufacturing became an ideal option for the U.S 
government.

	 In fact, in Ralph Stanley’s letter sent in September 1985, he already mentioned that 
the remaining members of the USTTG—General Electric Corporation; the General Railway 
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Signal Company; Transit America; Westinghouse Electric Corporation; and Wabco-Union 
Switch and Signal—would continue their cooperative marketing strategy in Taiwan and 
pursue contracts on the Taipei MRT Project individually or in a joint venture as hardware 
and equipment needed were tendered for . Under this pressure, the DORTS opened the 367
bid of the system for the Brown Line in 1987 ahead of the bid of trains for other lines, and 
it took the “American-European only” policy aimed at excluding Japanese firms but 
including European firms in the competition. The policy had two outcomes. First, the 
intention to exclude the Japanese seemed to be meaningless because Mitsubishi and 
Hitachi used the names of the Mitsui USA and Sumitomo USA to join the competition. 
Second, the policy of including European led to the victory of the Matra, the only 
European firm among firms submitting technical proposals. This outcome disappointed 
the U.S. government and related American firms, and the political pressure intensified

	 In spite of the pressure, Paul Lai, as the chief engineer of the DORTS, still insisted 
that the bid for trains for the RRT metro lines should not be “American only” because he 
and his colleagues in the DORTS found that there was no “true” American company 
manufacturing electric multiple-unit trains in the U.S. In fact, all American electric 
multiple-unit train manufacturers were owned by other countries’ firms. Therefore, he and 
the DORTS thought that the bids of electric multiple-unit trains for the RRT metro lines 
should at least be open to European countries as was for bid of the system for the Brown 
Line .  The Executive Yuan and the CEPD decided to compromise. The prime minister, 368
Yu Kuo-hwa, directly ordered the DORTS to take an “American only” policy in this bid. 

	 Paul Lai and the DORTS was right. The DORTS received technical proposals from 
three “American” train manufacturers: Breda Transportation USA, Bombardier USA, and 
Union Rail Car Partnership (URC). Breda Transportation USA was the subsidiary of the 
Italian railway equipment manufacturer, Società Italiana Ernesto Breda . To compete for 369
Taipei Metro’s bid, the Breda designed an electric multiple-unit train with Hitachi’s motors 
and Breda’s bogies, and it had the experience of making trains for the WMATA and the 
subway of LA. Bombardier USA was the subsidiary of the Canadian huge transportation 
technology group, the Bombardier. According to its technical proposal, the Bombardier’s 
 National Archives 國家檔案閱覽中心, “Metro System 捷運系統,” September 4, 1985.367
 The interview with TP03; Liu and Lu, The Lesson, Pp. 142.368
 The Breda was merged with another Italian railway equipment manufacturer, Ansaldo, in 2001, 369
forming the AnsaldoBreda. The AnsaldoBreda was acquired by the Hitachi in 2015, reforming as 
the Hitachi Rail Italy (HRI), becoming one of the biggest railway equipment manufacturers in the 
world.
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electric multiple-unit train would have motors from GE, traction control, and power 
equipment from Westinghouse. Moreover, the WABCO (Westinghouse Air Brake 
Corporation) would supply the friction brake system to the Bombardier. Thus, three 
members of the USTTG joined the competition on Bombardier’s trains, although no actual 
American train manufacturer could fight for the bid. 

	 The URC was once called the United Rail Car Partnership. It was the Japanese 
firms KHI and Nissho Iwai’s (日商岩井) joint venture in the U.S. In fact, the establishment 
of the URC was due to the U.S. government’s “Buy America” provision so that the 
Japanese manufacturers could provide electric multiple-unit trains to American cities, 
mainly New York and New Jersey. Compared to Bombardier, the URC would only use the 
WABCO as the supplier of the brake system, and other Japanese companies and their 
American subsidiaries would supply most of the parts of the URC’s trains. Therefore, to 
the USTTG’s interests, the Bombardier would be the best candidate to win the bid.

	 However, to many people’s surprise, the little known URC beat the Bombardier and 
the Breda winning the business in September 1988 because of its lowest price. The next 
March, Representative John Dingell and Senator Patrick Leahy released a press release 
attacking the DORTS and the URC. Senator Leahy even criticized the URC as a scam 
since this Japanese American subsidiary could not fulfill the requirement of " theBuy 
American" policy which demanded that 50% of the parts of a train should be 
manufactured in the U.S. while the Bombardier could easily reach 80% if it won the 
contract . But, the DORTS and the Commissioner Chi denied the accusation 370
emphasizing that the bid had followed a rigorous and open process, and the DORTS 
continued the purchase process of the URC’s trains, Type C301 (ironically, Taiwan was 
suffering from being on the watch list of the Congress Section 301 Special Report at that 
time).  Frankly, the URC did have experience of providing electric multiple-unit trains to 
American metro systems, and its establishment was due to " theBuy American" policy, so 
the American politicians’ criticisms seemed to be groundless. In the DORTS’ view, 
Japanese electric multiple-unit trains had a much better reputation than the North 
American’s, and the URC did provide a better price. Three decades passed, and 
Taiwanese technical officials and passengers of the Taipei Metro regard Type C301 as a 
reliable train nowadays . Thus, the victory of the URC might be not only the victory of 371
 Liu and Lu, The Lesson, Pp. 142-143.370
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Japanese companies but also the victory of Taiwanese technical officials to maintain their 
autonomy as the client of the metro system.

	 Therefore, the “American only” bidding policy still had a side effect, namely a 
fantastic global trip for the trains. First of all, Kawasaki needed to produce key 
components of the trains in their factory in Hyogo Prefecture, Japan. Then, Kawasaki 
transported these components to the URC’s factory in Yonkers, NY, crossing the Pacific 
and Panama Canal. After the URC had assembled the trains, these trains would cross 
back to the other side of the Earth, finally reaching Taiwan. On these trains, we see two 
metal plates showing the manufacturers’ names instead of one, and the names on them 
are the Kawasaki and “the Union Rail Car Partnership from Yonkers, NY, the U.S.” The 
subsequent bids of electric multiple-unit trains for the RRT network have never taken the 
"American only” policy again because of the change of the international situation. 
Therefore, the Type C301 became the only type to have experienced a global trip and to 
have two metal name plates.
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Figure 6.9: The Picture in the Bombardier’s Technical Proposal 
 Figure 6.10: The Exterior View Plan in the URC’s Technical Proposal 
Figure 6.11: and 6.12: The Name Plates on the Trains Type C301  372
Joint Development and Underground City 
 Joint Development means that the government or the operator of a metro system 
cooperates with the property owners who have properties supposed to be parts of 
facilities like the station and other basic components to develop business facilities. So, all 
actors involved in the development can generate  profit thanks to the development, and 
 台北捷運301型電聯車-維基百科，自由的百科全書: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/台北捷運301型372
電聯車. Accessed on December 4, 2019.
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the government does not need to spend an enormous budget to acquire land and 
buildings from property owners. The metro operator can build department stores, 
apartments, or underground malls to generate income, and the original property owners 
and investor of the joint development can share the profit. In this sense, joint 
development involves rewarding systems of development, institutions, regulations, 
particular designs of stations, and the affiliated business. 

	 When the BMTC was still the general consultant of the Taipei Metro project, the 
British consultants and Taiwanese technical officials anticipated that the Taipei Metro 
could not solely rely on the income of tickets. So, the British consultants suggested that 
the Taiwanese organize a schedule  for joint development. However, the BMTC did not 
present detailed information on the regulation of joint development, strategies for 
collecting funds, types of activities in the properties after the development, and the 
environmental evaluation of joint development . Therefore, the DORTS contracted with 373
universities and local consultants to plan joint development projects on the Red Line and 
to institutionalize joint development .
374
 In the beginning, commissioner Chi planned to set up a public development company to 
implement joint development for higher efficiency and profit. However, he found that the 
company would not have public power to negotiate with the property owners, and the 
DORTS needed to acquire these properties for building stations and other necessary 
facilities.  So he changed the plan of joint development setting up an office of joint 
development within the DORTS . With the establishment of the office, the DORTS first 375
hired a Hong Kong advisor to help the office to plan the process of joint development, 
and then sent two American consultants to the DORTS . 
376
	 Although the U.S. had the superiority of many technologies of metro systems over 
Taiwan, it did not have much more experience than Taiwan and other countries at a 
practical level. The American consultants could not provide many practical suggestions to 
the DORTS since the American metro systems did not have many cases of joint 
development, though American scholars had produced theoretical works about it . Dr. 377
 The Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government, 1987 Annual Book, Pp 181.373
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Hwang Ti-chang’s (黃荻昌) travel report reveals the American metro systems’ lack of 
experience. Dr. Hwang spent about a month studying American metro systems’ joint 
development in Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New York, Baltimore, LA, and San 
Francisco. He concluded that Taipei needed to take the institution of value engineering in 
LA as a reference so that the Taipei Metro could analyze how much cost and profit would 
be produced by the project and how to plan the development of its facilities, especially in 
the stations downtown. Moreover, he also appreciated the rewarding system of joint 
development in New York. However, as regards examples and the practical design of joint 
development, Dr. Hwang mentioned that the Taipei Metro should avoid the problems of 
the operation of the Penn Stations in New York and Philadelphia. He also only suggested 
that Taipei take New York, Washington, and Philadelphia’s designs as reference rather 
than learning from these cases. Indeed, after the period of service, the two American 
consultants only provided some design sketches and standard processes of joint 
development, providing limited assistance to the DORTS . The other problem faced by 378
the DORTS was that the cases of joint development in American cities were joint 
development among public agencies while Taipei needed the experience of joint 
development of government and the private sector . Thus, the DORTS studied the 379
cases and institutions of joint development in Hong Kong and Japan combing American 
experience to set up institutions and to help the central government to define laws for 
joint development . 
380
	  The ATC’s design of the underground malls also shows that the American 
consultants did not have impressive knowledge or ideas about business facilities in metro 
systems. Because the Red Line and the Blue Line’s tunnels were built by the “cut and 
cover” approach instead of tunnel boring machines, the ATC thought building 
underground malls above the tunnels would be better than covering the completed 
tunnels with dirt. However, the American consultants did not carefully design the 
underground malls from the viewpoint of development . Instead, they just designed two 381
underground malls, and each of them connected three stations and had single-aisle and 
stores in one or two rows. Taiwanese technical officials and engineers quickly found that 
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this kind of design would not be suitable for Taipei . Therefore, the Bureau of Public 382
Works, Taipei City Government, as we discuss in chapter 3, hired the Kaku Morin Group 
(KMG) which was founded by the Taiwanese Japanese architect, Kaku Morin to study 
how to build better underground malls in the Taipei Metro, and it passed this project to 
the DORTS for implementation .
383
	 The KMG introduced Japanese style underground malls into Taipei due to Kaku’s 
Japanese experience. First of all, the KMG’s underground malls have two aisles rather 
than one so that it would have stores in three or four rows meaning more business 
facilities. Second, these underground malls were well organized into different areas, and 
different areas had particular kinds of stores. Therefore, the underground malls defined by 
the KMG are just like small department stores with bookstores, restaurants, coffee shops, 
and varieties of stores carefully arranged. The KMG also designed small plazas in 
underground malls for street artists or special events. We can find the same features in 
the underground malls in Japanese metro systems. 

	 Because two of the Japanese style underground malls and one American 
underground mall surround the Taipei Main Station, three different types of designs of 
business facilities of a metro system are found in the same station zone: German, 
American, and Japanese styles. The Taipei Main Station itself follows German 
consultants’ idea of the central station with limited business facilities and ample space for 
people flows. The American style underground mall on the Red Line connects the Taipei 
Main Station, the Zhongshan Station (中山站), and the Shuanglian Station (雙連站) with a 
single aisle and one or two lines of stores. The Japanese style underground malls are on 
the north side and west side of the Taipei Main Station with abundant business activities 
attracting many people to shop, to date, and to eat in the beautiful underground world. 
Therefore, the Taipei Main Station became a typical example of technological hybridity of 
styles and functions because German, American, and Japanese consultants contributed 
their efforts, profession, and experience or inexperience into the same station and metro 
system. However, Taiwanese technical officials and engineers’ integration and strategies 
were the main driving force to make it come together as a concrete system

 The interview with TP09.382
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Figure 6.13: The American Style Underground Mall on the Red Line  384
Figure 6.14: The Japanese Style Underground Mall next to the Taipei Main Station  385
 中山地下街-維基百科，自由的百科全書: https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/中山地下街. Accessed on 384
December 4, 2019.
 誠品站前店-維基百科，自由的百科全書:https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/誠品站前店. Accessed on 385
December 4, 2019.
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Hybridity Emerged while Dancing 
	 The American hegemony of mass transportation technology did not exist in Taiwan 
in the 1980s when Taipei City began to implement the project of the Taipei Metro, but two 
things still played a vital role in this large project. First, the U.S. was the hegemonic 
political power over Taiwan at that time. Notably, the KMT government faced a severe 
political crisis of legitimacy as ruling Taiwan after its lost many countries’ formal 
diplomatic relations, including the U.S.  China, simultaneously, continued to pressure 
Taiwan with political and military threats. Second, the U.S. still had the superiority of 
metro technology because of its development of metro systems in the 1960s and the 
1970s. The massive trade deficit between the U.S. and Taiwan created apolitical 
momentum to combine these two facts leading to the return of American mass 
transportation technology in Taiwan. However, the return of American experts and their 
technology did not necessarily mean that Americanization occurred again in the 1980s. 
Taiwanese technical officials and engineers had become more experienced, and other 
international consultants from Germany, Japan, and Britain with abundant experience of 
metro systems were helping Taiwan. Therefore, a series of negotiation and strategies 
occurred between the DORTS and the American consultants in the project of the Taipei 
Metro to maintain Taiwan’s autonomy of building even though Taiwan had no choice 
choice but to hire the American consultants and follow an "American only” policy in the 
bid for electric multiple-unit trains for the RRT network.

	 Thus technological hybridity emerged in the process of negotiation, compromise, 
and resistance of the Taiwanese. Facing political pressure from the U.S., Taiwanese 
technical officials, on the one hand, accepted American professional services and its 
technological superiority; on the other hand, they adopted several strategies to check the 
quality of the service and the artifacts. First of all, they had international consultants from 
different countries to check each others’ works. Moreover, the alternative resources from 
Britain, Europe, and Japan compensated the professional deficit of American consultants 
and suppliers. Third, the DORTS insisted on their position as the client of the project. 
Finally, they sought local resources to help them to complete the metro system. These 
strategies themselves were a series of actions of mixing knowledge or artifacts, and their 
products, the network, the stations, the trains, and the underground malls, hence are 
hybrid. Technological hybridity was both the means and the outcome in the Taipei Metro.

	 In the cases which we discuss in this chapter, we can find the following 
phenomena. First of all, the knowledge or artifacts generated with different ideas were 
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integrated into one system, making the system workable. The network and the stations of 
the Taipei Metro were a typical instance. The DORTS followed the British consultants’ 
plan building the L-shape network with four stations with cross-platform interchange, but 
it also followed the American consultants’ experience and ideas designing larger stations 
and trains. The Taipei Main Station even shows how different technological ideas 
contradicting each other were integrated as one. Furthermore, with the return of the 
American experts, the DORTS redefined the meaning of the Taipei Metro, trying to shape 
it as a symbol of the progressive nation with its monumental architecture of stations. Last 
but not least, we need to note the reason why the DORTS launched the strategies was its 
attempt to change the power relationship between it and the U.S. while the KMT 
government needed to fulfill the requirement from the U.S. at the same time.

	 By combining the discussion in this chapter and the last chapter, the total picture 
of the relations between Taiwanese and international consultants became clear. The 
change of the U.S.-Taiwan relations caused by the imbalanced trade and the KMT 
government’s political crisis in the 1980s drove the American metro technology to travel 
to Taiwan. The Taiwanese technical officials exploited the American professional service 
and artifacts, which might not be most appropriate for the Taiwanese but were still 
predominant in building the Taipei Metro. The DORTS also mobilized human resources 
and knowledge in and out of Taiwan in this project, building not only the system but also 
the ability to build more. However, the Taiwanese knew that the American consultants and 
suppliers might not be able to provide the best output for them.

	 Moreover, they also aimed at guaranteeing their autonomy in the project. 
Therefore, a tension between Taiwanese and Americans was inevitable. To deal with the 
tension, the Taiwanese took a series of hybrid strategies leading to the technological 
hybridity of mass transportation technology. In some sense, I would like to use “dancing” 
as a metaphor for U.S.-Taiwan relations in the project of the Taipei Metro. But, it was only 
a part of the story between Taiwanese technical officials and international consultants/
suppliers of the Taipei Metro because the problem of autonomy and the power 
relationship between technologically dominant countries and the catching-up country, 
Taiwan, did not only arise with America; alternative sources of expertise could also 
produce their own problems. 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Chapter 7: The Hybrid Metro 
The Brown Line 1982-2010

“If Matra does not pull, we pull! (馬特拉不拉，我們自己拉！).1998 ," Chen Shui-bian (陳水
扁）, Mayor of Taipei City(1994-1998) and the president of Taiwan(2000-2008).1996 , 
“A key feature of the seamless integration with the existing Muzha line will be the deployment of 
the CITYFLO ATC technology. Proven in other urban and airport applications, the CITYFLO ATC 
will be overlaid onto the existing system with minimal service disruption.” Michael E. Fetsko and 
Marc Drolet, Vice President, Project Management, Bombardier, and Vice President, Signaling, 
Bombardier, 2005. 
	 In 1996 when I was ten years old, the first metro line of the Taipei Metro, the Brown 
Line, opened. Like many Taiwanese, my father took me to the Taipei City Zoo by riding 
Taiwan’s first metro line. We did not even go to the zoo because our purpose was to see 
the metro line itself. The Brown Line was the only metro using the automated guided 
transit (AGT) system in the Taipei Metro until 2020, so, in the passengers’ eyes, this metro 
line does not have a driver, and its trains are running on concrete rails with rubber tires 
rather than steel wheels on steel rails. When we left the terminal station, the Taipei City 
Zoo Station, the system experienced a shutdown for about five minutes. People on the 
train were stunned but did not panic, and some of them started to laugh at the Taipei City 
Government and at the French firm Matra that built the trains. People interested in the 
metro line had already heard many news reports, rumors, and criticisms about this metro 
line. One candidate for mayor in the municipal election in 1994 even claimed that he 
would tear down the Brown Line because it had suffered tire explosions, fire accidents, 
and the councilor had strong doubts about the quality of its construction.  I still remember 
that many questions crossed my mind, like “why does this metro line have no driver?” ”
Why do the trains use rubber tires?” And “ why does this line have so many problems?”

	 After 13 years, the extended phase of the Brown Line, the Neihu section, opened. 
The extensive phase project did not only involve building the extended line in Neihu 
connecting to he Blue Blue Line in Nangang. It also required but integrating the existing 
system and trains with the new one manufactured by the Canadian transportation group, 
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Bombardier. Thus the Brown Line is a unique case of system integration of two different 
driverless and patented systems. However, the Brown Line experienced frequent 
shutdowns after the new phase opened, and was severely criticized leading to the 
resignation of the commissioner of the DORTS. Ten years have passed, and the Brown 
Line has run smoothly for years like other lines in the Taipei Metro. Thus more questions 
about the Brown Line arise. How did the DORTST integrate the two different systems? 
Were the difficulties encountered in the Brown Line ’s extension phase avoidable? How 
did the DORTS (Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government) and the 
TRTC (Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation) overcome the problems needed to make the 
metro line work smoothly? No matter whether it failed or succeeded, these facts make 
the Brown Line the most unusual line in the Taipei Metro. In this chapter, we try to answer 
to the questions above by discussing the Brown Line’s history.

The Prologue: the TMCTS 
	  In 1982, the TPB (Transportation Planning Board) and the BMTC (British Mass 
Transit Consultants) had just completed the report of their plan of the Taipei Metro, and 
the Taipei City Government initiated another metro project in cooperation with the 
Institute of Transportation, National Chao Tung University (NCTU). In their technical report 
completed in 1983, they argued that the Taipei Metro would only serve the main corridors 
connecting suburban areas and downtown Taipei City while the minor corridors within 
Taipei City would be served by buses. However, buses seemed not to be an efficient 
means to provide service in these corridors since it was impossible to include areas for 
roads so that traffic congestion in these corridors would remain critical. The solution to 
this problem was to introduce a new type of metro system, which was newly developed in 
America, Europe, and Japan,  a system that was cheaper, flexible, and had a high quality 
of service . It was called a “medium-capacity transit system (MCTS)” because its capacity 
was between railway transit and bus . The so-called MCTS referred to the driverless 386
metro systems with smaller architecture and higher automation levels developed in the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s. At that time, only a few systems provided service, and 
they belonged to four companies: the Matra’s VAL (Véhicule Automatique Léger; France), 
the Westinghouse’ Automated People Mover (APM; America), the UTDC’s (Urban 
Transportation Development Corporation) SkyTrain (Canada), and Japan’s New Transport 
 Taipei City Government 臺北市政府, The Development Plan of the Medium Capacity Transit 386
System for Taipei City I: System Analysis 《台北市中運量捷運系統之發展規劃壹：系統分析》. 
(Taipei: Taipei City Government 台北市政府, 1983): Pp.3.
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System (NTS, 新交通システム). Nowadays, these systems are called “automated guided 
transit,” AGT.

	 The main advocate for introducing the automatic system into Taiwan was Dr. Wang 
Chuan-fang (王傳芳), who was on the faculty of the Institute of Transportation, NCTU, and 
the municipal advisor to the Taipei City Government. In December 1980, the TPB held a 
three-day seminar on mass rapid transit inviting several American guest speakers, 
including two faculty of the University of Pennsylvania, one faculty of the University of 
Virginia, and a former executive director of the Chicago Transit Authority. One of the 
faculty at the University of Pennsylvania was Vukan Vuchic, who was dedicated to 
promoting mass transportation and metro systems throughout his career. Vuchic 
introduced various kinds of mass transit technology to his Taiwanese audiences, and the 
driverless systems caught Dr. Wang’s eye. At that time, as we said above, transportation 
corporations in France, Japan, and the U.S. were developing automatic transit systems, 
and Dr. Wang kept introducing the latest information into Taiwan, studying it with his 
colleagues and students . The automated transit systems like the Matra’s VAL had a 387
shorter construction period and lower cost due to its smaller architecture, but it had much 
higher capacity because its automated technology could shorten the time between trains. 
Therefore, Dr. Wang concluded that an automated transit system would be a solution to 
traffic congestion of Taipei and other cities in Taiwan before the completion of metro 
systems using traditional rail transit. For better understanding in Taiwan, he called this 
kind of system “medium-capacity transit” rather than “automated guided transit." He 
argued that the automated transit system could provide service to the routes where traffic 
flows were smaller than those served by traditional railway metro lines but larger than 
those where buses could provide service . He used a metaphor to explain the function 388
of the automated transit system: big cats walk through a big hole, and small cats walk 
through a small hole. How about medium-size cats? Let them walk through medium-sized 
holes !
389
	 As the advisor to Taipei City Government and a transportation scholar, Dr. Wang’s 
advocacy gained Taipei City Government and C.C. Wang’s attention. In 1981, Taipei City 
Government contracted with the Institute of Transportation, NCTU to start the study of 
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(Taipei: San Min Book 三民書局, 1998): Pp. 542.
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the automated transit system and its possible exploitation in Taipei City. In the system 
analysis report, the research group suggested that the system could serve the routes 
which the metro system planned by the TPB could not serve, and it devised a “premetro” 
strategy. The so-called “premetro” strategy meant that a route would have several 
development stages graduating progressively towards building a regular metro line 
depending on its traffic flow. If a route’s current traffic flow was not high enough to 
support a metro line, the government should only use buses to serve it until its traffic flow 
grew large enough to move to the next stage, at which the government should build a 
"medium-capacity transit system" to serve the route. If a route with a "medium-capacity 
transit system" had a higher traffic flow to support a metro line or transit system with 
higher capacity, the government needed to plan to upgrade the system or build a 
traditional metro line . In this strategy, “medium-capacity transit” was defined as a 390
transit system with an independent route, certain degrees of speed and numbers of 
trains, and a capacity of 5,000-20,000 passengers per hour . On this basis, the research 391
group suggested several possible lines connecting the newly opened Taipei City Zoo, the 
new central business district in the east side of Taipei, and downtown .
392
	 The next year, Taipei City Government formed the “Taipei Medium-Capacity Transit 
System Group (TMCTS)” to plan a driverless system in Taipei.  Dr. Wang was in charge of 
this research group. The TMCTS studied different systems worldwide including the VAL 
systems in Lille, the APM system in Miami, the Tokyo Monorail connecting Haneda Airport 
and downtown Tokyo, and the NTS systems in Kobe and Osaka . It also recommended 393
two lines that aimed at connecting the City Zoo, the new business district in the east, and 
the Taipei Main Station according to the traffic prediction of different areas within Taipei 
City . Taipei City Government submitted this project to the CEPD (Council for Economic 394
Planning and Development) asking for budgets and approval. As we discussed in the 
previous chapter, the U.S. government and American companies tool this opportunity to 
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interrupt the project of Taipei Metro, leading to the integration study held by the TTC 
(Taipei Transit Consultants). The TTC and the CEPD decided that the Brown Line, which 
connects the City Zoo and downtown Taipei, would be the only metro line using the 
automated transit system. The metro line connecting the new business district and the 
Taipei Main Station was planned as the Blue Line using a conventional railway transit 
system, as we discussed in the previous chapters.

Matra’s Triumph 
	 After the establishment of the DORTS, the group determined that the Red and the 
Brown Lines would be the first two lines to be constructed. For the construction of the 
Brown Line, the DORTS took different bidding strategies seeking suppliers and 
contractors from other lines, which used conventional systems. For the other lines, the 
DORTS opened bids for the signal control system, cars, power supply systems, civil 
engineering, and other events individually so that Taiwanese companies could bid for the 
business except for the signal control system, cars, and power supply systems, which 
only international suppliers were able to provide. With similar logic, the DORTS also 
opened civil engineering parts to Taiwanese companies. However, it combined the signal 
control system, cars, architectures, and the power supply system as a system bid open to 
American and European companies as requested by  the U.S. government. This policy 
had two consequences. First, it invited Matra, which was one of the pioneers of driverless 
transit systems at that time, and, second, it aimed at excluding Japanese companies. Not 
only Matra but also the General Electric Company (GEC) from the U.K. submitted 
technical proposals to the DORTS’ call for bids, though Japanese companies still joined 
the bidding. Moreover, the Canadian company owned by the Government of Ontario, the 
UTDC (Urban Transportation Development Corporation), also submitted its technical 
proposal through its American branch.

	 Including Westinghouse, six companies bid for business on the  Brown Line:  Matra 
from France, the UTDC from Canada, the GEC from the U.K., the Mitsui U.S.A., and the 
Sumitomo of America from Japan . Westinghouse was the only “pure” American 395
company and member of the USTTG (the U.S. Taiwan Transit Group) among all the 
American companies, and it presented its APM system to pursue the system bid of the 
Brown Line. In the 1960s, the Westinghouse already initiated a new type of transportation 
system using rubber tires and an automated system and built a demonstration system in 
 The technical proposals from these companies are stored in the DORTS’ library in Taipei. The 395
technical information in this section directly comes from them.
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Philadelphia. Then, in the 1970s and the 1980s, Westinghouse installed its APM system in 
8 airports including Tampa International Airport, McCarran International Airport in Las 
Vegas, Sea-Tac International Airport, Miami International Airport, Hartsfield-Jackson 
Atlanta International Airport, Orlando International Airport, Gatwick Airport in England and 
one resort area, all before 1988 when the system bid of the Brown Line was open. The 
APM system had only one example as an urban transportation system, which was 
Miami’s Metromover beginning to operate in 1986. Another system coming from North 
America was UTDC’s Skytrain. Unlike many other automatic systems, the Skytrain, which 
connects Vancouver International Airport and downtown Vancouver, is powered by linear 
motors, and its trains run on steel rails. Because the trains only used electromagnet 
instead of whole motors, the Skytrain had higher speed than its competitors. 

	 Mitsui and Sumitomo, as two giant Japanese trading groups, did not produce 
transportation equipment, but they were coordinators of two Japanese systems. 
Japanese companies often take a similar strategy to seek substantial business projects. 
What Mitsui represented was Hitachi’s Monorail systems, which served in Tokyo to 
connect the city to Haneda International Airport in the 1960s and to Kitakyushu in the 
1980s.  Mitsui actively promoted Kitakyushu’s system since it was new and had a higher 
degree of automation. The most distinctive feature of the Monorail system was that the 
trains did not run on concrete tracks or steel rails; instead, they were held on a concrete 
track by their rubber tires so that the architecture surrounding them was minimal. 
Sumitomo submitted the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (三菱重工業株式会社) and the 
Niigata Engineering’s (新潟鐵工所 ) NTS system. Like APM and VAL, NTS also exploited 396
communication technology to increase its degree of automation, and it also used 
concrete tracks and rubber tires for better acceleration and braking so that the 
passengers could enjoy more trains per time slot. The NTS’ examples were Osaka’s 
Newtram connecting Itami Airport and downtown Osaka and Saitama’s Newshuttle. 

	 The GEC and the Matra were the two European companies bidding for the Brown 
Line’s business.  GEC had a long relationship with Taiwan’s railway while the Matra’s VAL 
system caught much attention all around the world at that time. In the project of 
electrification of the West Coast Line of the TRA (Taiwan Railway Administration), GEC 
was the supplier providing electric locomotives and the first electric multiple units for the 
 Niigata Engineering went bankrupt and dismissed in 2001, and other Japanese industrial 396
groups acquired its business units. Its rail transportation department became a subsidiary of IHI 
Corporation renamed as Niigata Transys (新潟トランシス) continuing to develop driverless transit 
systems.
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intercity express trains, Type EMU100. In the bid for the Brown Line, GEC did not give a 
particular name for its system, but it would introduce the one it built for the Docklands 
Light Railway (DLR) in London. Although the GEC’s system was also driverless and with 
light structures, it still used traditional steel rails for its trains. 

Matra presented its VAL256, the number meaning that the width of the car was 
2.56m, to the DORTS based on its VAL208 for Lille and Chicago O’Hare International 
Airport. At the time when computing power was not as powerful as today, Matra’s system 
used a brilliant idea to reach driverless operation. On the VAL’s concrete tracks, there 
were transmission line assembly (TLA) loops, and trains with antennas would scan the 
TLAs sending a signal to a central train control center that calculated where the trains 
were. Furthermore, the computers in the trains were embedded a program ordering how 
long trains would pass one TLA loop meaning trains would be fast when they passed 
through a larger TLA loop while they would be slower when they passed a smaller TLA 
loop. Thus, by arranging different sizes of TLA loops, the system could not only manage 
trains on tracks but also control their speed without a driver using relatively low 
computing power. However, like its personal rapid transit (PRT) system, the ARMIS, 
Alstom provided trains to the Matra because the Matra could not manufacture trains. 
What Matra had was the train control program and the patent for the means to control 
trains using the TLA.

	 To select the winning system, the DORTS set up a committee with members in and 
out of the Taipei City Government.  Each member would list their first, second, and third 
preferences and the system gaining the highest sum of the individual rankings would win 
the bid. Among the 15 committee members, only Paul Lai voted the UTDC’s Skytrain in 
first place while other committee members chose the Matra’s VAL256 as the best 
choice . 
397
Matra’s victory raised a considerable controversy even though it was a pioneer in 
the development of automated transit systems. First of all, the decision to include 
European companies in the competition seemed to be the reason why Matra won the bid. 
Moreover, as with the consultants, “buy American” was supposed to be the policy 
adopted to help the KMT government to reduce pressure from Washington to close the 
trade deficit, yet a French company took the business under the DORTS' supervision. 
 The interview with TP03; Liu and Lu, The Lesson, Pp. 137.397
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Indeed, a Taiwanese newspaper pointed out that Matra was the “lucky underdog” beating 
Westinghouse, which was regarded as the possible winner in the bid . 
398
The most sensitive issue was that there were rumors that the KMT government 
tried to purchase Mirage 2000 fighters and La Fayette class frigates from France after the 
U.S. refused to sell F-16 Fighting Falcon fighters to Taiwan.  Matra’s defense department 
had a close connection with the fighters’ and frigates’ manufacturers, Dassault and 
Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS). After Matra’s victory, the Taipei 
City Council questioned the DORTS as to whether it chose the Matra system as part of a 
deal that included buying French fighters .  In fact, in 1989, Taiwan successfully 399
purchased Mirage 2000 fighters and La Fayette class frigates from France. It is plausible 
to assume then that procurement of French fighters and warships in the 1980s, when the 
KMT government had difficulty in acquiring advanced weapons from the USA, went along 
with the decision to prefer Matra over Westinghouse . However,  we have no definite 400
evidence to  prove the rumors so far.

Let us put aside the rumors about national defense issues. We can still explain 
Matra’s triumph in the bid for the Brown Line. Besides cost, the Taiwanese committee 
weighed two abilities of the competing systems heavily: the degree of automation and 
passenger capacity. Although Dr. Wang and the TMCTS believed the automated transit 
system was suitable for the route connecting the City Zoo and downtown Taipei City, the 
DORTS found that traffic flow on this route would be as large as other metro lines. 
Therefore, the DORTS hoped not only that the driverless system could run more cars per 
train but also that waiting time for passengers would be as short as possible. The former 
meant bigger trains or more cars per train; the latter meant a higher level of automation. 
We also need to note that the DORTS and Taiwanese technical officials wanted to build 
an advanced mass transportation system to make Taipei a modern city, for which the 
degree of automation became an index.

	 Moreover, the traffic flow on the route could increase due to the city’s growth and 
expansion, so the possibility of expansion of capacity would also an advantage. 
According to this criterion, Mitsui/Hitachi’s Monorail was the first to be excluded. 
Although the trains had the most abundant space and the Mitsui and the Hitachi stated 
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that the Monorail had an automatic train operation (ATO) system, they still recommended 
the DORTS to deploy one driver on each train for increasing departure frequency. 
However, despite sending one driver on each train, the shortest gap between trains was 
120 seconds, which was longer than the other competitors. In this sense, the Monorail 
could not be recognized as a driverless transit system, so it was not “modern” enough.

	 The VAL256 also had the second shortest peak gap distance among the six 
systems thanks to its higher automation level. The GEC’s system, the Monorail, and the 
NTS could operate one train per 120 seconds at peak time while the VAL256 could 
operate one per 109 seconds. The Skytrain had a similar gap time with the VAL; it was the 
speediest due to the lightness of its trains. But, it was less comfortable to ride on the 
trains . Also, the size of the car was smaller than the VAL256, and it only used 2-car 401
trains so that it would have less capacity than the VAL256 because Matra promised that 
they could integrate two 2-car trains (married-pair) into one 4-car train initially and three 
married-pairs into one 6-car train if necessary in the future. Westinghouse's APM system 
was the only one that had shorter peak gap time than the VAL256, but the capacity also 
hindered it from beating the VAL256. One APM car could carry only 78 passengers while 
the VAL256’s car could carry 114 passengers. Besides its system’s superiority of peak 
gap time and capacity, Matra successfully included many Taiwanese companies, 
including the state-owned BES (Bureau of Engineering Service; 中華工程公司) 
Engineering Corporation, the CTCI (Chinese Technical Consulting Incorporated, 中鼎工程
公司), and Haigo Shen & Associate (沈祖海建築師事務所) in the project. By contrast, 
others only included one or no Taiwanese company into their teams. In sum, the VAL256 
was the technological system fitting the DORTS and Taipei’s technological context 
creating stronger technological momentum than its competitors.

I argue thus that VAL256’s higher automation level and higher capacity than its 
competitors can explain Matra's triumph over its competitors, notwithstanding the 
possible bias introduced by the rumored connection with the national defense deals for 
the Mirage 2000 and La Fayette class frigates. Furthermore, the DORTS’s determination 
to include European companies into the bid to show their autonomy was the driving force 
of  Matra’s victory. Even if the rumors about the connection between the Matra’s victory 
and the military deals were true, the deals only reinforced the VAL256’s superiority rather 
than changed the game. Moreover, almost all committee members voted the VAL256 as 
their best choice. Hence, even if all of them received an order or pressure to let Matra win, 
 The interview with TP03.401
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we cannot conclude that the political factor was the most critical reason for Matra's 
victory.   However, I cannot exclude the possibility that the Taiwanese government struck 
a deal with  Matra and French government because the DORTS has not opened the 
record of the bid at the specific request of Commissioner Chi and the committee 
members.  This suggests that the decision was extremely sensitive politically.  In any 402
event the technical choice and the DORTS’ ambition to be autonomous had dramatic 
consequences for Matra, the DORTS, and Taipei City. 
Figure 7.1: Sumitomo’s technical proposal of the NTS.  
 Wang, “Lost in Arbitration!” December 3, 2000.402
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Figure 7.2: Mitsui’s booklet in Chinese within its technical proposal of the Monorail 
Figure 7.3: The UTDC’s technical proposal of the Skytrain. 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Figure 7.4: The GEC’s technical proposal 
Figure 7.5:  Westinghouse’ technical proposal 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Figure 7.6: Matra’s technical proposal. Note how the program controls a train. 
Fire on the Tracks 
	 May 5th, 1993. The DORTS and Matra’s engineers were testing the VAL256 hoping 
that the Brown Line could be open to the citizens soon.  Construction had begun five 
years earlier with the promise that the Line would be completed in three years as Matra 
had done in Lille. As a train drew into the Xinhai Station (辛亥站), one of the darkest 
moments in  DORTS history occurred. The train’s second married pairs’ tires exploded, 
and the train caught  fire. No one got hurt in the accident since no passenger was in the 
trains at the time.  The DORTS was testing the system, and the system was driverless. 
Matra’s engineers thought the brake system caused the accident tried to fix it during the 
test phase.  However, on September 24, 1993, a tire explosion and fire accident 403
happened again, leading to the suspension of the test. To pray for safety for the nearly-
completed Brown Line, the DORTS asked a famous Taoist temple which is close to the 
Brown Line to hold a ceremony asking the gods to bless the metro line on September 13, 
 Wang, I-chung. “Matra Submitted the First Report of the Fire Accident「馬特拉」送出第一次火403
燒車報告” The United News, October 2, 1993.
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1994 . But, on September 24, 1995 there was another  tire explosion a year to the day 404
from the previous accident, though there was no fire this time.

	 The fire accidents and tire explosions were only the most severe problems on the 
Brown Line. The   quality of the product and the cost of the construction also raised 
severe doubts and criticisms. The subsequent delay of the opening of this metro line, 
which was supposed to be the first line of the Taipei Metro, led to a crisis of trust in the 
DORTS and the whole metro system. In the election for mayor in 1994, the Brown Line’s 
problems naturally became a hot spot. This was the first election of the mayor of Taipei 
City since Taipei became a special municipality in 1967, and it was also the first election 
of both of the special municipality (Taipei and Kaohsiung) and Taiwan Province in Taiwan. 
As the capital of this country, Taipei’s election received most attention in the press, and  
the crisis of the Brown Line made headlines nationwide. The candidates from the 
opposition parties, Chen Shui-bian from the Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) and Jaw 
Shaw-kong (趙少康) from the New Party, sharply criticized the KMT’s Mayor Huang Ta-
chou (黃大洲) for the Brown Line. Facing rivals’ attacks, Mayor Huang and the DORTS 
delivered a white book to explain the process of the construction of the Brown Line . 405
However, the two rivals even claimed that they would not open the Brown Line or would 
even demolish it. Finally, Huang and Jaw lost to Chen, and the Brown Line seemed to be 
in danger. 

	 Before we start to discuss how the DORTS and the Brown Line overcame the 
crisis, why the fire accidents happened needs explaining. In the bid for the system for the 
Brown Line, Matra promised that the VAL256 could run 4-car trains, and it could run 6-car 
trains in the future if necessary so that it won the bid for the system’s capacity. This 
promise had two outcomes. First, every station’s platform on the Brown Line had 
additional length for the future expansion to 6-car trains. Second, Matra modified the train 
control program. Matra did not develop a new program for the 4-car trains. It slightly 
modified its VAL208 to meet the promise. In the VAL256, a 2-car train as a married pair 
was still defined as a unit, and the Matra connected two married pairs as one train. 
Ideally, once the married pair ahead received an order from the control center, it would 
 Shiao, Yuan-chung 蕭元鍾. “Praying for Safety Not Escaping from Adversity 大拜拜 祈消災 劫404
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send the same order to the one behind so that the train would operate smoothly like the 
trains in the VAL208 in Lille and O’Hare Airport .
406
	 However, if the connection between the first married pair and the second one 
malfunctioned, a tire explosion and even a fire accident could occur. Although the cars of 
the VAL256 were like a huge bus due to its rubber tires and disc brakes, the operation of 
the brake system was different to that of automobiles. In the case of an automobile, the 
brake is off unless the driver steps on the brake peddle or pulls the hand brake.   The 
logic is reversed in the VAL system. The car’s brake is always on unless the car receives 
an order to move. Also, the second married pair could not send a message of its situation 
to the first one, so the system could not stop the train if there was a malfunction in the 
second married pair . What happened in the fire accidents and tire explosions was this. 407
When the connection between the two married pairs was out of order, and the system 
ordered the trains to move, the first married pair would release its brakes and move 
forward while the second married pair would still hold its brake on, and was dragged by 
the first married-pair because it did not receive an order to move. Thus, the second 
married pair’s rubber tires would cause friction directly with the concrete tracks without 
rolling, generating heat that exploded the tires and caused a fire . Matra erred in 408
checking  the brake system instead of the connection system after the first fire accident 
happened, and whole scenario soon repeated itself. 

	 Taoist gods could not solve this problem, but Matra and the DORTS could. They 
did three things to overcome the problem. First, they installed a temperature sensor on 
each tire’s brake disc;  the system would be shut down if the sensor detected the  
temperature as being too high, preventing the first married pair from keeping dragging the 
second pair. Second, they refined the connection between the two married pairs. Third, 
they set a coasting mode for the trains. When trains were leaving a station, the motors 
would drive the trains and then stop immediately, so, when the brake was off, the trains 
would slide for a few seconds. In these moments, the system would check if the brake 
was on or not, and the trains would move forward again if brakes were off; if the system 
found that brakes were on, it would stop the trains, and the operator would send 
technicians to check the trains . Moreover, a member of the faculty of National Tsing 409
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Hua University (NTHU, 國立清華大學) found a different design of the rubber tire provided 
by Michelin, and persuaded Matra and Michelin to change to a more muscular tire for the 
VAL256 . 
410
Even though the braking problem was solved, the future of the Brown Line was still 
unknown because the DPP had won the election and because citizens no longer trusted 
Matra. . The technical problem was solved, but the technopolitical problem was newborn 
causing even more headaches for the DORTS. 
Figure 7.7: The communication design of two married-pairs in the VAL256  411
We Pull it! 
	 December 25, 1994.  Chen Chui-bian took office as mayor of Taipei. How he would 
deal with the Brown Line became one of the focuses of his decision making, especially as 
he once mentioned that he would not let the Brown Line open during the election 
campaign . However, Taipei City Government set up an ad hoc committee, the Brown 
 Li, Yen-fu 李彥甫, ” The Brown Line Works! Research Institute Took the Lead! 木柵線成行 研究410
單位居首功” The United News, September 27, 1997.
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Line Investigation Committee (臺北捷運系統木柵線體檢委員會),  to investigate the Brown 
Line instead of tearing it down directly or suspending the plans for its future operation. 
The committee had 20 members divided into four technical groups, including civil 
engineering, electromechanical, operation, and system integration. The members 
included faculty from Taiwan’s universities, high-level engineers employed by international 
consultants, and experts from an automation technology corporation. One of the 
committee members was the general manager of Lille Metro, which was the first metro 
system using the VAL . The committee specially focused on the quality of the 412
architecture, noise problem, and the most critical problem, the causes of the tire 
explosions and subsequent fires.  With the metro line almost ready, the Brown Line 
committee spent two months reviewing all the problems mentioned during the 
construction and test and concluded that the Brown Line was ready to open to the public 
if the problems they listed in the report could be solved although the committee did not 
think much of the Brown Line’s planning and design .
413
	 Although the Brown Line Investigation Committee’s endorsement saved the Brown 
Line from being demolished, its report revealed the strong tension between the DORTS, 
Matra, and the newly established Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation (TRTC). The system 
integration group of the committee pointed out that the TRTC blamed the DORTS for 
signing a contract made it difficult to buy spare parts and maintenance manuals from 
Matra. On the other hand, the DORTS argued that the TRTC refused to take over the 
system without even trying to make the system better, since all it did was to rely on 
Matra. The report showed that the committee members often needed to be peacemakers 
in the meeting with the DORTS, Matra, and the TRTC, failing the meetings were 
suspended to stop dramatic arguing between the stakeholders . Matra condemned the 414
TRTC for not training its technicians did not follow the system maintainers rules . The 415
report also showed that local Taiwanese contractors were one factor causing the delay. 
The committee members admitted that the construction quality was as good as that used 
in the VAL system . For example, the pavement of concrete track was not smooth, and 416
some of the gaps between tracks were too wide so that the cars’ rubber tires could be 
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damaged, contributing tire explosions . Last but not least, the Taipei City Council kept 417
asking the DORTS to request Matra for compensation for the fire accidents, though 
DORTS held back the reimbursement payment due to the general delay and under 
political pressure . The system seemed to be ready to go, but this highly automated 418
transit system needed all partners needed to bury their differences in the name of for 
safety and efficiency so that the tension among them, especially the relationship between 
Matra and its Taiwanese clients, would not put successful  future operation at risk. 

	 In this situation, the Taipei City Government decided to open the Brown Line to the 
public on February 27, 1996, for a free test ride, and, after refining the disadvantages that 
emerged during the test drive, the TRTC began to operate the first metro line in Taiwan’s 
history. On March 28, the Brown Line officially opened for operation, and Taiwan finally 
owned its metro system after three-decade-long discussion and planning. 

On April 17 and 18, the president of Matra’s Taiwan branch visited the Mayor Chen 
Shui-bian and the Deputy Mayor Chen Shih-meng (陳師孟) who was in charge of the 
Brown Line’s problems, He warned the Taipei City Government that the firm  might 
withdraw all its technicians from Taipei if the Taipei City Government insisted in holding 
back NTD 1 billion down payment. The DORTS and Matra were ready to sign the contract 
for maintenance and parts supply for the Brown Line. However, the Taipei City 
Government hoped that Matra to treat the down-payment and the maintenance contract 
independently from the main contract It mentioned that the Brown Line still had problems 
of noise, brakes, and lack of software so that it could not pay the down-payment to 
Matra .
419
	 On May 30, 1996, Matra abruptly withdrew all of its technicians from Taipei without 
signing the maintenance contract. The VAL system contained many parts and software 
which were protected by patents so that  Matra was the only source. It was also difficult 
to imagine that Taipei could run the Brown Line without Matra since Taipei was a novice in 
running a metro system. Even before Matra left Taipei, outages occurred twice on the 
Brown Line, showing that the VAL256 was still unstable . Moreover, the Brown Line was 420
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in operation, so there would be a political storm if the Brown Line were shut down due to 
Matra’s leaving. Matra seemed to hold all the bards in its negotiation with the Taipei City 
Government, and Taiwan, as a catching-up country in the field of metro technology, had 
no weapons  to fight back. Even the Chairman of the TRTC said that the Brown Line’s 
service might last for only half of a year without Matra, and the Brown Line had 
malfunctioned four times from December 1996 to January 1997 . The shutdown of the 421
Brown Line and Taipei’s surrender was imminent.

	 Nonetheless, in 1998, the Brown Line received the ISO9002 quality certification 
showing that the Brown Line survived and provided stable service after Matra’s 
departure . What did the DORTS and the TRTC do to make this happen? In historian of 422
technology Thomas Hughes’ words, the VAL256 was a system with hard technological 
momentum because it was protected by the interweaving of knowledge, artifacts, and a 
legal system.   Matra was supposed to have power over Taipei City, pressuring the City 
Government to pay the down-payment. Instead the DORTS and the TRTC got control of 
the system and made it work smoothly, making Matra redundant. How?

 First, when the tension between Taipei City Government and Matra emerged, the 
DORTS and the TRTC anticipated that Matra might withdraw its technicians as a strategy 
to threaten Taipei City to pay the down-payment, So the TRTC’s engineers stealthily 
copied Matra’s latest version of the control program whenever the Matra sent a new 
version from France to the Brown Line’s control center. Thus, when Matra’s technicians 
suddenly left the control center, the TRTC simultaneously installed the copied program 
into the sections running the system, so the Brown Line was not shut down despite 
Matra’s action . 
423
Second, the TRTC invited a local computer manufacturer, MiTAC (神通電腦) to 
study the functions of the VAL256’s motherboards and chips controlling the system and 
then rewrote the program into the parts manufactured by the MiTAC or purchased from 
other suppliers so that they could replicate the system’s parts without breaking Matra’s 
patents . The TRTC found that many parts in the VAL256 were to standard 424
specifications, and it believed that Taiwan, as the primary manufacturer of electronic 
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products worldwide, could manufacture these parts. Therefore, it sent its engineers to 
Taiwan’s biggest computer electronic parts market, Guang Hua Digital Plaza (光華商場) , 425
to collect necessary parts for the system. Sometimes the engineers could not directly find 
the parts they needed, but the dealers in Guang Hua Digital Plaza could use their 
international connections to get the parts from other countries . 
426
Finally, because the copied program was not the best version, so that the system 
might crash due to bugs inside the program, the TRTC would shut down the system at 
midnight once a year and reinstall the program since it found the system would crash 
after 13-months of operation . 
427
	 The digital clock in the control center was fixed at the date and the time when 
Matra’s engineers and technicians left , but the trains on the Brown Line kept running, 428
and passengers kept riding and leaving the metro line. In a seminar on the future of the 
Brown Line held after Matra withdrew its technical assistance, the vice president of 
Matra’s Taiwan branch claimed that the security of the Brown Line was problematic and 
that Matra would not take any responsibility if any accident happened . However, no 429
accident happened after the Taiwanese modified the system making the VAL256 a 
Franco-Taiwanese metro system. 

In October 1998, Siemens acquired Matra Transportation, but did not recognize the 
legal conflict between Taipei City Government and Matra. Nonetheless, the merger 
brought a change to the Brown Line. In April 1999, Siemens agreed to sell the VAL256’s 
parts to the TRTC, and it signed a maintenance contract for the electronic parts in the 
system. The contract value was NTD11,000,000(about USD3.3 million) while Matra asked 
NTD300,000,000(about USD30 million) for the same contract when it withdrew its 
technicians three years earlier . Taipei had reversed the power relationship with Matra 430
thanks to Taiwanese engineers and technical officials’ strategies and actions, creating a 
metro system which was built by the French but reborn by the Taiwanese. The mayor of 
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Taipei City from 1994 to 1998 and the future president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, left a 
sentence memorized by many Taiwanese precisely depicting the story: “ If Matra doesn’t 
pull, we pull! (馬特拉不拉，我們自己拉)”

The Resolution: CBTC 
	 Siemens’ supply of parts did not solve the Brown Line’s problems thoroughly. First, 
the TRTC was still using the train control program with bugs even though the Brown Line 
was temporarily stable. Second, the core parts of the system were protected by Matra’s 
patents meaning the TRTC could not gain any upgrades since the Taipei City Government 
and Matra were still in a lawsuit. Finally, the Brown Line had an extension plan to connect 
the Taipei Song Shan Airport, Neihu District, and downtown Taipei City. If the DORTS 
directly used the VAL256 to build an extension line, Siemens would be the only supplier 
so that the price of the system would be extremely high. If the DORTS decided to change 
the system, the Brown Line needed to be shut down for a long time, causing congestion 
on the route. Furthermore, after the conflicts and controversies with Matra, Matra already 
had a terrible reputation among Taiwanese, so there would be a political storm if the 
DORTS chose the same system to build an extension line even though Siemens merged 
with  Matra Transportation.

	 However, the City Government and Council had once considered planning a 
different line in Neihu District in 1993 when the fire accidents happened, although the 
DORTS planned to extend the Brown Line into Neihu gaining the City Council’s approval 
in 1989 . In 1999, after years-long discussion, the DORTS founded an ad hoc team to 431
study the possible options for the metro line in Neihu listing five alternative options, four 
were an extension of other regular railway metro lines, and one was an independent 
automated transit line. But, the DORTS found that the alternative options would increase 
the cost of construction too much and that the regular railway transit system was not 
suitable for Neihu due to Neihu’s narrow streets. Furthermore, an independent driverless 
metro line was unrealistic and expensive . Finally, after the DORTS released a poll 432
showing that over 70% of the residents of Neihu agreed with the original plan, the 
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extension of the Brown Line, the City Government and City Council decided to extend the 
Brown Line into Neihu in 2001. Moreover, Taipei City Government modified the plan for 
the extension of the Brown Line, adding one station in Taipei Song Shan Airport, ensuring 
the final plan of the extension metro line in 2001 .
433
	 The cost and environment of Neihu were only two of the reasons to keep the 
extension plan;  the Brown Line’s system was also a reason for supporting this plan. The 
Neihu extension plan was both a problem and an opportunity for the DORTS. If the 
DORTS continued to use the VAL256 on the Neihu extension section, Siemens would ask 
a high price thanks to its monopoly status. The high price obviously would create a 
severe political storm for the DORTS and Taipei City Government. But, building an 
extension line could also be an opportunity to replace the VAL256 with a newer system. If 
the replacement was successful, the DORTS could not only upgrade the Brown Line’s 
system but also escape from the problematic VAL system. The problem was that 
changing the system should not lead to the suspension of the Brown Line’s ongoing 
service because the Brown Line was serving too many passengers to be stopped. To 
fulfill the demands required by changing the system while retaining an ongoing service, 
the DORTS found a new train control technology: communication-based train control 
(CBTC) .
434
	 CBTC means the central control center sends orders to trains through 
communication channels like optical fibers instead of using analogical signals. In other 
words, CBTC is the application of internet technology in rail mass transportation. At the 
time of the advent of the VAL or other driverless systems, the computing power and 
communication speed were not powerful enough to control trains automatically so that 
these systems needed to use analogical signals for sending orders, and their programs 
needed to work with equipment like TLA, or the control center could not control its trains. 
This imposed limitations on the systems. For example, the VAL’s trains’ speed was fixed, 
meaning the control center could not order them to speed up during running because it 
was a given that a train would pass one TLA for a particular time. Thus, only the size of 
TLA loops could determine its speed, and the TLA was fixed on tracks. Moreover, the 
systems using analogical signals could control trains with fixed block, so how many trains 
could run on the line was also determined. On the other hand, CBTC could use moving 
blocks allowing more trains on the line at the same time. Moreover, CBTC’s wayside 
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equipment would not conflict with those belonging to analogical systems. Although only a 
few systems were using CBTC technology in the 2000s, the DORTS decided to introduce 
CBTC to thoroughly solve the Brown Line’s problem .
435
	 The DORTS took the following strategies for determining which system would win 
the business of the extension of the metro line. First, it combined the civil engineering bid 
and system bid into one rather than two separate bids. Taiwanese engineering companies 
needed to find an international system provider on their own so that the DORTS could 
avoid judging the systems directly. Thus, if Siemens did not get the business, it could not 
blame the DORTS. Moreover, the court finally determined that the Taipei City Government 
needed to give the down-payment with interest (NTD 1 billion in total) to Matra because 
the court thought the local constructors delayed Matra instead of Matra itself. To avoid a 
similar situation, asking constructors to manage their system providers would be the right 
choice. Second, the DORTS did not exclude the VAL or similar systems, but it also 
includes CBTC as an acceptable option. Therefore, if the Siemens wanted to win the bid, 
it needed to lower its cost. Third, the DORTS asked the system providers to integrate the 
existing VAL256 system and the new system without shutting down the whole Brown 
Line. The DORTS anticipated that Siemens would seek a higher price for providing the 
VAL to the extension line so that the local constructor winning the bid would not choose 
it . As the DORTS expected, the Bombardier became the system provider, and it 436
planned to install its automated transit system with CBTC technology, CITYFLO650, on 
the Brown Line.  

	 Building the extension line in Neihu and installing CITYFLO650 on the existing line 
was not a big challenge, while the Brown Line continued to serve its passengers.  Testing 
was.  Since the existing section would be integrated into the new system, the TRTC 
needed to shut down the VAL256 letting the Bombardier’s trains, the Bombardier 
INNOVIA APM 256, run on the existing tracks when the DORTS and the Bombardier 
tested the new system. Therefore, they could only use off hours to test the system and 
trains. When the construction entered the testing stage, the Bombardier and the DORTS 
designed a switch system. In the service hours, the Brown Line still used the existing 
VAL256 to provide service; after service ended, the DORTS would send its engineers to 
all the stations switching the system from the VAL256 to the CITYFLO650 starting the 
test. When the service hours approached, they switched the system back again. The 
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DORTS and the Bombardier even refined the switch, making it change system 
automatically . Therefore, when the DORTS and Bombardier tested the new system, the 437
Brown Line had two systems, though passengers did not know it.

	 In the final stage, the TRTC shut down the whole Brown Line at weekends to verify 
the functions and the trains of the CITYFLO650 for two months, and the TRTC also shut 
down the Brown Line during the Chinese New Year for testing in February 2009. After the 
test, Taipei City Government decided to open the Neihu extension section and the new 
CITYFLO650 to the public in May 2009. However, compared to the VAL256, the test of 
the CITYFLO650 was not that thorough before it opened. In the case of the VAL256, the 
DORTS and Matra ran the trains 24 hours per day continually for 14 days at once, 
verifying the system’s functions and liability  while the DORTS only tested CITYFLO650 438
over 24 hours on several weekends before it started to provide service. Furthermore, the 
VAL256 for the first phase of the Brown Line was simply a system installed on the metro 
line, while the CITYFLO650 was integrated with the existing system so that the 
complexity and difficulty of installing the later on the Brown Line in the 2000s were higher 
than the former in 1990s. 

Taipei City Government paid the price for the decision to open the extension line 
just after the opening  of the new system. On July 4, the opening day of the extension line 
and the new system, the Brown Line was stopped for 9 minutes because of an alarm 
triggered by an obstacle on the track. The next day, the same thing happened again, 
leading to a service suspension for 8 minutes. On July 10, the Brown Line experienced a  
power outage for more than 8 hours due to the malfunction of the uninterruptible power 
system (UPS) and the following cyber storm. This time passengers got out of the trains 
and walked on the tracks to leave the metro system. In the following months, the Brown 
Line experienced outages and dysfunctions ten times, leading to the resignation of the 
commissioner of the DORTS and to the public’s distrust of to the system. The Brown Line 
seemed to face another failure, and a technopolitical disaster before the problem of the 
VAL256 was solved, though this hybrid metro Line finally reached over 99% liability in 
2010, confirming the success of the system replacement.

	 The most critical outage of the system on July 10 was caused by the malfunction 
of the UPS and a cyber storm of the communication system. The latter was caused by 
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the former. In the beginning, the Brown Line’s power system for one zone  of the line 439
experienced an outage. Ideally, the UPS should take it over, introducing power from the 
city’s power supply system. But the UPS provider did not use this design,  directly 
providing power from its battery. When the battery was out of power, this zone was shut 
down. At this time, one train was on the edge of the zone without power and in another 
zone, so the system found that it could not receive a signal from the train leading to an 
abnormal situation in the system. The system kept asking for signals through different 
communication channels, trying to find the train and exhausting its computing power, 
creating a cyber storm. The consequence of the cyber storm was that the control center 
could not find any train on its monitor, so the manager of the control center pushed the 
emergency button turning off the whole system . 
440
Besides the design of the UPS, the harsh construction environment also 
contributed to the showdown and cyber storm. Too much dust caused short-circuits in 
the electronic components . The DORTS, the TRTC, and the Bombardier refined the 441
system to reach the goal of a stable system. First, for the outage caused by the 
malfunction of the UPS, the DORTS took two actions. It added one more UPS for the 
system and separated the power supply system into two, one for the train controlling 
system and another one for other usages like escalators, lights, and the ticket system. 
The DORTS also asked the UPS provider to modify its design. Second, the DORTS found 
that it would be impossible to solve the problem of dust on electronic components, so it 
asked the Bombardier to upgrade the communication system. After the upgrading, if 
electronic components crashed due to dust, the cyber storm would not happen because 
the communication system had higher computing power and broader bandwidth so that 
signals could be sent smoothly .
442
	 The DORTS and Bombardier knew that they could build a stable system on the 
Brown Line if they had enough time to test the system finding problems and solving them 
so that passengers would not face the inconvenience of persistent technical problems . 443
However, the mayor of Taipei City at the time, Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌), decided to open the 
extension line in May 2009 rather than later. Why did Mayor Hau decide to do so? The 
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municipal election in December 2010 might be the reason. In 2010, Mayor Hau was 
campaigning for reelection, and, if there was any problem in the newly opened extension 
line and the system, he would face harsh criticism from his opponents .  Problems on a 
new system could be expected, especially the CITYFLO650 that was a system integrating 
an old one, and citizens would once be frustrated by the metro’s problems. Thus, opening 
the system earlier became a reasonable strategy. Although the passengers would 
experience the outage and shutdown of the system, the citizens would find that the 
reborn Brown Line finally became stable by the time  the election came around so that the 
mayor could claim that he had solved the problem of the Brown Line. We do not have 
evidence to establish how Mayor Hau made the decision, so the argument above is 
deduced from a technopolitical analysis. Indeed, Mayor Hau won the election.

Changing Brains 
	 One more problem remained unsolved of the hybrid metro despite the opening of 
the extension line and the CITYFLO650: the 51 married pairs of the VAL256. When the 
Neihu extension line was opened to public, only the Bombardier’s INNOVA APM 256 (101 
married-pairs) provided service. Because the Brown Line had been suffering from 
congestion since it opened in 1996, the trains of VAL256 left by Matra were needed for 
transportation on the Brown Line. However, these trains were specially designed and 
manufactured for the VAL system. Moreover, these trains were made in the 1980s when 
train control and communication were using analog signals rather than digital signals. 
Therefore, how to integrate them with the CITYFLO650 became a critical challenge.

	 First, the TRTC transferred one married pair to the DORTS, and the DORTS and 
Bombardier’s engineers installed a machine on the married pair, letting the machine 
record the functions of every wire on the car on the testing track with the VAL256 system 
on the bottom of the train on the Brown Line. Then, according to the information recorded 
by the machine, the Bombardier manufactured the prototype of the control and 
communication system for the trains that was compatible with the CITYFLO650 and 
installed it on the married pair,  testing it on the track with the CITYFLO650 system. 
During the test, the DORTS and Bombardier’s engineers modified the system on the 
married pair piece by piece . If the test of this married pair was successful, Bombardier 444
would go on manufacturing the “new brains” for the other 50 married pairs. However, 
after three long years of work, the DORTS and Bombardier still could not precisely 
replicate the acceleration and brake curves of the VAL256’s married pair, which showed 
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how to speed up and slow down the cars. Without exact acceleration and brake curves, 
the engineers could not write a control program making the married pair stop at the 
precise point so that the car's doors could match the platform’s automatic doors. In 2009, 
the Bombardier almost abandoned the plan of modifying Matra’s train .
445
	 Finally, Bombardier found engineers who had once worked for Matra and Alstom 
and hired them to modify of the cars. Because of these engineers’ familiarity with the 
cars, the DORTS and Bombardier quickly solved the problem of the acceleration and 
brake curve, making Matra’s train precisely speed up and stop under the Bombardier’s 
control system . Then, the DORTS and Bombardier removed the VAL256 system from 446
the VAL256’s trains, installing “new brains” on them. After a six-month-long test, these 
cars were returned to duty in December 2010. It was the birth of the only “hybrid Metro” 
in the world. Among all the automated transit systems in the world, the Brown Line of the 
Taipei Metro was the only one running two types of cars that were manufactured by two 
different companies in two different countries. Today, we can see both the VAL256 and 
the Bombardier INNOVA APM 256 running on the Brown Line’s track automatically and 
precisely at the same time. It was a happy end to a process marked by a series of 
accidents, political storms, transnational conflicts, and stealthy technological innovations. 
Be it intentionally or not, the DORTS, the TRTC, the Bombardier, and, in some sense, 
even Matra and Siemens were involved in this decades-long formation of technological 
hybridity.
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Figure 7.8: the Matra’s train (right) and Bombardier’s train (left)  447
The technological Hybridity of Systems  
	 December 15, 1996, about 9 months after the Brown Line opened to the public, 
the Jacksonville Transportation Authority (JTA) shut down its VAL system on the Skyway 
automated metro because it failed to negotiate with Matra for the extension project. 
Bombardier Transportation won the contract to replace the VAL system and the extension 
project in 1994, and the Skyway was transformed into an automated monorail system. 
The JTA sold the VAL’s cars to Chicago O’Hare International Airport. The VAL’s first urban 
metro system out of France ended. The Brown Line faced not only the challenge of 
extension but also experienced accidents on the tracks and legal conflicts with tMatra. 
However, the DORTS and the TRTS did not shut down the system or pay the Matra to 
solve the problems of the Brown Line. Instead, they built and ran a “hybrid metro.” 
Coincidently, Bombardier’s systems were the alternatives for the two cities’ VAL systems, 
but Taipei’s story shows how a catching-up country used hybrid strategies to change the 
power relationship with the technologically advanced country. Furthermore, we should not 
forget that the birth of the Brown Line was a product of Taiwan’s international politico-
economic context in the 1980s.

	 Thomas Hughes’ idea of technological system and technological momentum can 
help us to understand how the Taiwanese used hybrid strategies to change its power 
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relationship with the Matra. Hughes states that technological systems solve problems or 
fulfill goals using whatever means are available and appropriate; the problems have to do 
mostly with reordering the physical world in ways considered useful or desirable, at least 
by those designing or employing a technological system . Moreover, Hughes does not 448
regard the technological system as a static object. Instead, he notices that the interaction 
of technological systems and society is not symmetrical over time. Evolving technological 
systems are time-dependent. As the technological system became larger and more 
complex, thereby gathering momentum, the system became less shaped by, and more 
the shaper of, its environment . Hughes also reminds his readers that technological 449
systems both have the technical core and social core . The VAL, or any other metro 450
system, is a technological system, but the VAL was a system with hard momentum in the 
late 1980s when Matra introduced it to Taipei. First, the VAL became mature after it 
successfully proved its efficiency as a reliable automated people moving system in many 
airports and as an urban metro system in Lille. Moreover, the system was legally 
protected by the patent system so that no one could easily replicate the components of 
the system. Finally, Matra, which was a huge technology corporation, sought to reap the 
rewards of any success of this system. In Hughes’ word, the VAL was a “seamless web.” 
What the DORTS could do for Taiwan’s development of the metro system was to upgrade 
its constructors’ ability with the help of the VAL’s technological momentum .
451
	 However, as Chang’s case study of the Brown Line shows, when the VAL traveled 
to Taiwan, it faced the integration with Taiwan’s material and social context leading to a 
reverse salient of the technological system . That is to say, the VAL’s momentum was 452
weakened in the process of its transplantation into Taipei. The fire accidents and tire 
explosions were evidence of this fact. The accidents triggered the conflicts between the 
DORTS and Matra, and Matra tried to use the VAL’s momentum to leverage its power 
pressuring the DORTS to compensate it for its loss in the accidents and their conflicts. 
But, the DORTS and the TRTC chose to make the Brown Line hybrid instead of turning to 
Matra to overcome the reverse salient of the VAL256 system. In the first phase, the 
DORTS and the TRTC mobilized local resources to break through the bottleneck of the 
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operation of the VAL256 making the Brown Line a Franco-Taiwanese metro system. Then, 
when facing the extension issue of the Neihu section as Jacksonville once experienced, 
the DORTS introduced Bombardier Transportation and its CBTC technology, finishing the 
second phase of the making of the hybrid metro. Therefore, although the DORTS and 
Taiwanese did not mean to do so at the very beginning, they exploited the weakened 
technological momentum to reverse or at least to change the power relationship between 
them and Matra by making the Brown Line a Taiwanese-Franco-Canadian hybrid metro. 
The hybrid metro and the making of it are at once a  strategy and an outcome. Although 
the Taiwanese were facing a French company instead of the American hegemony, they 
chose similar strategies to deal with both, from which technological hybridity emerged.

	 The accomplishment of the Brown Line is also a story of innovation, but the 
innovation was not driven by ambitious goals of changing a city, or a country’s 
environment, even though this was the goal the Taiwanese wanted to reach by 
introducing the automated transit system into Taipei. Instead, it was Taiwan’s catching-up 
status and lack of ability on metro technology that forced the DORTS, the TRTC, other 
Taiwanese engineers, and even the Bombardier to embark on innovation. Thus although 
the DORTS successfully solved the Brown Line’s problems left by Matra, the DORTS and 
other metro authorities set up processes and institutions to prevent the problems 
happening again on the Brown Line. For example, the Taiwanese government set up an 
institution to directly contract with the system provider of a metro line for a possible 
extension so that it did not need to face the system integration issues like those in the 
Brown Line. The Yellow Line of the Taipei Metro  and the light rail system in New Taipei 453
City will be the first results of establishing institution . The DORTS might be proud of its 454
achievement, but it does not want to relive the experience of the Brown Line!  
 The Yellow Line was open to the public in January 2020. It is also a metro line with an 453
automated transit system. According to the DORTS’ plan, the Yellow Line will become a circle line 
connecting outskirt of Taipei Metropolitan so that the extension will be vital issue. If its extension 
plan is approved, the DORTS could directly contract the system provider, Hitachi Italy, under 
particular limitation rather than open a bid to all possible system providers. 
 The interview with TP01.454
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Chapter 8: The People 




“This the first light rail train made in Taiwan, ‘!(Cruising Warrior) Shingwuje’[……] The road of 
‘national trains made by the nations’ will continue! (這就是台灣第一輛國產的輕軌捷運車輛，
「行武者號」！[......]「國車國造」的路，還要走下去！)—”Eric Chu Li-lun (朱立倫), the 
Mayor of New Taipei City (2010-2018). 
“The MRT space for the performance of this new citizenry has created an ‘MRT tribe’ (jieyunzu) of 
everyday riders who embody well-disciplined and prideful behavior—they are smart, efficient, and 
considerate participants in the running of the city. “ Joseph R. Allen, 2012. 455
	 In May 2012, a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator suggested amending 
the Mass Rapid Transit Act to allow passengers to drink water in metro systems because 
drinking water was essential for human wellbeing and it would not cause any pollution in 
the trains and the station. He emphasized that drinking water and eating food in metros 
systems was allowed in advanced countries like the U.S., Canada, European countries, 
and Japan so that Taiwan should not insist on the rule. In Taiwan drinking water and 
eating in metro systems was against the law, and people who did so so were fined. The 
suggestion was severely criticized and many concerns were expressed. “Then, there 
would be people asking to eat meals in the metro system!” “It is too hard to tell the 
difference between water and liquor!” Interestingly, earlier in January, the Kaohsiung 
Metro (this legislator was elected in Kaohsiung) released propaganda urging people not to 
drink water, to sell goods, or to eat food in the metro system . Finally, as with many 456
such initiatives in the past, and in the future, the law remains the same. Taiwanese still do 
not want people to drink water in their metro systems. Taiwanese are enthusiastic about 
 Allen, R. Joseph. Taipei: City of Displacements. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 455
Pp. 88.
 https://www.ettoday.net/news/20120506/44276.htm. Accessed on January 22, 2020.456
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keeping the metro’s environment clean. They also spend much time and effort to define 
orders and etiquette in metro systems.

	 In this chapter, we discuss how the Taiwanese have shaped the Taipei Metro and 
other metro systems into a clean, highly ordered, and respectful environment. I argue that 
the phenomenon was derived from the Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City 
Government (DORTS), and the Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation’s (TRTC)’s ambition to 
build a “progressive” and “advanced” metro system to change Taipei and Taiwan. 
Moreover, the making of the environment of the metro and the metro system itself 
generated the standards of what metro space should be and were made an issue national 
pride about the metro in Taiwan. Furthermore, when other cities were building their metro 
systems, they also followed wanted to create beautiful architectures for their metro 
systems and to build neat spaces within the systems. The rail transportation systems like 
the TRA (Taiwan Railways Administration) and the Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR) also 
aim to follow the Taipei Metro’s experience to improve management and the customer’s 
experience of the ride. However, Taiwanese do not entirely like the construction of the 
metro systems in Taiwan despite their admiration for the systems. This chapter tells the 
story from the opening of the Taipei Metro and describes how people have participated in 
interpreting and shaping the metro system.

Safe, Clean, and On Time 
	 In 1987, the Deputy Commissioner of the DORTS at the time, Wu Meng-kuei (吳夢
桂), his colleagues in the DORTS, and a few of Taipei City councilors started visited Korea, 
Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong to study options for the metro systems for the future 
Taipei Metro. The trip lasted for two weeks, and the metro study group carefully recorded 
how these metro systems were built, and how these cities managed their metro systems. 
Except for the metro systems in Seoul and Tokyo, the systems they visited including 
Osaka’s New Tram, Kitakyushu’s Monorail, Singapore’s MRT (Mass Rapid Transit), and 
Hong Kong’s MTR (Mass Transit Railway), had been recently built. In his report on this 
trip, the Deputy Commissioner Wu wrote, “take ‘new’ as the initial point with pioneer’s 
determination to build ‘the culture of the metro’ to stimulate the construction of the Taipei 
Metro glorifying the first chapter of the history of the Taipei Metro. ”  He went on to say, 457
 Wu, Meng-kuei 吳夢桂, Liu, Te-li 劉德黎, and Tieh, Tai-chih 帖台之. The Trip of Metro in 457
Northeast and Southeast Aisa: the Investigation Report of the metro in Korea, Japan, Singapore, 
and Hong Kong 《東北南亞捷運行》. (Taipei: The Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City 
Government 臺北市政府捷運工程局,1987), Pp. 124.
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“Anyway, be new, be progressive, be thoughtful, be ambitious. We can emphasize our 
national feature and our specialty, but we did not invent the metro system, so we should, 
in the principle of choosing the best and the latest, collect all the advantages of others 
catching up but not left behind. The only advantage of catching up is not to repeat other’s 
painful steps in their experiences and failures. We must especially not only think about the 
metro as such but also its added value That is to say, the metro is the basis, but what will 
the metro bring about? That is what we should care about! ” 
458
	 As we discussed in chapter 4, this kind of ambition illustrated in Deputy 
Commissioner Wu’s words perfectly matched the American consultants’ experience and 
ideology of building a metro system that led to the monumental architecture of the 
stations of the Taipei Metro. Initially, the technical officials tended to build something new 
in the capital, and they aimed at changing the city and even the country through building 
an advanced and inspiring metro system. The previous chapters also show that 
Taiwanese technical officials and scholars preferred the Automated Guideway Transit 
(AGT) system as a means of solving the congestion problem in Taipei because it was the 
latest metro technology at that time. The DORTS also mentioned that building the Taipei 
Metro could show the country’s technological ability and economic growth . This idea 459
was conveyed to the operator of the Taipei Metro, the TRTC, since many members of the 
newly founded metro company came from the DORTS.

	 The company set “safe,” “clean,” and “on time” as its goals . As a metro 460
company, safety must be the highest goal, but cleanliness seems to be unique in this 
case. To reach the goal of cleanliness, the TRTC set a criterion that allowed only one 
piece of paper per a number of square metes: this was to be used as a guide by the 
contractors who kept the stations and trains clean . Moreover, the TRTC also uses a 461
surveillance system to monitor the cleanliness of the station to help the cleaning 
contractors and passengers to maintain the stations’ and the trains’ cleanliness.

	 In addition to the TRTC’s effort to keep the metro’s space clean, the most crucial 
factor contributing to keeping the Taipei Metro and other metro systems in Taiwan clean 
was the Mass Rapid Transit Act (MRT Act). The MRT Act was passed in June 1988 when 
the construction of the Taipei Metro had just begun. It has been amended six times. The 
 Wu, Liu, and Tieh, Trip of Metro in Northeast and Southeast Aisa, Pp. 132-133.458
 The Department of Rapid Transit, The Q&A, Pp. 16.459
 Huang, “The Awkward Rail,” Pp. 31.460
 Huang, “The Awkward Rail,” Pp. 31.461
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main changes in the amendments define light rail as a kind of mass rapid transit, modify 
fines for misbehavior, and enforce the rights of the ‘physically challenged’ in metro 
systems. One feature of the act, the rules aiming at keeping the stations and trains clean, 
was added in an amendment in 1997 when the Brown Line and the Red Line had just 
opened to the public. According to this amendment, Article 50, paragraph 8, of the MRT 
Act stipulated that those who smoke, eat, drink, spit, spit out betel nut and waste, and 
throw waste paper, cigarette butts, gum, fruits’ waste, and other general trash would face 
a penalty of NTD1,500 to 7,500 (about USD50 to USD250). However, not all lawmakers 
supported this amendment. Tsai Huang-liang (蔡煌瑯) from the DPP argued that betel 
nuts were part of Taiwan’s national spirit so that the penalty for chewing betel nuts should 
not be written into the law, or the law would be a form of discrimination . Stella Chou (周462
筌) from the New Party and Chen Chi-Mai (陳其邁) also worried that listing eating and 
drinking in metro systems as illegal behavior in the MRT Act might be against the 
constitutional right of personal freedom . The official of the Ministry of Transportation 463
and Communication (MOTC) admitted that banning eating and drinking in metro systems 
was intended to keep metro systems clean and neat. The vice president of the TRTC, Fan 
Liang-shiow (范良銹), tried to connect the cleanliness issue with a security issue, arguing 
that the waste of food might lead to outages of metro systems . Finally, the committee 464
of transportation listed only spitting out betel nut and its waste in metro systems as 
illegal; chewing the nut was not. 

	 The driving force of this amendment was the opening of the Red Line and the 
Brown Line. First of all, the TRTC established the administrative rules to ban eating and 
drinking in the Taipei Metro. It even once banned the selling beverage and food in the 
business facilities within its stations but canceled this policy because it found it 
challenging to recruit stores into its facilities. However, not all passengers were willing to 
follow the TRTC’s rules. Many passengers still ate food, drunk beverages, smoked, and 
chewed betel nuts or gum in the metro stations. The employees of the TRTC could only 
ask them not to do so, and even that sometimes led to severe arguments with the 
passengers . To contain the disorder in the stations and trains, officials even suggested 465
 The Gazette of Legislative Yuan 《立法院公報》, Vol. 85 No.39 2861, at Pp. 212-213.462
 The Gazette of Legislative Yuan, Pp. 214-215.463
 The Gazette of Legislative Yuan, Pp. 215.464
m Yu, Hong-chen 游鴻程. “Free Riders…a Little ‘Highhanded’ 免費乘客 有些‘鴨霸’” The United 465
Evening News, March 15, 1996.
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taking pictures of those who breached the company’s rules and publishing them in 
stations . Before the amendment of the MRT Act in 1997, the TRTC sent 150 people on 466
the Brown Line to advise passengers not to eat and to drink in the metro system. After 
the amendment, on June 15, the TRTC warned 45 passengers not to eat and to drink in 
the Taipei Metro on the Red Line and emphasized that the metro police would start to fine 
those who ate and drunk in the metro system . Compared to the thousands of riders, 467
the cases of disorder seemed to be rare. In 2007, the number of penalties for eating or 
drinking in the Taipei Metro was just 231 for the whole year .
468
	 However, chewing gum and betel nuts became problematic since article 50, 
Paragraph 8, of the MRT Act only stipulated that those who spat out betel nuts and 
chewing gum would be fined, not those who merely chewed them. But, the TRTC still 
insisted on fining passengers who chewed gum or betel nuts. Faced with this situation, 
Taipei City Government reminded passengers who were fined for chewing gum or betel 
nuts to appeal and asked the MOTC to explain the law .  In 2004, the Legislative Yuan 469
amended the previous MRT Act, and chewing gum and betel nuts in metro systems 
became illegal. According to the discussion between an official and a DPP lawmaker, the 
DPP lawmaker, unlike his colleague fighting for betel nuts, even complained that the fine 
for chewing gum was not high enough because gum may increase the risk of outages of 
the metro’s equipment leading to a security issue . Chewing the “national spirit” in 470
VAL256 would be fined.

	 The people in Taipei appreciate this rule. In 2000, the Department of 
Transportation, Taipei City Government (DOT), decided to promote the policy of no food 
and drink on buses. It mentioned that many citizens told its officials that they appreciated 
the clean environment in the Taipei Metro and that many foreigners also admired it. It was 
the law forbidding eating and drinking in the metro that contributed to the clean space in 
the Taipei Metro. The DOT hoped to promote the same policy on buses. After consulting 
 Yu, Hong-chen. “Plan to Publish Photos of Eating and Drinking in Trains 車廂內飲食 擬公布照466
片” The United Evening News, April 26, 1996.
 Chou, Wei-hsin 周維新. “Warning Disorder in Metro Eating. Snack and Smoking is the Most 捷467
運違規勸導 吃零食抽菸最多," The United News, June 16, 1997.
 Chiang, Ying 姜穎. “No Food for a Clean Space Metro Rider: Proud! 禁食換乾淨空間 捷運族：468
很驕傲” The United Evening News, June 1, 2008.
 Yu, Hong-chen. “Controversy! Fined for Chewing Gum in Metro 嚼口香糖搭捷運受罰 有爭議” 469
The United Evening News, July 10, 1997.
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bus drivers, the DOT found that most bus drivers appreciated this policy. Although 
passengers would not be fined if they ate or drunk on buses because it was not against 
the law, the DOT and bus companies believed that a clean bus would make passengers 
obey the rule . A poll in 2001 showed that 86% of citizens supported the policy . 
471 472
	 Comparing the Taipei Metro’s clean environment with those in American or 
European cities became more and more common among Taiwanese. A young woman 
who traveled in London shared what she saw and felt in London’s Tube in a newspaper. 
She appreciated the Tube’s convenience though this system was old, narrow, and lacked 
fresh air. She complained about how dirty Tube stations were and how she almost sat on 
gum on a bench. She wrote, “When a train enters the station, you will see trash flying in 
the air. At that moment, the image that foreigners are more respectful of the public 
vanished." She concluded that the citizens in Taipei were lucky since they had the Taipei 
Metro, that was clean, and in which the price of a ticket was low. “The grass is not always 
greener on the other side,” she said . Taiwan’s media are also enthusiastic to report how 473
foreigners appreciate the cleanliness of the Taipei Metro. For example, the Global Views 
Monthly (遠見雜誌) translated an article by Martha Sorren. It praised the cleanliness and 
consideration of people in the Taipei Metro, especially compared with New York, where 
she had lived for seven years. She emphasized how clean the bathrooms in the stations 
are, “Someone was even cleaning the bathroom I was in when I used it, proving that it's 
actually a priority for the metro system to keep its facilities in good condition. Who knew 
the Taipei metro could turn me into the kind of person who goes to the bathroom in a 
subway? .”
474
Stand on the Right Side! 
	 Besides cleanliness, order is another target that the TRTC and many Taiwanese are 
happy to cooperate in and to maintain. The MRT Act has also played an essential role in 
this respect. Article 50 of the MRT Act listed the following behaviors in metro systems as 
being subject to a penalty (unless needed to maintain cleanliness and safety in metro 
 The United News. “The Month of Clean Bus. Promote not to Eat or Drink on Bus Next Month 471
公車環保月 下月起宣導禁食” The United News, June 21, 2000.
 Chou, Wei-hsin. “86% Support the Policy of No Food on Bus 公車禁飲食86％ 贊成” The 472
United News, May 12, 2001.
 Sophie 蘇菲. “The Taipei People’s Luck 台北人的福氣” The United News, September 20, 2000.473
 https://www.gvm.com.tw/article/55774. Accessed on January 23, 2020. Martha Sorren’s 474
article: https://www.insider.com/taipei-metro-vs-america-2019-1. Accessed on January 23, 2020.
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systems). People can be fined for staying on trains out of service ignoring staff’s advice, 
unauthorized fundraising, unauthorized posting or disseminating propaganda materials, 
unauthorized selling of goods or other business activities, bringing animals without 
permission, blocking entrances, exits, ticket machines, escalators, elevators, or other 
paths that impede passengers, setting up stands without permission, lying on benches 
and chairs, wandering around on platforms, trains, halls, playing on platforms, walking on 
escalators, and running on escalators. Like the issue of no food and drinking in metro 
systems, listing these behaviors in the metro as illegal once again produced some 
opposition. Critics thought this law might be against constitutional rights of personal 
freedom. For example, one lawmaker questioned the official definition of wandering, 
worrying that the vague definition would make it easy for passengers to break the law . 475
Parliament passed the paragraphs about appropriate behavior all the same.  Subsequent 
amendments of the MRT Act did not include these paragraphs.

	 The MRT Act alone cannot build a highly ordered environment of the metro system, 
without its terms being implemented by the TRTC. One of the most critical policies was 
advising users of escalators to stand on the right side, letting those in a hurry walk past 
on the left side. This escalator etiquette did not originate in Taiwan. Countries including 
the U.K., Canada, and Japan  had promoted it. Many other countries like China and 476
Korea also followed the examples of the U.K. and Japan, reminding the metro passengers 
to do so, not always with much success Taiwan’s cities, however, successfully 
implemented this rule. In 1999, the TRTC started to advise passengers to stand on the 
right of escalators, but it did not merely put stickers on escalators or make an 
announcement. It chose three escalators in the Taipei Main Station, sending people to 
demonstrate how to behave properly . The TRTC’s advocacy produced some 477
controversies and even conflicts in and out of the Taipei Metro. There were many 
arguments on the Internet. Furthermore, people who agreed with the etiquette fought with 
those who did not in the stations causing the staff some embarrassment since this was a 
matter of etiquette, not one of law. Faced with the controversies, the TRTC insisted on 
 The Gazette of Legislative Yuan, at Pp. 212-213.475
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persuading its passengers to follow the etiquette if only for others’ convenience, although 
no law obliged it .
478
	 In May 2000, the TRTC decided to strengthen its advocacy of escalator etiquette. 
Besides the approaches it had already taken, such as posting stickers on escalators and 
setting up stands, the TRTC used the station’s broadcasting system repeatedly to remind 
passengers. Moreover, it sent staff to the stations on the Blue Line, which was the metro 
line with the most ridership to “direct” passengers to follow the etiquette. The staff not 
only advised those who did not stand on the right side of escalators but also used 
speakers to loudly remind passengers to stand on the right on  escalators. The TRTC told 
one journalist, “ most of the passengers accept this etiquette, but some passengers think 
that no law asks them to do so; sometimes conflicts occurred because of the 
disagreement.” Thus, “the TRTC believes that generating group pressure by strong 
promotion can reduce conflicts. ” After the big promotion for a whole day, most 479
passengers followed the staffs’ direction standing on the right; the Zhongxiao Fuxing 
Station’s (忠孝復興) staffs said the situation remained the same, many passengers did not 
follow the instruction. However, the Zhongxiao Fuxing Station's biggest escalators 
connecting the underground station of the Blue Line and the elevated station of the 
Brown Line did not have any staff to promote the escalator etiquette because the TRTC 
thought walking on the four long escalators may cause danger .
480
	 On New Year Eve in 2004, thousands of passengers rushed into the Taipei Metro to 
attend a party next to the City Hall Station, and, at about 10:30 pm, an accident 
happened in Taipei Main Station. Several passengers fell on a moving escalator causing 
five females to be injured. Two of them had their  hair caught in the moving escalator 
leading to critical head injuries.  After this serious accident, the TRTC changed its 
promotion of the escalator etiquette focusing more on safety on escalators rather than the 
etiquette of standing on the right. However, the TRTC invited the famous Taiwanese opera 
(歌仔戲) actress, Sun Tsui-feng (孫翠鳳), to be a spokesperson for escalator  safety, 
demonstrating the escalator etiquette in public. Sun and the TRTC suggested standing on 
the right of escalators while also emphasizing how to stand on escalators safely by 
 Wang, I-chung 王一中. “Standing on the Right Fights on the Internet 搭電扶梯靠右站 網路開478
戰.” The United Daily News, March 13, 2000.
 Wang, I-chung. “Standing on the Right! Strong Persuasion 捷運電扶梯請靠右站左側通行 強力479
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standing inside of a yellow frame and holding on to the moving handrail . TRTC finally 481
removed the propaganda for escalator etiquette; rather, it urges its passengers to use 
escalators safely using stickers, display stands, and broadcast systems. 

Figure 8.1: the Taiwanese opera star, Sun Tsui-feng (right), demonstrated how to 
take escalators.  482
Just as it invited the Taiwanese opera star to promote escalator etiquette and 
safety, the TRTC also invited other celebrities to promote etiquette in the metro systems. 
The etiquette was not limited to the escalator use, and it included not eating or drinking, 
leaving priority seats for those who were in need, letting passengers on trains get off first, 
waiting for trains in line, keeping quiet in trains, and not blocking trains’ doors. The 
celebrities would demonstrate the appropriate behavior in the metro system, film video 
  Feng, Fu-hua 馮復華. “How to Use Escalator Sun Demonstrates 搭捷運電扶梯 孫翠鳳示範” 481




clipsfor promotion, and receive interviews to promote metro etiquettes. For example, in 
2002, the TRTC cooperated with radio stations to release “Metro News,” “Metro Stories,” 
and “Metro Music Festival,” and invited singers like Jay Chou (周杰倫), A-Mei (張惠妹) and 
Leehom Wang (王力宏) to make videos to promote metro etiquettes . In 2013, the TRTC 483
set March 28, which was the date when the Brown Line opened in 1996, as Metro Culture 
Festival. In the Festival, the TRTC  holds a series of cultural actives like small size 
concerts in the stations and art competitions, and these activities aim at promoting metro 
etiquette and safety. One of the features of the Metro Culture Festival is releasing videos 
promoting metro etiquette. These videos do not appeal to etiquette directly but tell a story 
to show how to follow the etiquette and how good it was to do so. 

	 We need to note one of the videos released in the first Metro Culture Festival. In 
this video, a white female named Sara visited her Taiwanese male friend Bill in Taipei (the 
video does not show where Sara came from and if they were lovers or not). At the 
beginning of the video, Bill welcomes Sara at Song Shan International Airport, which is 
the international airport located on the Brown Line. They used contactless smart cards to 
enter the station, starting their trip in Taipei. They visited many famous sights in Taipei, 
including Beitou Hot Spring, Taipei 101, Tamsui Old Town, and the National Palace 
Museum using the Taipei Metro. In the metro system, Sara saw “the most beautiful 
scenes in the Taipei Metro” including safety (the TRTC’s staff held passengers behind the 
yellow line on the platform when a train was coming), order (passengers got on the train in 
line), warmth (a volunteer showed a way to a passenger), and consideration (the TRTC’s 
staff helped an old man to enter a train). In Sara’s eyes, there were many things “making 
riding on the Taipei Metro a ‘cultural’ thing” including leaving seats to those who need it, 
being active (young people dancing in the designated open space of the metro system 
with mirrors), and following the order (passengers standing on the right side of the 
escalator while Sara and Bill walked by them on the left side). At the end of the video, the 
mayor of Taipei City at that time  Mayor Hau appeared saying “ those who are supporting 
warmth and caring and creating happiness and a convenient life together are the 
‘Metroers’ (捷客).’” 

	 Three things in the video are worthy of discussion. First, in the section showing 
what Sara was looking at in the Taipei Metro, order in the metro system appeared twice 
emphasizing its importance. Furthermore, although this video was released in 2013 when 
 Wang, I-chung. “A-Mei and Jay Chou’s Voice for Metro 阿妹、周杰倫為捷運發聲.” The United 483
Daily News, December 24, 2002.
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the TRTC had already stopped promote the etiquette of standing on the right of the 
escalators, standing on the right was still seen as obeying order in the metro system. 
Second, all the “good” behaviors in the Taipei Metro were defined as constituting a metro 
culture. The TRTC shows how it tries to create an ideal environment in the metro system 
to exhibit Taiwan’s goodness. The TRTC’s efforts echo the DORTS’ ambition to change 
the city and the country by building an outstanding metro system. What is good is not 
limited to how efficient the metro system was and how beautiful the architecture of the 
metro space and its pubic artworks was.  How people act in the system and even the 
quality of the people, the Taiwanese, also matters. Third, the most notably feature of the 
video, the main character, was an English-speaking white female. Compared with the 
other character in the video, Bill, Sara was the critical eye witnessing the goodness in the 
Taipei Metro. Why does a video promoting the metro etiquette to Taiwanese need to use a 
foreigner’s perceptions to see assess the etiquette and the people’s quality? In Taiwan, 
the metro is not only about a city but about the whole country.

Figure 8.2: the screenshot of the video for the Metro Culture Festival in 2013.  484
 https://taipeino1.taipei/Video/Detail/4d41c8b6-6efa-4602-81cd-abb30e6346e9. Accessed on 484
January 27, 2020. The word showing on the screenshot is “following orders” in Chinese.
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National Pride 
	 Using foreigners’ viewpoints to verify how good Taiwan’s metro systems are is not 
limited to the TRTC. As the previous section shows, Taiwanese media often introduce the 
news or articles in other country’s media to the advantages of the Taipei Metro, and 
comparing the Taipei Metro with the metro systems in European and American cities is a 
common approach. For example, the Buzzorange (報橘), a newly rising online media in 
Taiwan, made special reports for the 20th anniversary of the Taipei Metro at the end of 
2015. Among six articles about the Taipei Metro that Buzzorange introduced or translated 
into the special reports, four described how to make the Taipei Metro better or mentioned 
its disadvantages, and two described the advantages of the Taipei Metro. Interestingly, 
the two that had a positive attitude toward the metro system were derived from 
foreigner’s articles. The first one was the Buzzorange’s introduction and translation of an 
article written by a Japanese designer, Akase Tatsuzo (赤瀬　達三), who highly values the 
space deigns of the Taipei Metro. The second one was the introduction and translation of 
an article written by a Taiwanese American journalist, Benjamin Dunn, comparing the 
Taipei Metro and the LA Metro finding that the Taipei Metro was far better than the LA 
Metro . At the same time, traditional media like newspapers also took a similar 485
approach to report the 20th anniversary of the Taipei Metro. One report mentioned three 
specialties of the metro culture: standing on the right on escalators, no food and drinks in 
the metro, and leaving seats for those who needed them. This report went on to 
emphasize how Japanese who were regarded extremely disciplined were surprised by 
how clean and ordered the Taipei Metro was and how well Taiwanese maintained it.  
486
	 After scrutinizing the media contents, the metro systems, including the Taipei 
Metro, Kaohsiung Rapid Transit System (KRTS), and the Taoyuan Metro, were sources of 
national pride. In my view there were three reasons for this: the metro culture, its 
operation, and its architecture. As we discussed above, the metro culture shaped by the 
TRTC, the MRT Act, and the passengers is the feature mentioned the most to show 
Taiwan’s goodness. Moreover, the operation of the metro systems, notably the Taipei 
Metro, is another feature to be regarded as a source of national pride. First of all, 
cleanliness is not only an achievement of the quality of the Taiwanese people but also of 
TRTC’s management. In 2017, Singapore’s MTR experienced a flood and a car accident, 
 https://buzzorange.com/category/feature/taipei-mrt/. Accessed on January 27. 2020.485
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and it asked the Taipei Metro to assist it in improving its operation. Taiwanese media 
widely reported this news . Furthermore, many of the contents also focus on the 487
efficiency and reliability of the Taipei Metro. The TRTC also stresses this aspect. For 
instance, the TRTC has released press releases claiming that the Taipei Metro is more 
reliable than other members in the Nova (Nova Urban Railway Benchmarking Group) and 
CoMET (Community of Metros). (These are international metro communities that set the 
benchmark for metro systems .)   On the TRTC’s website, the TRTC takes a page to 488
introduce the CoMET to Chinese-speaking visitors. 

	 Finally, the architecture and the public artwork of the metro systems in Taiwan can 
be regarded as sources of national pride, though the KRTS (Kaohsiung Rapid Transit 
System) should be mentioned rather than the Taipei Metro. In 2012, the KRTS' Formosa 
Boulevard Station (美麗島站) was listed in second place in the rank of the most beautiful 
metro stations in the world by a traveler website, BoostnAll. Two years later, CNN and the 
PolicyMic, which is an online media, also listed the Formosa Boulevard Station as one of 
the most beautiful stations in the world. Moreover, the Central Park Station of the KRTS, 
as the Formosa Boulevard Station, was also listed by the PolicyMic as one of the “8 
Elegant Global Subway Stations New Yorkers Could Only Dream Of. ” These rankings 489
were widely reported by Taiwanese media. Although the rankings sometimes come from 
new online media instead of well-known media like CNN, Taiwanese media still found 
them and widely reported them. For the Taipei Metro, the EBC News (東森新聞) reported a 
video made by an American. Besides the metro culture and the efficiency of the Taipei 
Metro, the video emphasized that the music which was played when a train enters a 
station as a part of the “best metro. ” 
490
 For example, the reports from the Liberty Times Net (自由新聞網) https://news.ltn.com.tw/487
news/life/breakingnews/2247390, the NowNews (今日新聞) https://www.nownews.com/news/
20171119/2647059/, and the Business Today (今周刊) https://www.businesstoday.com.tw/article/
category/80392/post/201803290014/北捷成功經驗紅到海外%20星媒列五大關鍵. Accessed on 
January 27, 2020.
 The Nova and the CoMET are the systems of rail transportation run by the Transport Strategy 488
Centre at Imperial College London. The metro systems with annual ridership below 500 million 
can join the Nova while the systems have ridership higher than 500 million can join the CoMET. 
The Taipei Metro joined the Nova in 2002 and then became a member of the CoMET in 2011.
 https://www.mic.com/articles/78745/8-elegant-global-subway-stations-new-yorkers-could-489
only-dream-of. Accessed on January 27, 2020.
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WEPn5kJMtdI. Accessed on January 27, 2020.490
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“Metroalization” 
 The three features of the Taipei Metro, the metro culture, well-run operation, and 
architecture and public artworks were replicated in other metro systems in Taiwan 
because the technical officials from the DORTS and TRTC worked in projects of these 
metro systems. Moreover, the Taipei Metro set the benchmark  for metros in Taiwan so 
that other cities would follow Taipei’s model. Finally, Taipei is the capital city of the 
country, so people in other areas would tend to follow how people behave in the Taipei 
Metro, all the more so since the Taipei Metro was the only metro system in Taiwan for 
twelve years. Nonetheless, the expansion of these features is not limited to the metro 
systems, but to other two important rail transportation systems, the Taiwan Railways 
Administration (TRA) and the Taiwan High Speed Rail (THSR), through the same 
approach.  Hence, I argue that the imitation of the space, culture, and operation of metro 
systems in Taiwan in other mass rail transportation can be called “Metrolization.”  

	 The word “Metrolization” is derived from the Mandarin Chinese Jieyunhua (捷運化), 
meaning to make things like the metro. The Railway Reconstruction Bureau, Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication (RRB) first use this word. As we discussed in chapter 
3, the TRUPO (Taipei Railway Underground Project Office) was reformed as the RRB once 
it had turned the section from Banciao Station to Songshan Station on the West Coast 
Line into an underground system in 2002. Since then, the RRB extended its working area 
outside of Taipei Metropolitan. First, the RRB focused on refining the East Coast Line. 
Second, it initiated the massive project of “ the Metrolization of the TRA (台鐵捷運化)” in 
other metropolitans. The projects to build or to rebuild the TRA’s line in urban areas aimed 
to make the intercity railways like metro systems. To make the intercity railways metro-
like, the TRA rebuilt the West Coast Line in Taichung and Kaohsiung as elevated 
(Taichung) and subterranean (Kaohsiung), and in the projects, it built new commute 
stations to shorten the distance between stations. Besides reconstructing urban parts of 
the West Coast Line, the RRB also built new elevated branch lines as “metro lines which 
are not metro.” Moreover, the projects also purchased commuter electrified trains to serve 
the new elevated/subterranean railways and new stations. The DEC’s (Deutsche 
Eisenbahn Consulting) idea of rebuilding railways in downtown Taipei into the Taiwanese 
version of an S-Bahn was finally realized in Hsinchu, Taichung, Yuanlin, Kaohsiung, and 
some areas of New Taipei City.  

	 The Metrolization of the railways did not only involve transforming intercity railways 
into commuter railways. The RRB copied the ways the DORTS made the stations’ space. 
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First, it tried to build monumental architectures for stations. Second, it built new regional 
central control centers to upgrade the efficiency of its operation. Third, it introduced 
public artworks as the Taipei Metro did. Finally, the TRA, the operator of the railways, also 
promoted escalator etiquette and priority seats in its stations no matter whether they were 
newly built or not. Without strong promotion, the passengers who had been trained by the 
Taipei Metro naturally transplanted their behavior in the metro into the TRA’s stations. In 
some cases in the TRA’s intercity express trains, conflicts arose over whether young 
passengers with seat reservations should leave the seats to the elderly, children, or 
pregnant women. For example, the TVBS News reported that a young woman 
complained that one older man asked her to leave the seat for him because he was old 
while she was young, even though the woman had reserved the seat . In 2015, one 491
pregnant woman complained that another young woman with a seat reservation of a 
limited express train refused to leave her the seat, and she took the photo of the young 
lady posting it online. However, this action led to much criticism, and the young woman 
who was accused also posted an article showing that she was pregnant . 
492
	 The TRA cannot wholly replicate the metro’s operation and the metro culture 
because of the TRA’s problems with efficiency and lack of resources, the different 
functions of the railway and the metro, and the differences between the Railway Act and 
the MRT Act (for example, the Railway Act allows passengers to eat food and drink on 
trains and in stations). However,  the TRA’s stations and trains and the passengers’ 
behaviors how that the builder (the RRB), the operator (the TRA), and the passengers 
work together to make the stations and the trains more like the Taipei Metro. 

	 The THSR (Taiwan High Speed Rail) was a slightly different story. Unlike the TRA 
and the RRB, the THSR was a brand new company run and owned by the private section, 
state-owned companies, professional mangers, and mass investors. Therefore, the THSR 
could decide how to build the space of the high speed railway system. Tong and Li 
already point out that the THSR built a neat, highly ordered, and organized environment 
for its passengers and system by initiating the Taipei Metro under the same context of 
modernization and globalization. In this sense, they further regard the THSR as a “big-size 
 https://news.tvbs.com.tw/life/1158504. Accessed on January 28, 2020.491
 https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/life/breakingnews/1273898. Accessed on January 28, 2020.492
229
metro. ” In the THSR’s stations, we can see the monumental architectures as if all rail 493
transportation should have them. Moreover, the THSR used the same standard to 
maintain the cleanliness of its stations and trains. It also heavily focuses on the etiquette 
of riding on a high speed rail train. On the 10th anniversary of the THSR, the United Daily 
News released a report about how the high speed railway had incubated a high standard 
of civilization into its passengers. The right behavior listed by the report, including waiting 
for trains in line, cleanliness in trains and stations, and consideration of others, all echo 
the metro culture, which was built by the TRTC and the Taipei Metro’s passengers .
494
Figure 8.3: the rebuilt elevated TRA Taichung Station  495
 Tung, Chien-Hung 董建宏, and Lee, An-Ru 李安如. “The Progressive Transportation 493
Construction and the Change of Taiwan’ Urban Culture: the Taipei Metro and the THSR 進步性交
通建設與台灣都市文化轉變：以台北捷運與台灣高鐵為例"  in ECONOMIC OUTLOOK Bimonthly 
《經濟前瞻》No. 124, (2009): 43-47.
 Tseng, Chi-sung 曾吉松. “The Considering THSR Incubates Civilized Passengers 貼心高鐵 養494
出一批文明客” The United Daily News, January 5, 2017.
 Photoed by the author.495
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Figure 8.4: THSR’s propaganda of etiquettes on the train. ” 496
The Exception of National Pride 
	 Taiwanese see Taiwan’s metro systems as a source of national pride because of 
the cultural habits it promote, its operation, and its space. Mattes are different  when it 
comes to the manufacturing of metro artifacts. On November 7, 2017, Taoyuan City 
Government announced that only those rolling stock companies which had had 
experience in building entire  electromechanical systems for metro systems were qualified 
to compete for the business of trains and controlling system in the planned Green Line of 
Taoyuan Metro. This means that the Taiwan Rolling Stock Company (TRSC), the half 
state-owned train manufacturer in which huge Japanese rolling stock manufacturer 
 The translation of the Chinese sentence on it is, “the easiest way to a comfortable trip is to 496
lower your volume, not letting others know what happens in your home. The THSR’s website: 
https://m.thsrc.com.tw/tw/News/Detail/2b71cfd0-7d17-4d94-a6c1-be480f3cad26/1. Accessed on 
January 28, 2020.
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Nippon Sharyo (日本車輌製造株式会社) and the Japanese group Sumitomo (住友グルー
プ) owns about 40% of its stock, lost this business in advance because it only had 
experience in assembling trains. Moreover, Japanese or German companies provided the 
orders and design diagrams to the TRSC to assemble the trains. In January, 2018, there 
was more bad news for the TRSC. The Mayor of Taipei City announced the same policy 
as Taoyuan City for the planned Light Green Line of the Taipei Metro. Tsai Huang-liang, 
the lawmaker who had stressed that betel nut was the “national spirit” of Taiwan to stop 
the prohibition of chewing betel nuts in metro systems when the parliament reviewed the 
amendment of the MRT Act, became the focus of metro issues again. As the president of 
the TRSC, he argued that Taipei City and Taoyuan City should take a “National trains 
made by Nationals (國車國造)” policy to incubate the growing rolling stock industries in 
Taiwan.  He insisted that TRSC did have the ability to provide total solutions of 
electromechanical system for the two cities. If the government did not provide 
opportunities to Taiwanese companies, they would never gain experience in 
manufacturing rolling stock and train control systems. So, Tsai hoped Taipei City would 
allow the TRSC to join the bid by cooperating with international partners with 
experience .
497
 Posted on Tsai’s Facebook on January 19 and 20, 2018: https://www.facebook.com/497
373362590787/posts/10159917098905788/?d=n and https://www.facebook.com/373362590787/
posts/10159922286165788/?d=n. Accessed on January 29, 2020.
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Figure 8.5: the president of the TRSC. The calligraphy says “National trains made by 
nationals. ” 498
	 The TRSC and Tsai reanimated severe controversies, and the two cities refused 
TRSC’s requirement. The mayor of Taipei City, Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), even emphasized that 
the TRSC could not provide a total solution for the electromechanical part of a metro line, 
and that it was impossible for TRSC and president Tsai to “reach the heaven with only one 
step. ” The legislator Tuan Yi-kang (段宜康) also condemned the TRSC’s “National trains 499
made by Nationals” as being merely a slogan. He stated that the Shingwuje light rail train 
for the Danhai Light Rail in Tamsui, New Taipei City manufactured by TRSC, was merely a 
product of assembling a German company’s diagrams, and the TRSC could not make a 
whole metro train . The most embarrassing thing was that Tsai and Tuan both were 500
members of the ruling party, the DPP.  Although Tsai had an interview with the media to 
explain his idea, the two cities did not change the bidding requirements, and no 
 Tsai’s Facebook profile photo posted on August 20, 2019: https://www.facebook.com/498
373362590787/photos/a.10150396830190788/10162242440590788/?type=3. Accessed on 
January 29, 2020.  
 https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20180120001888-260407?chdtv Accessed on 499
January 29, 2020.
 https://www.ettoday.net/news/20180120/1097056.htm. Accessed on January 29, 2020.500
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indisputable evidence shows that strong opinions were pressuring Taipei and Taoyuan to 
change their mind.

	 The TRSC’s lack of experience can explain why its president’s advocacy did not 
receive strong support in Taiwan. This conflict also shows that Taiwanese do not support 
their rolling stock manufacturer merely due to nationalist reasons. Taiwanese do not value 
the manufacturing quality of the TRSC, and they do not value the fact that the TRSC 
assembles trains designed by international companies and buys diagrams to manufacture 
them. Moreover, China had dedicated its own resources to its metro systems, high speed 
rail, and indigenous railway industries. As the main rival for Taiwan’s national identity the 
growing Chinese railway industries seem to be overwhelmingly superior to Taiwan’s 
TRSC. One of my informants also criticized the TRSC’s design ability. The informant 
argued that the quality of the Shingwuje LRT train was not as good as the Taipei Metro ’s 
train assembled by the TRSC because it did not provide the specs of materials with 
sufficient precision. Moreover, Taiwan also lacked the market and industrial supply chains 
for national railway industries, so he was not optimistic about the future of railway 
industries in Taiwan .  By contrast another informant who has worked in the project of 501
the Taipei Metro as a contractor rather than as a technical official thinks the Taiwanese 
government should give a chance to Taiwanese manufacturers although they do not have 
enough experience, or they would never have chance to accumulate their experience and 
ability.  National pride in a metro system is limited to its culture, management, and space. 
The DPP government might have a nationalist ambitions for the railway industries, but not 
all Taiwanese are enthusiastic about it.

When the shutdown of the Brown Line after the integrated system was over  in 
2009, many media and councilors insisted that the hybrid system caused the problems . 502
The same situation also happened to THSR. The THSR is the high speed railway system 
using a signal control system from Europe and trains from Japan. Before it opened, it was 
severe criticized for its hybridity of European and Japanese systems. Because the THSR 
changed its trains from a European one to Japan’s Shinkansen after it became the builder 
and the operator of the railway system, some believed this change was the “payment” for 
Japan who welcomed ex-president Lee Teng-hui to have heart surgery there. The THSR 
 The interview with TP08.501
 Lin, Pei-i 林佩怡. ”The Hybrid Brown Line Wrong with Integration? 內湖線拼裝貨 系統整合凸502
槌？” The China Times, July 11, 2009; The Apple Daily, “The Brown Line Stopped for 8.5 Hours 木
柵內湖 捷運停擺8.5小時” The Apple Daily, July 11, 2009.
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denied this allegation . Lin’s case study of assembly cars in rural Taiwan shows that the 503
idea of assembly or hybridity would be regarded as dangerous and unstable even though 
the assembly cars fully satisfied users’ needs and could adapt to different kinds of 
environment . Although the Brown Line and the THSR have run smoothly for over ten 504
years, the technological hybridity of rail transportation is still seen as a problem rather 
than an advantage or an achievement. 

Formosa Technological Sublime 
	 In June, 1995, the president of Taiwan at that time, Lee Teng-hui, visited his alma 
mater, Cornell University, and gave a speech. To make the trip happen, the KMT 
government hired Cassidy & Associate, a well known public relations firm with a strong tie 
to the Democratic Party after Cornell’s president visited Taipei initiating the process of 
inviting President Lee to visit the U.S in 1993 . In May 1995, the House voted 396-0 for 505
a nonbinding resolution favoring Lee’s trip; in the Senate, despite administration pressure, 
similar measure carried 97-1 . With the pressure from the Congress, Bill Clinton 506
authorized Lee’s trip to the U.S. On June 9  President Lee gave the speech at Cornell 
University. He introduced two new points in his speech. First, Lee emphasized that 
popular elections imbued the R.O.C. with sovereignty, not just its status as the successor 
state to the Qing Dynasty. Second, he asserted that Taiwan’s democracy should be a 
model for China and the world. Lee’s success in securing a visa and becoming the first 
Taiwanese president to travel in the U.S. infuriated the Chinese . In 1996, China 507
launched missiles when Taiwan held its first presidential popular election, causing the 
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The resulting military confrontation with China in Taiwan Strait 
involving two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups saw the Clinton administration eventually 
move to a much more coherent engagement policy toward China . Taiwanese elected 508
  Li, Wen-i 李文儀, Liu, Li-jen 劉力仁, and Wen, Chun-hua 溫春華 “Nita Ing: No Political 503
Exchange for choosing Japan rather than Europe 殷琪︰棄歐就日 無政治交換” The Liberty Times, 
January 18, 2005.
 Lin, Chung-Hsi 林崇熙, “Technology in Silence: Self-Assembled Vehicles on Jianan Plain 沈默504
的技術--嘉南平原上的拼裝車.” Taiwanese Journal for Studies of Science, Technology and 
Medicine, No.1 (2001): Pp. 1-42.
 Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China 505
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), Pp. 206. 
 Tucker, Strait Talk, Pp. 211.506
 Tucker, Strait Talk, Pp. 214.507
 Sutter, US-China Relations, Pp. 103.508
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Lee in response to China’s military threats, and the Taiwanese national identity was 
strengthened even though Taiwanese business investment in China kept increasing. 

	 However, Taiwan’s special status and constitutional situation remain the same, and 
this fact drove the Taiwanese to seek the meaning of being Taiwanese rather than 
Chinese. Furthermore, China’s strong economic growth and closer relations with the U.S. 
and other countries in the world created pressure to build a new national  national identity. 
Taiwan, known as the Republic of China, is not recognized by most of the countries in the 
world; on the other hand, faced by the increase of China’s economic, technological and 
military power, Taiwan seems to be powerless and devoid of a coherent identity. 
Taiwanese have thus been seeking reasons for being Taiwanese in many fields. For 
example, they named  Wang Chien-ming (王建民), a major player for the New York 
Yankees during 2005 and 2008, the “lighting of Taiwan”, connecting his dominant 
performance in baseball, the “national sport” of Taiwan, to Taiwan’s greatness in a domain 
that China cannot reach. At the same time, the Taipei Metro, a brand new transportation 
system with the ambition to change the city and the country, was opened for the 
Taiwanese.

	 In American Technological Sublime, David Nye argues that the American sublime 
embraced technology. Where Kant had reasoned that the awe inspired by a sublime 
object made men aware of their moral worth, the American sublime transformed the 
individual’s experience of immensity and awe into a belief in national greatness . Nye 509
states, “the rededication of the Statue of Liberty, like the launch of Apollo XI, was nearly 
empty of the contents of political life required by republicanism. Neither made any 
reference to a virtuous citizenry, and neither made the once-common claim that a new 
technology was a moral machine that would elevate the people. Instead, each was a 
massive display of organizational and technical power. Each encouraged the belief that 
democracy and state control of advanced technology was compatible. Each event 
presented a technical achievement as a sign of national greatness, encouraging the 
citizen to introject this vision of power and make it a fundamental part of personal identity. 
In this way, each enhanced the technological sublime as a category of American political 
experience. ” Nye’s view can help us to understand the metro systems as a source of 510
national pride in Taiwan, although Taiwan’s political experiences and the content of 
national identity are different from the U.S.

 Nye, American Technological Sublime, Pp. 43.509
 Nye, American Technological Sublime, Pp. 279-280.510
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	 I call the combination of the metro systems’ space, operation, and culture a 
“Formosa technological sublime.” In the field of metro systems, although the Taiwanese 
know that many core parts of their metro systems were not invented, designed, and 
manufactured in Taiwan, they know that the metro systems’ space was planned and 
managed by the Taiwanese. Indeed, Taiwanese do not even value the technological 
hybrid strategies used in the construction of the metro and Taiwan’s manufacturing ability 
of metro equipment. Moreover, the mobilization of transnational knowledge and 
technology is simply the consequence  of the tight connection between the global 
economy and politics. The systems providers and the consultants were not necessarily 
Taiwanese, but the outcome was coordinated and organized by the Taiwanese. Like the 
Jiantan Station of the Taipei Metro and the Formosa Boulevard Station of the KRTS, the 
architects and the artist of the breathtaking artworks could be a foreigner, but it is the the 
Taiwanese that made it happen on a grandiose scale. Notably, the Formosa Boulevard 
Station is the place where the democratic movement started in 1979, and the glass 
ceiling artwork talks about the myth of the birth of the city, Kaohsiung, from the ocean. 
This fact is just like the metaphor of Taiwan’s status in the global industrial chain, “we may 
not create something innovative, but we make things from all around the world great,” a 
capacity that lies at the root of Taiwan’s decades-long prosperity. Interestingly, the idea of 
creating an outstanding metro space was derived from American consultants!  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Figure 8.6: the Formosa Boulevard Station  511
	 The operation followed a similar logic; the cities operate the metro. Originally, the 
DORTS just wanted to build the best metro system in the world . The TRTC which was 512
composed of former DROTS’ members when it was founded set the same goal focusing 
their performance on impressing the world Additionally, it and other metro operators in 
Taiwan were always aware of how to make international visitors feel at home  and 
comfortable.

	 Taiwanese passengers can also compare their experience in other countries’ 
metros and imagine how foreigners feel when they enjoy the efficiency of the metro 
systems. So, although Taiwanese passengers do not get involved in the operation of the 
metros, they still can feel that they share in the reliability and comfort of the metro 
systems. The success of the metro systems is the success of Taiwan.

	 Finally, the passengers respond to the call of the DORTS and the TRTC’s ambition 
of making the best metro in the world, building and maintaining the metro culture, 
 https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/美麗島站#/media/511
File:Glassart_in_Formosa_Boulevard_Station.JPG.  ㄆ
 The interview with TP05.512
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although it was initiated by the TRTC and bolstered by the MRT Act. They even further 
expanded the culture to other rail transportation systems in Taiwan. Taiwanese do not 
show how powerful they; instead they promote their order and cleanliness; they do not 
stress how they innovated the technological systems and how they crafted the 
monumental architecture of the stations but emphasize their care and consideration for 
others.  Passengers' respectful behavior and etiquette paints a picture of Taiwanese 
collective cultural values on the canvas composed of the breathtaking architecture of 
stations. The ordered lines on the escalators and the platforms are the landscape of a 
highly efficient technological system showing that Taiwanese can mobilize international 
resources to build the metro successfully and maintain it successfully. Being a part of it, 
they perform no matter whether they have heard it or not, the dictum of the Taiwanese 
nationalist activist, Cheng Nan-jung (鄭南榕) , “we are humble people in a small nation; 513
but, we are kind people in a good nation (我們是小國小民，但是我們是好國好民).”   
 Cheng Nan-jung, a democratic and Taiwanese nationalist activist. He had struggled with the 513
authoritarian KMT government for “100% freedom of speech” and “New Taiwanese Nation 
Movement.” In 1989, when the police tried to arrest him for treason, he jailed himself in his office 
of the magazine run by him for months. Finally, on April 7, 1989, he burned himself to death at the 
age of 41 due to the police’s raid into his office. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
America, Hybridity, and Nation-Building

“A metro system can bring multiple benefits to society, and, in general, the benefits are the 
following. First, national and social benefits: promoting international economic status; upgrading 
transportation and technology; a showcase exhibiting the technical level and economic growth of 
our nation (捷運系統能為社會創造多方面的效益，大體而言，捷運系統的效益為：一、國家
與社會效益：1. 提高國際經濟地位。2. 提升交通運輸與科技。3. 為我國技術水準及經濟成展
之展示櫥窗。)” . The Department of Rapid Transit System, Taipei City Government (DORTS), 514
1988 (my translation). 
“The word ‘republic’ is derived from the Latin term res publica, literally, a ‘public thing.’ Metro is a 
public thing. It is public transportation, public works, public policy, public investment, and, since its 
opening, public space. It is a monument to confidence in the public realm. ” Zachary M. Schrag, 515
2006. 
	 This dissertation answers the questions of how the Taipei Metro and the rail mass 
transportation systems were built, of what factors caused the technological hybridity of 
Taiwan’s rail mass transportation technology, of how technology was transferred in the 
field of metro related knowledge and technology, and of how a catching-up country like 
Taiwan dealt with technologically advanced countries. American hegemony over Taiwan 
provided resources, and facilitated the transnational circulation of knowledge and 
technology. It also helped establish institutions for the Taiwanese to build the profession 
of transportation studies and planning. American hegemony was also the driving force 
that shaped the environment for the technological hybridity of metro technology. The 
most solid product of the decades-long process of building the metro system is the Taipei 
Metro —  a nationalist technology composed of hybrid technology, efficient operation, 
and a unique metro culture. It has been built and shaped by all actors including technical 
 The Department of Rapid Transit, Taipei City Government, The Q&A, Pp.16.514
 Schrag, Great Society Subway, Pp.282-283.515
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officials, international consultants, political leaders, engineers, system operators, and the 
passengers of the metro system.  

American Hegemony in Taiwan 
	 The two civil wars in East Asia in the mid-20th century changed Taiwan’s trajectory. 
Although Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT government had already acquired Taiwan as the 
representative of the Allies under MacArthur’s General Order No. 1 , the Chinese Civil 516
War sent the whole KMT government to Taiwan, making Taipei the capital city of the 
regime. But, the KMT government could be overthrown at any time if communist troops 
crossed the Taiwan strait: the U.S. decided not to intervene in the bloody Chinese civil 
war from 1945 to 1950.  The outbreak of the Korean War changed the KMT government 
again. Taiwan, along with Chiang Kai-shek’s government, became the Asian front of the 
Free World, facing communist China. With the neutralization of the Taiwan Strait and the 
subsequent Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, and the professed U.S. 
commitment, the KMT government’s territorial base was undoubtedly made more secure 
against Communist encroachment. Yet, an inevitable corollary of the treaty and resolution 
was that Taipei’s military capability would henceforth be purely defensive, and would be 
substantially restricted in scope by its American ally, with little possibility of reaching 
beyond the island territories the Nationalists now claimed as the Republic of China . 517
Taiwan became the “accidental island state.”

 	 Besides the security of the island state, the Korean War also brought “U.S. Aid” 
into Taiwan. U.S. Aid did not only pour military and economic assistance into Taiwan. It 
also facilitated the transnational circulation of knowledge, technology, and people 
between the U.S. and Taiwan, in cooperation with the Taiwanese, producing consensual 
American hegemony over science and technology in Taiwan. Taiwan thus faced a double 
American hegemonic power: military and technological. U.S. Aid started the construction 
of American hegemony, but it extended beyond that. After 1965, when Washington 
terminated U.S. Aid, military protection and technological assistance projects continued. 
With the U.N.’s technological assistance projects, the KMT government began to build 
the profession of transportation studies and planning, and international consultants, most 
of whom were American, came to Taiwan. They helped Taiwanese technical officials to 
 According to General Order No. 1, the Empire of Japan should order its armed forces to 516
disarmed and surrender to the Allies. In China, except for Manchuria, Taiwan, and French 
Indochina north of 16 degrees north latitude, Japanese armed forces were required to surrender 
to Chiang Kai-shek, the Supreme Leader of the China Front.
 Lin, Accidental State, Pp. 237.517
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found their institute for the profession, the Transportation Planning Board (TPB). In the 
TPB, knowledge moved into Taiwan via written documents like manuals, journal articles, 
technical reports, and people with experience and know-how from the U.S. thus 
Americanizing the fields of transportation studies and planning in Taiwan 

	 The change  in  U.S.-Taiwan relations since 1972 triggered the decline of American 
hegemony over transportation technology and hybrid knowledge. The Taiwanese began 
to seek alternative sources of knowledge and technology for the development of rail mass 
transportation. They turned first to Germany and then to Japan and to Britain. The 
disruption of diplomatic relations with the U.S. created the space for Taiwanese technical 
officials to introduce different types of knowledge and ideas as regards technology from 
advanced countries other than the U.S. All the same, the change in the U.S.-Taiwan 
relations could keep American at a distance, but it could stimulate a new closer 
relationship. The trade deficit between the U.S. and Taiwan led to America’s intervention 
in the Taipei Metro project, bringing American consultants and technology into Taipei 
since Washington still had military and political hegemony over the island state.

	 This brief historical account shows that Taiwan’s diplomacy and its relationship 
with the U.S. was one key factor explaining technological development on the island. The 
Taipei Metro and other railway systems in Taiwan show how the transnational circulation 
of knowledge and technology between the U.S. and Taiwan along with American 
hegemonic power shaped them with designs and artifacts embedding American models 
and experience. The mixture with which the designs and artifacts coming from other 
countries were deployed also reveals traces of the interaction between the U.S. and 
Taiwan.  

	 Further questions for research hence emerge. Despite this study of rail 
transportation technology,  we can also include the diplomatic factors and U.S.-Taiwan 
relations as a key viewpoint to explain other technological systems and their hybridity. 
Moreover, another member of Taiwan’s rail transportation system, the Taiwan High Speed 
Rail (THSR) which was planned, designed, and built after the 1990s may also be 
discussed within the same analytical frame, a vast technological system that still needs to 
be studied in greater depth than was possible in this  dissertation.

Creating Hybridity 
	 The technological hybridity of rail mass transportation technology is both the 
strategy and the outcome of the process of building technological systems, including the 
Taipei Metro and the subterranean railways in Taipei. Consensual American hegemony in 
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technology and the development of U.S.-Taiwan relations created a suitable environment 
for producing hybrid knowledge and technology. Indeed the  determination to maintain 
autonomy drove Taiwanese to take hybrid strategies while they were building 
technological systems and their capabilities for future development. This was a decades-
long process from the making of knowledge to building a successful metro system. The 
mixture and integration of different knowledge, ideas, designs, and artifacts led to the 
material deployment of hybridity. As this dissertation reveals, we can classify 
technological hybridity into three types: the hybridity of knowledge, the hybridity of styles 
and functions, and the hybridity of systems.

	 The technological hybridity of knowledge was based on the Americanization of 
Taiwan’s transportation studies and planning and created by Taiwanese technical officials’ 
strategies and efforts for autonomy for the island state. In the case of the metro system in 
Taiwan, the acquisition of knowledge played an essential role in building the system and 
the formation of other types of hybridity. First, planners and engineers needed to generate 
the knowledge of the city, including the ways how people move, its economic 
development, the geography of the city, and other many kinds of urban activities, or they 
would have had no idea how to design and build the system. Second, the knowledge 
embedded a technological and political ideology defining the ideal of order and  its 
material embodiment in the system and the city.  And once the ideas and designs were 
realized, the technological hybridity of styles and functions emerged.

	 The technological hybridity of styles and functions reveals how ideas, designs, and 
artifacts were integrated into Taiwan’s local context ant political agenda after their 
transnational travels. The transnational history of the metro system in Taiwan is not the 
history of the replication of technological systems from technologically advanced 
countries, with minor modifications to adapt it to the local context; instead, it is the 
history of how transnational technology provided the materials for the catching-up 
countries to build their systems. However, catching-up countries cannot build systems 
arbitrarily; instead, they build their systems within the limitation of their resources and 
their power relationships with technologically-advanced countries. So, as the 
subterranean railways in Taipei and the Taipei Metro show, technological systems are the 
outcomes of the negotiations, conflicts, compromises, and cooperation of multiple actors 
representing their nation-states. Some designs and material deployments can tell a story 
of how technologically advanced countries overpowered catching-up countries, while 
others show how catching-up countries changed the power relations with partners.
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	 Technological hybridity exhibits the possibility that multiple technological systems 
can be integrated into one to pursue different goals and techno-social orders. 
Transnational movement of technological systems might weaken their technological 
momentum since technological systems need to customize themselves to the local 
context. Systems’ momentum generates system builders’ (mostly from technologically 
advanced countries) power over system receivers (catching-up countries). Hence, the 
weakening of technological systems means the chance for catching-up countries to 
change the power relations with technologically advanced countries. The hybrid system 
also must generate the technological hybridity of styles and functions since every 
technological system aims at a particular goal by its designs, modification of the material 
world, and deployment of artifacts.

	 These three types of hybridity are rooted in the case studies of this dissertation on 
the history of Taiwan’s rail mass transportation technology, but I do not argue these types 
of hybridity exhaust all possible forms of hybridity. The technological hybridity derived 
from this dissertation may inspire future researches on hybrid knowledge and technology, 
and I expect future research can explore different types of hybridity or even modify my 
classification. Moreover, readers may wonder whether there are other conditions that 
make technological hybridity meaningful. This dissertation shows that the concept of 
technological hybridity can contribute to the transnational history of technological 
systems, but what if the boundary of different technological systems is not nations? 
Historians of technology may explore the possibilities of of this concept in different 
situations, though always bearing in mind that the exploitation of this concept has its 
limits.

The “American Dream” in Taiwan 
	 The Taipei Metro is an “American dream” come true in Taiwan, but the content of 
this dream is far different from the stereotype of the American dream. It was an alternative 
version of the American dream about moving in cities. In fact, in some American cities, 
this dream of metro systems has failed or at least disappointed. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
American metro engineers tried to build metro systems in American cities, including San 
Francisco, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C., hoping to change the automobile-centric urban 
environment. In these cities, we can find that the Metro is a public thing. It is public 
transportation, public works, public policy, public investment, and, since its opening, 
public space. It is a monument to confidence in the public realm . For example, the 518
 Schrag, Great Society Subway, Pp. 282-283.518
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Washington Metro, its creation, took place in an era when Americans passionately 
embraced the automobile . These dreamers needed to compete with automobiles, the 519
ideology of an automobile-centric society, and a major transport system already gaining 
momentum.

	 As chapter 4 shows, these metro systems in American cities were not only built 
and run by public authorities but also took a series of approaches to compete with 
automobiles. For example, they all had monumental architectures and artworks to attract 
people to use them. Their builders spent much effort to make the space of the systems 
comfortable, and they tried to build the systems serving all classes and all races. 
However, the metros were built, but the dream was not. For instance, at the very 
beginning, the builders of Atlanta’s MARTA (Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority) 
hoped that six counties would join the project, but only two counties were engaged by  
2015. The MARTA even has the nickname of “Moving African Americans Rapidly Through 
Atlanta," revealing the disproportion of racial distribution of its riders. Not even to mention 
its temporary shutdown every Sunday due to the financial crisis in 2008.

	 However, these system builders and their successors traveled transnationally to 
Taipei in the mid-1980s along with American intervention of the project of the Taipei 
Metro. Their knowledge, experience, and ideology also entered Taipei finding the perfect 
match with Taiwanese technical officials’ ambition to build a metro system that could be a 
source of pride and change the city and the island country. By integrating with the 
designs coming from other countries, Taiwanese and their American consultants built a 
metro system which is a crucial component of the metropolitan area inhabited by at least 
6 million people. In 2019, the Taipei Metro’s average ridership per day was 2,163,285, 
making of it a sustainable metro system. The Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation (TRTC), 
which is a 100% public corporation, generated about 18.9 billion NTD (about USD3.3 
billion) revenue-earning and about 1.4 billion NTD (about USD470 million) profit after tax 
in 2017. Last but not least, the price of each ticket is from 20 NTD to 65 NTD (about 
USD0.6 to 2.1), making it one of the most affordable metro systems in the world. The 
American planners and engineers made their dream come true, not in any American city 
but in Taiwan’s capital city.

	 This dissertation suggests that maintenance, management, and operation defines 
the difference between metro systems in Taiwan and those in American cities, but a more 
comprehensive comparison between the metro systems  is necessary to fully  explain the 
 Schrag, Great Society Subway, Pp.1.519
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differences. Although Taiwan’s cities have many different characteristics from American 
cities, we still have enough elements to compare the systems on two sides of the Pacific. 
First, the same group of planners and engineers were involved in building the systems 
meaning these systems shared many designs and ideas. Second, all American and 
Taiwanese cities were automobile-centric when they started the projects of metro 
systems. In the 1980s, Taiwan had never ever had a metro system in its history. That is to 
say, these cities all needed to change and transform an urban environment designed for 
automobiles. Finally, both America and Taiwan do not have strong railway manufacturing 
industries, so both countries need to rely on international suppliers for core systems of 
metro systems like signal control and rolling stocks highly. 

Building Systems, Building a Nation 
	 From the very beginning, the history of Taiwan’s rail mass transportation 
technology after WWII is not merely the history of building a metro system; instead, the 
story started from the time when Taiwan suddenly became an accidental island state 
during the 1950s. As a former colony facing the possible military threat from China under 
the U.S.' protection, Taiwan and the KMT government’s goal was to survive and gain 
economic and technological power to confront China in the context of geopolitics in the 
Cold War. Therefore, in the case of transportation systems, Taiwan did not only want a 
railway or any particular transportation system but the ability to generate necessary 
knowledge for developing its transportation systems in the future. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the transportation projects like the subterranean railways in Taipei and the Taipei 
Metro were being planned and designed, Taiwanese technical officials and political 
leaders still held the same motivation of gaining technological power leading to 
technology transfer in these projects.

	 Hence, the Taiwanese technical officials did not merely try to build a metro system 
and a subterranean railway for Taipei; their efforts were a part of nation-building. Besides 
the technical officials’ motivation and approach to building the profession and ability to 
generate knowledge, three facts show that building mass transportation systems can be 
regarded as part of the nation-building of Taiwan. Firstly, from the TPB to the Taipei Metro, 
all projects were initiated from the central government, although the Taipei Metro was 
completed and operated by the hand of the Taipei City Government. Secondly, the 
Taiwanese technical officials and political leaders vehemently maintained the Taiwanese 
government’s autonomy, although they were involved in the coproduction of American 
hegemony in the early stage, and they compromised due to political pressure many times. 
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Finally, after the Taipei Metro was open to the public, the TRTC and its passengers have 
meticulously shaped the space and culture of the Taipei Metro regarding it and other 
metro systems in Taiwan as a national pride to show Taiwan’s unique goodness.

	 As the introduction of this dissertation argues, the Taipei Metro and the project of 
subterranean railways in Taipei were national projects instead of municipal projects. All 
the projects were initiated by the central government in the scope of national 
development rather than merely solving one city’s problems. Moreover, many critical 
decisions were made by the top level of the KMT government like Chiang Kai-shek, 
Chiang Ching-kuo, and Yu Kuo-hwa which shows that building mass transportation 
systems in Taiwan was a national affair. Also, Taipei is the main stage of this history, and 
because it is the capital city of the island state it involves many Taiwanese out of Taipei. 
The Taipei metropolitan already engages a third of the population in Taiwan, and 
Taiwanese living in other areas have a high possibility to visit Taipei because it is the 
capital. Hence, the transportation system projects are inherently national.

	 The technical officials, engineers, and political leaders’ actions of maintaining 
Taiwan’s autonomy toward technologically advanced countries, including the U.S., 
Germany, Britain, and France, also generated the sovereignty of Taiwan. Chang’s 
dissertation about the construction of the THSR shows how engineering practice formed 
a national and engineering identity and subjectivity . This dissertation further reveals 520
that identity and autonomy were generated and maintained in an earlier stage of building 
rail transportation system: knowledge-making. Furthermore, the history of the Taipei 
Metro just shows how vague the boundary is between political or technical decisions. 
Although one of the most important political issues for Taiwanese is to describe the 
differences between them and Chinese, the history of rail transportation technology in 
Taiwan shows that Taiwanese officials also generated Taiwan’s autonomy by 
distinguishing themselves from the U.S. and other technologically advanced countries. 
Indeed, one of the nation-state’s characteristics is to show the differences from all 
countries except itself. Frankly, this dissertation is not to argue that all Taiwanese 
technical officials or Chiang Ching-kuo were Taiwanese nationalists. In fact, many 
technical officials even held strong Chinese national identity (do not forget the meaning of 
the KMT is “Chinese Nationalist Party) or had little interest in national identity. 
Nonetheless, their positions, decisions, and actions of building the systems involved the 
 Chang, “Technological Construction.”520
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making of the nation-state named Taiwan or the Republic of China no matter what kinds 
of national identity they held. 

	 In this sense, this dissertation may inspire a different approach to the studies of 
nationalism. What role do material and institutional factors play in the formation of a 
nation-state? Besides technological nationalists, we can find an alternative viewpoint 
when we try to understand the relationship between technology and nationalism though 
this dissertation only touches a little on this issue.

	 Finally, after the mid-1990s, the growing Taiwanese national identity has been 
eager to show the island nation’s uniqueness even though Taiwan has been excluded 
from mainstream international society for decades. Hence, the stunning metro systems 
became the technological sublime to exhibit Taiwan's exceptional quality as a nation-state 
in the world. This dissertation points out that operation, maintenance, and passengers’ 
behaviors and understandings are also critical parts of the building and shaping of 
technological systems. Taiwanese built the profession to generate knowledge about their 
city and people. With international consultants’ assistance, they integrated technological 
and political ideas about rail transportation designing their railways and stations and 
making them stunning. Finally, they shape the metro culture and space by disciplining 
their bodies and equipping considerateness as a part of Formosa's technological sublime 
so that they can declare they have as much national pride as any other country in the 
world. By building the systems, the Taiwanese are building the island nation. 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Appendix A 
People and Places 

	 This dissertation mentions many Taiwanese, Chinese, and Japanese, and 
Taiwanese cities, administrative districts, and sites are also points for the discussion. 
However, the formation of the English spelling of the names of the people and places in 
Taiwan is quite complicated because of Taiwan’s political and historical development. 
Therefore, this article explains how the English spelling of the names of people and places 
come in this dissertation. 

People 
	 In this dissertation, when I mention a Taiwanese, Chinese, or Japanese, I follow the 
order that surname comes first, and the first name follows. This order is how East Asian 
countries call their people. Moreover, some Taiwanese and Chinese are customarily called 
with this order, such as Chiang Kai-shek, but some others were not. I think it might 
confuse. To avoid confusion, I use the name order with East Asian customs when I 
mention the names of Taiwanese, Chinese, and Japanese. For example, Chiang Chin-kuo 
(蔣經國) and Shima Hideo (島 秀雄). 

	 Furthermore, when this dissertation mentions these people’s surnames, I add their 
title in front of the surnames because different Chinese or Japanese surnames may use 
the same English spelling. For example, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣中正) and Dr. Chiang Yu-
sheng’s (姜渝⽣) English spelling of their surnames are the same, but they have different 
surnames “蔣“ and “姜.“ In order to avoid confusion, the dissertation uses Dr. Chiang 
when it only mentions Dr. Chiang Yu-sheng's surname. Other examples are Professor 
Yeh, General Tung, commissioner Chi, and counselor Fu.

	 Some technical officials have specific English names or like to use the acronyms of 
their first name as an English name since many of them had a tight connection with 
foreigners, and people customarily use these names to call them. For the former, Paul Lai 
(賴世聲) and David Poo (濮⼤威) are the examples; for the later, K.T. Li (李國鼎) and C. C. 
Wang (王章清) are the cases.

	 Taiwanese use multiple spelling systems to compose the English spelling of their 
names, and some of them would even use two systems at the same time due to their 
identity. All of the people mentioned in this dissertation were born before the 1970s, and 
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before the 1990s, most Taiwanese would use the Wade–Giles system to compose the 
English spelling of their name. Therefore, most of the names of Taiwanese mentioned in 
this dissertation would follow the Wade-Giles system. Nonetheless, there are many 
exceptions. Some people’s names already have their conventional spelling, like Chiang 
Kai-shek. Some people use the spelling from multiple systems, such as Lee Teng-hui (李
登輝) and Chen Shui-bian (陳⽔扁). There are also cases that they have exact English 
names, like David Poo, Paul Lai, and Morris Chang (張忠謀). Lim Giong (林強) is a special 
case since he uses his name’s Taiwanese pronunciation instead of Chinese one to form 
his English name. Moreover, Taiwanese’s names all have a hyphen between the two 




	 Like people’s names, the English spelling of Taiwanese places’ names can come 
from multiple spelling systems, but no rule can determine which places use the Wade-
Giles system, the Hanyu Pinyin system, or the Tongyong Pinyin system. Therefore, I take 
the following policies to determine to use which version of English spelling of the name of 
places. 

	 For cities and administrative districts, this dissertation follows the local 
government’s decisions. Some of these places have unique ways to compose their 
English names. Tamsui (淡⽔) is a typical case. This romanization name was used 
customarily for centuries. Therefore, when the dissertation mentions the railway or metro 
lines, river, and station named after this old town, it would use "Tamsui." For instance, the 
Tamsui River, the Tamsui Station, and the TRA Tamsui Line. New Taipei City (新北市) is 
another particular case. According to the Hanyu Pinyin system, this city was supposed to 
be “Xinbei City” when it was reformed from Taipei County as the special municipality in 
2010, but, after a toll, the citizens prefer to translate the city’s name by meaning rather 
than the pronunciation. 

	 For the stations and lines in the railway and metro systems, this dissertation 
follows the TRA (Taiwan Railway Administration), Taipei Metro, and KRTS’ (Kaohsiung 
Rapid Transit System) English websites even though some of the lines’ English names 
have different meanings from its Chinese names. For instance, the West Coast Line (縱貫
線). The names of the lines in the Taipei Metro need to be explained. Although Taiwanese 
are used to use names of places to refer the metro lines, such as Tamsui-Xinyi Line (Red 
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Line; 淡⽔信義線), this way would be wordy and hard to read for English readers. 
Especially in the case of the Blue Line and the Brown Line, Taiwanese would call them 
“Bannan Line (板南線)” and "Wenhu Line" meaning from Banqiao (板橋) to Nangang (南
港), and from Wenshen District (⽂⼭區) to Neihu District (內湖區), easily causing 
misunderstanding. Hence, this dissertation uses representative colors to refer to the 
metro lines. 

	 Finally, Taiwan has had many times of reformations of administrative districts in the 
half of a century, so many administrative districts would thus have different names from 
time to time. For example, Tamsui was once “Tamsui Township” but now “Tamsui 
District.” Hence, except for those cities which have never changed their names, such as 
Taipei City, Taichung City, and Kaohsiung City, this dissertation would drop the 
administrative districts after the names of places to avoid confusion. For instance, this 
dissertation would only mention “Tamsui” instead of “Tamsui Township” or “Tamsui 
District.” New Taipei City/Taipei County would be a special case. New Taipei City/Taipei 
County and Taipei City refer to two different areas. To avoid misunderstanding with Taipei 
City, when the dissertation mentions New Taipei City/Taipei County, it would always come 
with its full name. 

	 For reference, the following chart is the translation of the classification of the 
administrative districts in Taiwan.

Districts Chinese Example
City 市（直轄市、省轄市、縣轄市） Taipei City
County 縣 Taipei County
Township 鄉、鎮、市 Tamsui Township





	 I held ten interviews with the retired technical officials, metro engineers, operators 
of the metro system, suppliers of the Taipei Metro, and international consultants. The 
interviews were held during March and July 2019, and all of them have audio records. 
Because this research is under IRB’s protocol, all interviewees are anonymous, and the 







TP01 DORTS, TRTC March 31, 2019 14:20-16:20 The Daan Park Station, Taipei Metro, 
Taipei City, Taiwan.
TP02 DORTS April 17, 2019 14:30-18:00 The Taipei Main Station, Taipei City, 
Taiwan.
TP03 DORTS April 18, 2019 14:00-16:00 A Coffee shop in Taipei City, Taiwan.
TP04 International 
Consultants
April 26, 2019 16:00-18:00 The interviewee’s office in Taipei City, 
Taiwan.
TP05 TPB, DORTS April 30, 2019 14:00-17:00 The interviewees’s apartment in New 
Taipei City, Taiwan.
TP06 DORTS May 30, 2019 15:30-17:30 The interviewees’s apartment in Taipei 
City, Taiwan.
TP07 DORTS June 20, 2019 10:00-12:00 The interviewee’s office in Taipei City, 
Taiwan.
TP08 TPB, DORTS, 
RRB
July 3, 2019 09:30-12:00 The Taipei Main Station, Taipei City, 
Taiwan.
TP09 Contractors July 11, 2019 11:00-15:00 The interviewees’s apartment in New 
Taipei City, Taiwan.






	 The historical works in this dissertation rely on the archives in the National Archives 
in Xinzhuang District, New Taipei City, and the archives of the Institute of Modern  History, 
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0064/210/002/1/010 National Archives 國家檔
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0067/A-1.1.2/01 National Archives 國家檔
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The Plan for Improving 
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or Elevated Railway in 







36-10-001-070 Academia Sinica 
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36-10-001-071 Academia Sinica 
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